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Executive Department, April 4, 1862.
To W. A. Harris, Esq., Columbia, S. C. :

My Dear Sir : In conformity with your request, I have compared the proof sheets you sent me in relation to Fort Sumter, with the original docu- ments on file in this office, and take pleasure in stating that they are, in every respect, true and correct copies of the originals.

Early on the morning of the 27th of December, 1860, the smoking ruins of Fort Moultrie, and the evident activity pervading Fort Sumter, gave evidence of the fact that Fort Moultrie had been deserted by the United States garrison, and that they had taken possession of Fort Sumter, as the key of the harbor of Charleston. The prompt orders instantly issued by Governor Pickens, that the South Carolina troops should take possession of Castle Pinckney and Fort Moultrie on the same day — the immediate capture of these forts in obedience to said orders — the hauling down of the stars and stripes for the first time in the history of our country — the running up in their stead of the Palmetto banner — and the State of South Carolina thus defying the power of the United States — was the actual commencement of this great revolution.

After these important movements, the approach of the "Star of the West" and her prompt repulse, and the attack on Fort Sumter by the South Carolina troops, are among the most interesting events of the commencement of this struggle. It certainly required the highest courage and the purest patriotism to take these prom])t and defiant steps, for our Governor was opposed in them by many around him, but his large experience enabled him to foresee the mighty consequences which would follow his action on these points. He well knew, too, that in thus taking the first steps to establish South Carolina as a free and independent State, he had severed forever the bonds of this stupendous republic. In sovereign convention assembled, the people of South Carolina had calmly and deliberately resolved to sever their connection with the United States Government, a portion of which Government, while professing to hold together the States which formed it in lasting bonds of amity and concord, was attempting to raise to the presidential chair the champion of a party which held as its watchword the extinction of the dearest institution of the Southern States. The flight of events, from the adoption of the Ordinance of Secession by the people of South Carolina, to the period of the inauguration of the Southern Confederacy, might be, perhaps, too rapid and startling to be recorded in future history, were not a just and true record of those events kept as they occurred. The object of this pamphlet is to preserve for the coming historian a verified record of the action of the people of South Carolina in relation to Fort Sumter, from the time when she declared herself a free and independent State, up to the reduction of the proud fortress which frowned upon her in the harbor of Charleston, The action of our State in firing upon the " Star of the West" was an event fully equal, in boldness and decision, to the resistance of Fort Moultrie, in the days of our first revolution. By the order of our firm and patriotic Governor, a hostile vessel, bearing supplies and armed troops to the fortress of the United States in the harbor of Charleston, was fired into and driven back, and was made to bear the message to an enemy's government, that the voice of the people of South Carolina was not to be looked upon as an empty paper ordinance, but was to be baptized in fire, and christened, if needs be, in a sea of blood.

On the 12th of April, 1861, the first gun of the Southern Confederacy against the United States was heard booming across the water, and on the 13th of April of the same year, the forces of South Carolina took possession of Fort Sumter. By the firing into the "Star of the West," the State of South Carolina commenced the revolution ; by the reduction of Fort Sumter, her people again recorded their verdict of independence ; and in the war thus brought on. South Carolina is acting a noble and a gallant part.

These pages form the record of these important events, and this pamphlet is commended to the people of South Carolina, as a lasting memento of their gallant action. Many histories will hereafter be written. May the bravery of the South Carolinians in commencing the struggle augment in proportion to the continuance of the war, and may her people never have cause to weary of the Government which they alone inaugurated.

The war is not yet over; around the boundaries of our sister States as well as our own, it is still raging, with ever increasing bitterness. Let us not forget that the day is not yet come for us to lay aside our armor, but remembering that the favor of Heaven is ever with the right, let us gain new strength from every defeat, let us gather new energy from every victory.

			Page.
No.	1.	Letter from Governor Pickens to President Buchanan, demanding Fort Sumter	7
	2.	Major Hamilton's explanation as to its delivery and withdrawal	8
	3.	Colonel Trescott's explanation as to the same	9
	4.	Gen. Cushing's mission, with letter from President Buchanan to Governor Pickens	11
	5.	Orders from Governor Pickens to Col. Pettigrew to take Fort Moultrie, &c	12
	6.	General Orders from Governor Pickens to Maj. Gen. Schnierle	12
	7.	Orders to Maj. Gen. Schnierle to take command in person	14
	8.	Gen. Simons' Report upon the said Orders	14
	9.	Governor Pickens' Reply to Gen. Simons' Report	17
	10.	Order to Gen. Simons to take command in person	19
	11.	Reference of Gen. Simons' Report by Governor Pickens to Messrs. Jones and Drayton, and their agreement therein	20
	12.	Governor Pickens' endorsement on the same	20
	13.	Governor Pickens' order to Messrs. Trapier, Gwynn and others, to report a plan to reduce Fort Sumter	21
	14.	Report of plan, in obedience to above order	21
	15.	Account of the firing into the "Star of the West"	23
	16.	Note from Major Anderson to Governor Pickens, demanding apology, and threat	24
	17.	Governor Pickens' Reply, avowing the act	25
	18.	Major Anderson's Note to Governor Pickens, expressing desire to refer the matter to his Government at Washington.	27
	19.	Governor Pickens' Communication to Major Anderson, through Messrs. Magrath and Jamison, demanding the delivery of Fort Sumter	28
	20.	Major Anderson's Reply, refusing to comply with demand	28
	21.	Communication from Governor Pickens to President Buchanan by Hon. I. W. Hayne	29
	22.	Instructions to lion. I. W. Hayne from State Department	30
	23.	Letter from Senators of Seceding States to Hon. I. W. Hayne	32
	24.	Mr. Hayne in reply thereto	34
	25.	Extract from Message of Governor Pickens to the Legislature of South Carolina, in reference to the missions of Messrs. Fox and Lamon	35
	26.	Notice from President Lincoln to Governor Pickens, by Mr. Chew, of his intention to supply Fort Sumter	36
	27.	Endorsement thereon by Gov. Pickens and Gen. Beauregard.	36
	28.	Letter from Major Anderson to Adjutant General Thomas, of the U. S. Army	37
	29.	Secret Cabinet History in reference to Fort Sumter	38
	30.	Governor Pickens' Speech to the Citizens of Charleston, the night after the reduction of Fort Sumter	44

My Dear Sir : With a sincere desire to prevent a collision of force, I have thought proper to address you directly and truthfully on points of deep and immediate interest.

I am authentically informed that the forts in Charleston harbor are now being thoroughly prepared to turn, with effect, their guns upon the interior and the city. Jurisdiction was ceded by this State expressly for the purpose of external defence from foreign invasion, and not with any view that they should be turned upon the State.

In an ordinary case of mob rebellion, perhaps it might be proper to prepare them for sudden outbreak. But when the people of the State, in sovereign convention assembled, determine to resume their original powers of separate and independent sovereignty, the whole question is changed, and it is no longer an act of rebellion. I, therefore, most respectfully urge that all work on the forts be put a stop to for the present, and that no more force may be ordered there.

The regular Convention of the people of the State of South Carolina, legally and properly called, under our Constitution, is now in session, deliberating upon the gravest and most momentous questions, and the excitement of the great masses of the people is great, under a sense of deep wrongs, and a profound necessity of doing something to preserve the peace and safety of the State.

To spare the effusion of blood, which no human power may be able to prevent, I earnestly beg your immediate consideration of all the points I call your attention to. It is not improbable that, under orders from the Commandant, or perhaps from the Commander-in-Chief, of the army, the alteration and defences of those posts are progressing without the knowledge of yourself or the Secretary of War.

The Arsenal, in the city of Charleston, with the public arms, I am informed, was turned over, very properly, to the keeping and defence of a State force, at the urgent request of the Governor of South Carolina. I would most respectfully, and from a sincere devotion to the public peace, request that you would allow me to send a small force, not exceeding twenty-five men and an officer, to take possession of Fort Sumter immediately, in order to give a feeling of safety to the community. There are no United States troops in that fort whatever, or perhaps only four or five, at present, besides some additional workmen or laborers, lately employed to put the guns in order. If Fort Sumter could be given to me as Governor, under a permission similar to that by which the Governor was permitted to keep the Arsenal, with the United States arms, in the city of Charleston, then I think the public mind would be quieted, under a feeling of safety ; and as the Convention is now in full authority, it strikes me that it could be done with perfect propriety. I need not go into particulars, for urgent reasons will force themselves readily upon your consideration.

If something of the kind be not done, I cannot answer for the consequences.

I send this by a private and confidential gentleman, who is authorized to confer with Mr. Trescott fully, and to receive through him any answer you may think proper to give to this.

To THE President op the United States.






To His Excellency Governor Pickens:

Sir : In accordance with the request I have just received from you, to furnish you with a statement of my mission to President Buchanan, of the United States of America, bearing your letter of the 17th December, 1860, demanding that Fort Sumter should be delivered into the hands of the Executive of the State of South Carolina, I proceed to state that, in accordance with your instructions, I proceeded to Washington with the utmost haste, and on Thursday, the 20th December, 1860, sought and procured a private interview with President Buchanan, through the aid of Mr. Wm. Henry Trescott, Assistant Secretary of State of the United States. The letter was read by President Buchanan in my presence, and to my request that an answer was desired at the earliest possible moment, he replied that an answer should be furnished on Friday, the 21st December, 1860. In the interim, however, Messrs. Bonham, McQueen and Trescott, without my knowledge or consent, telegraphed your Excellency to withdraw your letter to the President of the United States of America, demanding possession of Fort Sumter. Nor was it until after your answer to the telegram of these gentlemen, consenting to the withdrawal of the said letter, that I was informed such a telegram had been sent to your Excellency. The reason then assigned to me for such a course was, that the delegation from South Carolina had pledged themselves for South Carolina, that if the status of the forts within the harbor of Charleston was not changed, South Carolina would make no attempt to take possession of any of the said forts. My mission being thus terminated, I received the letter and restored it to your Excellency's possession,

To His Excellency F. W. Pickens,

Sir : Your confidential letter to the President was duly delivered to him yesterday by D. H. Hamilton, Esq., according to your instructions. It was withdrawn (no copy having been taken) this morning by me, under the authority of your telegraphic dispatch. Its withdrawal was most opportune. It reached here under circumstances which you could, not have anticipated, and it produced the following effect upon the President :

He had removed Col. Gardiner from command at Fort Moultrie, for carrying ammunition from the Arsenal at Charleston; he had refused to send reinforcements to the garrison there; he had accepted the resignation of the oldest, most eminent and highest member of his Cabinet, rather than con- sent to send additional force, and the night before your letter arrived, upon a telegraphic communication that arms had been removed from the Arsenal to Fort Moultrie, the Department of War had issued prompt orders, by telegraph, to the officer removing them, to restore them immediately. He had done this upon his determination to avoid all risk of collision, and upon the written assurance of the majority of the Congressional Delegation from the State that they did not believe there was any danger of an attack upon the forts before the passage of the Ordinance, and an expression of their trust and hope that there would be none after, until the State had sent Commissioners here. His course had been violently denounced by the Northern press, and an effort was being made to institute a Congressional investigation. At that moment he could not have gone to the extent of action you desired, and I felt confident that if forced to answer your letter then, he would have taken such ground as would have prevented his even approaching it hereafter, a possibility not at all improbable, and which ought to be kept open. I considered, also, that the chance of public investigation rendered the utmost caution necessary as to any communications from the State, and having presented the letter, and ascertained what the nature of the reply would be, you had all the advantage of knowing the truth, without the disadvantage of having it put on record. Besides this, the President seemed to think that your request was based upon the impossibility of your restraining the spirit of our people ; an interpretation which did you injustice, and the possibility of which I deemed it due to you to avoid. He also appeared to labor under the impression that the representations of the members of Congress and your own differed essentially, and this, I thought, on account of both, should not be stated in any reply to you. I was also perfectly satisfied that the status of the garrisons would not be disturbed.

Under these circumstances, if I had been acting under formal credentials from you, and the letter had been unsealed, I would have delayed its presentation for some hours, until I could have telegraphed you, but that was impossible. As Mr. Hamilton, therefore, had brought with him General McQueen and General Bonham, when he called upon me and delivered the letter, and had even gone so far as to express the wish that they should be present when he delivered it to the President, a proposition which they declined, however, I deemed it not indiscreet nor in violation of the discretionary confidence which your letter implied, to take their counsel. We agreed perfectly, and the result was the telegraphic dispatch of last night. The withdrawal of the letter was a great relief to the President, who is most earnestly anxious to avoid an issue with the State or its authorities, and I think, has encouraged his disposition to go as far as he can in this matter, and to treat those who may represent the State with perfect frankness.

I have had, this morning, an interview with Gov. Floyd, the Secretary of War. No order has been issued that will at all disturb the present condition of the garrisons, and while I cannot even here venture into details, which are too confidential to be risked in any way, I am prepared to say, with a full sense of the responsibility, that nothing will be done which will either do you injury or properly create alarm. Of course, when your Com- missioners have succeeded or failed to effect their negotiations, the whole issue is fairly before you, to be met as courage, honor and wisdom may direct.

My delay in answering your telegraph concerning Col. Huger, was caused by his absence from this place. He came, in reply to my telegraph, last night, and this morning I telegraphed you his decision, which I presume he has explained by a letter of this same date. As Dr. Hamilton leaves this evening, I have only time to write this hurried letter, and am, sir,

I enclose your confidential letter in this.

My Dear Sir : From common notoriety, I assume the fact that the State of South Carolina is now deliberating on the question of seceding from the Union. Whilst any hope remains that this may be prevented, or even retarded, so long as to allow the people of her sister States an opportunity to manifest their opinion upon the causes which have led to this proceeding, it is my duty to exert all the means in my power to avert so dread a catastrophe. I have, therefore, deemed it advisable to send to you the Hon. Caleb Cushing, in whose integrity, ability and prudence I have full confidence, to hold communications with you on my behalf, for the purpose of changing or modifying the contemplated action of the State in the manner I have already suggested.

Commending Mr. Gushing to your kind attention, for his own sake as well as that of the cause, I remain,

His Excellency Francis W. Pickens.



Colonel Pettigrew :

Sir : You are hereby ordered to assemble the "Washington Light Infantry and the Meagher Guards at the Citadel. Arm them there, and then take measures for occupying Castle Pinckney.

To Colonel Pettigrew :

Sir : Keep the strictest discipline possible — no entrance to the fort to be allowed, except with your permission. All the heavy g^uns towards Fort Sumter to be put in the best condition, with full supply of ammunition — the fort to be defended to the last extremity. I sent an order to render an inventory, and also orders to practice the men with the heavy guns.

To Major General Schnierle :

Sir : A detachment of infantry, and twenty men from an artillery company, under Capt. King — all under command of Col. Pettigrew — are now in occupation of Castle Pinckney. They are ordered to defend it to the last extremity from any force, to keep up the strictest discipline, and to go on and put the fortress in the best condition for immediate defence. Lieuts. Gibbes and Reynolds, from West Point Academy, have resigned, and are also in Castle Pinckney, with orders to instruct the men in daily use of the large guns.

Lieut. Col. DeSaussure, with a detachment of one hundred and seventy men from an artillery regiment, and thirty men from Col. Pettigrew's rifle regiment, is in command of Fort Moultrie, with similar orders to those given the commandant at Castle Pinckney. Col. Gwynn, with Mr. Ramsay and Col. Calhoun as assistants, are also in Fort Moultrie as engineers, with orders to raise immediately merlins and other works to protect some five of the heavy guns that command Maffitt's Channel from the fire of Fort Sumter if possible, and to urge this work forward as rapidly as possible. Temporary bridges and boats, under the direction of Col. Hatch, Quartermaster General, are put across the creek back of Sullivan's Island, that connect it with the main land, so as, in any great emergency, the force under Col. DeSaussure shall secure a retreat. If pressed too hard by the guns of Fort Sumter, they are directed to retire, but occupy the Island as long as possible in any event.

A point for a battery has been selected by Col. Gwynn and Col. Manigault on Sullivan's Island, beyond Fort Moultrie, and out of the range of guns from Fort Sumter, and as soon as possible heavy columbiads are to be placed there, in order to endeavor to guard the harbor, and to prevent reinforcements to the garrison in Fort Sumter. A point has also been selected on Morris' Island, beyond the guns of Fort Sumter, by the same officers, and a battery is ordered there ; and Major Stevens, of the Citadel Academy, with a detachment of forty Cadets, is ordered there now, to urge the erection of the battery forward as fa.st as possible. A detachment or company of rifles, under Capt. Tupper, will be ordered there to-day, to assist in the same work, and also to defend it, if a force should be landed to take it. At present, two twenty-four pounders are sent there, with the intention to increase and strengthen them as soon as heavy guns can be got ready and mounted.

Capt. Johnson, with a detachment of fifty men, is now in possession of Fort Johnson, with orders to prevent any communication from Fort Sumter, and cut off supplies. The orders given you have been to prevent all communication with Charleston, also from Fort Sumter, except to allow the officers at the fortress to have their mails, but nothing else.

You will put yourself in communication, if necessary, with Quartermaster General Hatch and Commissary General Walker to assist you in anything in their departments, and also, with Col. Manigault, Ordnance officer, with rank of Colonel of Artillery. These are the general outlines of what I have heretofore ordered and directed in the confusion of extraordinary and exciting events, before I had time to consult fully as to details, and when I was comparatively unacquainted with individual officers and with details.

You are now ordered to see and attend particularly to the objects and the different commands I have detailed to you above, and for this purpose you are directed to call into requisition and council the valuable aid and cooperation of Brigadier Greneral Simons.

The officers in command at the different posts will be ordered to report daily through General Simons and yourself to headquarters.

Col. Cuuingham is also in command and possession of the United States Arsenal in this city, with all the arms, &c., and is ordered to make a strict and detailed inventory of everything in it.

To Major General Schnierle :

Sir : You are ordered to proceed immediately to Fort Moultrie and take charge, in person, of the troops there, as well as at Morris' Island, Castle Pinckney and Fort Johnson, and defend those positions to the best of your ability, under all the circumstances of the case, according to the general orders issued to you yesterday morning; and for this purpose you are especially urged to call to your aid and immediate appointment all the ablest military ability in your reach. Lieutenant Colonel DeSaussure having expressly requested to be relieved from his command to attend to his duties as a member of the Legislature, his request is hereby granted.

Governor : I have carefully considered the orders extended to me by the Major General, which emanated from your Headquarters yesterday, and the plan of military operations and line of defence therein set forth. I cannot sacrifice to matter of etiquette, questions and issues of such momentous importance as now surround us. I feel it to be my duty to report to you my opinion of the military movements which have been initiated.

First. — The line of operations embraces four points :

1. Fort Moultrie.
2. Castle Pinckney.
3. Fort Johnson.
4. Morris' Island.

By the map which accompanies these papers, it will appear that your lines of communication with these, as at present established, are directly within the range and effective power of Fort Sumter — the citadel of the harbor — controlling every point. At the first return fire from Fort Sumter, your lines of communication are utterly cut off with every single post, except, perhaps, Castle Pinckney. Let me simply observe, that you are indebted to the forbearance of the enemy for the liberty of transporting the reinforcements and supplies, which you ordered at midnight, and which are to be sent this day, at two o'clock, to your battery, now in course of erection on Morris' Island. A single gun from Fort Sumter would sink your transport, and destroy your troops and supplies. These lines of communication are the prime consideration of a General. It is vain to say others will be adopted. It is enough that they do not exist now ; and, when the present resources fail, your troops will be wholly isolated, and cut off" from each other and the main.

Second. — Fort Moultrie.

This post is wholly untenable. Lieutenant Colonel DeSaussure, a brave officer, gave you prompt notice of this fact on the morning after his occupation. His report, this morning, shows you the irrefragable proof of his first report, after nearly a week's occupation of the post. Moreover, he asks for supplies, which he applied to you for on the 30th ultimo. He urges me to supply these wants at the earliest practicable moment. Suppose he has them, however, there is probably not a single man out of the whole force which he carried down, who ever loaded a siege gun, or, perhaps, ever handled a single gun of heavy calibre, munition or implement, mentioned in the report. I know, and state as a fact, that there is no ordnance force in his whole command. His post must, even under the most favorable circumstances, fall to the enemy, after a very short and bloody contest.

Suppose they evacuate the post, where will they entrench themselves? Shall they resort to the sandhills? If the enemy be reinforced by two hundred and fifty United States artillery, as is reported, he can land two hundred men under the guns of Fort Moultrie, and attack Lieutenant Colonel DeSaussure's command — an unequal contest between disciplined veteran troops, commanded by educated and experienced ofl&cers, and raw militia, who never saw battle.

In the event of discomfiture to these brave young men, how can they make good their retreat from these sandhills? Will it be said, there will be a causeway to the mainland, or other communication? The answer is : The communication does not exist now, and the issue will be upon us in less than thirty hours.

Third. — Fort Johnson.

This post is garrisoned by Light Infantry, or rifles, who never handled a heavy gun, if there be such a gun or any munitions in the dilapidated post they now occupy. At any rate, a few shells from the enemy at Fort Sumter will compel them to retire from their position.

Fourth. — Morris' Island Battery.

Suppose it completed, which it is not, nor will be in thirty hours. The armament is three twenty-four pounders. The force is the corps of Cadets from the Citadel, and a corps of rifles; and these, to be reinforced by two more corps of rifles, not one man of whom, probably, ever saw a twenty-four pounder manipulated or fired.

When the Harriet Lane approaches, bows on, the Battery may fire a shot or two — never having been tried, the powder, the gun or the range — it is not even problematical whether they will strike the enemy. She will steam by, at fourteen knots per hour, and in fifteen minutes the reinforcements will be landed under the cannon of Fort Sumter.

Why, then, all this preparation and expense, if the work cannot but terminate in disastrous failure?

Suppose, however, the enemy be reinforced, and not fire a gun in reply to the Morris' Island Battery? He can demolish our other posts when he pleases, from one of the most impregnable fortresses in the world, and so our posts live at his will, and remain in our possession at his sufferance.

Suppose, however, we succeed in preventing reinforcements from entering our harbor? This will not prevent the United States Government from enforcing their revenue, for this can be done outside the Bar by a war steamer, as well as inside by the Harriet Lane.

Suppose, however, all your plans succeed, and Fort Sumter were in our possession, how would we raise the blockade of the war steamers outside?

If the Harriet Lane is not fired into, the preparations are unnecessary; and if she is fired into, we have commenced open war.

I ask your perusal of the report of Colonel Gwynn, to me, this morning. I have no transport at hand to send him, and have so notified him.

I feel it to be my duty, under all the circumstances above mentioned, to express my conviction of the inexpediency of commencing actual hostilities on our side, in our present wholly unprepared state, with raw, undisciplined troops, without equipments, munitions or proper arms required to work armaments that need the highest skill and training — nothing but bloody discomfiture must attend the opening campaign.

You will now require me, after this review, to offer a better plan.

Deferentially, and with great diffidence, I recommend that a skilled and educated military man be selected for Major General in Chief, to command all the troops, and that he should establish a plan of operations. Meanwhile, I would recommend that amplification of the Ordnance and Engineer Departments be ordered, and a more effective organization of the Commissariat and Quartermaster's Departments.

With great respect, I pray your Excellency, at this moment of great peril, to take into consideration what has been herein submitted, and to lay the matter speedily before a Council of War, in accordance with the custom of armies engaged in active operations.

To His Excellency Governor Pickens,



To Brigadier General Simeons :

Sir : Your extraordinary report I received last night, and have only to say that I do not pretend that the orders and disposition of forces in Charleston harbor are at all perfect, or beyond the criticism of military rule. But, in the first place, there was, when I came to the city, a distinct pledge of faith, between the Government at Washington and those who had a right to speak for South Carolina, that everything in the harbor, and all the forts, should remain precisely as they then were, and that there should be no increase of force, or any reinforcements sent from abroad, until our Commissioners presented themselves at Washington, and made regular negotiation for the forts. I acted with confidence upon this pledge. Suddenly we were surprised, from the step taken by Major Anderson, now acknowledged and proclaimed by the late Secretary of War to be in open violation of the faith of the Government. He abandoned Fort Moultrie, and burnt and spiked the guns, and the first report was that he destroyed Fort Moultrie. He transferred the garrison to Fort Sumter, which, of course, was the strong and commanding position. I had thus suddenly to take immediate steps to try and prevent the further destruction of public property ; and with this view, I ordered the occupation of Sullivan's Island, but not to occupy Fort Moultrie, unless it could be done without too much loss, and to reconnoitre and ascertain if there were mines, as reported. They found none ; and to put out the fire and prevent further destruction, they occupied the fort. And the same grounds were taken as to Castle Pinckney.

All the orders issued expressed the objects as above. Then the first step taken was to try and prevent reinforcements to Fort Sumter. With that view, orders were given to Colonel Gwynn, the most experienced Engineer I could find on the sudden emergency, and to Colonel Manigault, of the Ordnance Board, to examine and report if a place on Morris' Island could be selected to erect a battery, out of the reach of Fort Sumter, or protected from its guns. They reported such a point, and I immediately, with the limited means in my possession, ordered that one should be erected, in order to try and protect the Ship Channel, so as to prevent reinforcements. This was the object of the battery, then recommended by the most skillful men I could, in the confusion, procure. Orders were also issued to throw up merlons at Fort Moultrie, and other works, in order to try and protect, for the present, some of the guns that bear on the Ship Channel from being silenced from Sumter.

Colonel Gwynn, Engineer, and Colonel Manigault, Ordnance officer, again reported it a feasible measure, and every effort has been made to erect those works, and to endeavor to keep guns in position at Fort Moultrie to protect the channel, and, if possible, prevent the reinforcements. Our Commissioners at Washington telegraphed by all means to guard and protect the channel and entrance at all hazards. Castle Pinckney was kept with a view, if possible, to protect the immediate vicinity of Charleston, and everything in my power was used to put the guns in some sort of position for that purpose. Colonel Manigault reported a proper place to connect Sullivan's Island with the main land, by the erection of boats as temporary bridges, so as to provide for the safety of the troops at Fort Moultrie, if compelled, by superior force, to retire.

Fort Johnson was occupied merely because it was reported that there was public property there that required immediate protection, and in order to prevent the garrison in Fort Sumter from all communication, for the present, with that point, as they were taking coal and so forth from it.

It was well known, and sadly felt, as you state, that our troops were raw and inexperienced ; but, under all the circumstances, I had no alternative left but to do what has been done. And if we are to occupy no place, because our troops are raw and inexperienced, then we will have to abandon the State, for the same reason, if forces that are regular arc ordered to invade it. We calculated that if we were weak, so were our enemies, to a certain extent. Their regular force is not strong enough to admit of immediate division or transfer. They would be compelled to call for volunteers, also, in the progress of events, and, with the feeling in the country, there would be great difficulty in this operation. The question was, not whether we could maintain our position in Charleston harbor, with the certainty of assistance and reinforcements being thrown in immediately, but whether, in the present peculiar state of the country, and with a weak garrison as to numbers, who arc incapable of being divided, or any detachment being sent out from it to occupy any post their guns might drive us from — whether, under all these circumstances, we were capable of maintaining our position for the present, so as to prevent reinforcements, and to sustain the direct and urgent request from our Commissioners at Washington, hoping that every day might change events, so as to enable us to protect the State in the attitude she has assumed, of immediate independence. Colonel Pettigrew thinks if I had not occupied Castle Pinckney when I did, that it, too, in like manner, would have been destroyed, as Fort Moultrie, so far as the guns, and so forth, were concerned.

Headquarters, Charleston, S. C, January 2d, 1861. To Brigadier General Simons :

Sir : In consequence of the sudden illness of General Schnierle, you are ordered to proceed to Fort Moultrie immediately and take charge, in person, of the troops there, as well as at Morris' Island and Castle Pinckney, and Fort Johnson, and defend those positions to the best of your ability under all the circumstances of the case, according to the general orders issued to you yesterday morning; and for this purpose you are especially urged to call to your aid and immediate appointment all the ablest military ability in your reach. Lieutenant Colonel DeSaussure having expressly requested to be relieved from his command in order to attend to his duties as a member of the Legislature, his request is hereby granted.

No. 11. To His Excellency Gov. F. W. Pickens,

Dear Sir : We received, at a late hour last night, from the hand of Aid- de-Camp J. J. Lucas, the report of General James Simons, on the Military defences of the harbor of Charleston, and, in accordance with your instructions, beg leave to reply as follows:

We concur generally in the military positions assumed by Brigadier General Simons, of the Fourth Brigade South Carolina Militia, together with the conclusions thence deduced, but leave the question of the appointment of a Council of War to the discretion of your Excellency.

We have the honor to be.

JAMES JONES, THOS. F. DRAYTON,

Members of Ord. Bd.

P. S. — Within you will also receive the report of Brigadier General Simons.

The Board concur in the military positions assumed by General Simons, together with the conclusions thence deduced, but leave the Council of War to the discretion of myself "The conclusions" of that report, I consider, would be to order troops from Fort Moultrie and Sullivan's Island and Pinckney, and to abandon the attempt to keep out reinforcements, and, in fact, to yield, without a struggle, every point, and thus break down the spirit of our people, and cover our cause with imbecility and probable ruin.

I shall do no such thing, nor shall I yield to any Council of War that may drive me to such "conclusions."

To Col. Gwynn, Col. White, and Col. Trapier, Engineers:

You are ordered to come together, immediately, and consider and report the most favorable plan for operating upon Fort Sumter, so as to reduce that fortress, by batteries or other means in our possession; and for this consultation you are authorized to have with you Colonel Manigault, the State Ordnance Officer.

To His Excellency Governor Pickens:

Sir: In obedience to the order from Headquarters, issued yesterday, requiring us " to come together immediately, and consider and report the most feasible plan for operating upon Fort Sumter, so as to reduce that fortress by batteries, or other means in our possession," we have the honor to submit the following :

We are unanimously and decidedly of the opinion that — discarding all other methods of attack upon that fortress (whether by surprise, by open assault, or by stratagem), as uncertain in their results, and as, even if successful, involving probably much sacrifice of life — our dependence and sole reliance must be upon batteries of heavy ordnance, at least until a deep impression has been made upon the garrison, in its morale as well as in its physique, by an incessant bombardment and cannonade of many hours' duration. When this impression shall have been made, and a demand for a surrender refused, we are of opinion that, with its battlements mutilated, its embrasures beaten in, and its garrison weakened by casualties and disheartened by surrounding circumstances, this strong fortress would fall, with comparative ease, before an assaulting party.

We therefore submit the following plan of attack :

1st. We recommend that the dismantled battery at Fort Moultrie be restored, and protected by merlons; in other words, make of it an embrasure battery.

2d. That a mortar battery of two (2) mortars be erected on Sullivan's Island, at a point West of Fort Moultrie, and as near Fort Sumter as possible.

3d. That a mortar battery of four (4) mortars be erected at Fort Johnson.

4th. That a mortar battery of two (2) mortars be erected at Cummings' Point; and also at this point a battery of three (3) eight-inch Columbiads.

5th. That the implements and equipments and mountings for these batteries be ordered forthwith.

It is to be regretted that we have not in our possession, at the present moment, a greater number of mortars. We fear that the eight — which are all that we have, and which we have posted as above — may be inadequate to the task imposed upon them, and we therefore urgently recommend the purchase of seven (7) more heavy ten-inch mortars.

Though not precisely entering as an element in the subject-matter of the plan of attack upon Fort Sumter, still, as germain to it, and as a measure of vital importance in a future project, should our plan for reducing that place fail, we take the liberty respectfully but earnestly to recommend the erection, forthwith, of a gun battery of heavy guns, at about one thousand four hundred yards East from Fort Moultrie. This point completely commands the Maffitt Channel; and supposing our failure at Fort Sumter, and further supposing Fort Moultrie rendered untenable, as the result of the cannonade from Fort Sumter, still, by blocking up all the other channels to this city except the Maffitt Channel, and defending this as above recommended, the slow (but sure) process of starvation would yet put Fort Sumter in our possession.

We deem it our duty, in view of the fact that efforts are being made by the Government at Washington to reinforce their garrison at Fort Sumter — an event which, of course, would render the means of attack now at our command still more inadequate to the end in view — we venture still further to recommend and urge upon your Excellency the importance of immediate preparation for attack with the means we now have.

All of which is respectfully submitted,

WALTER GWYNN, EDWARD B. WHITE, J. H. TRAPIER, Captain Engineers. EDWARD MANIGAULT, Colonel of Ordnance.

The first gun of the new struggle for independence, (if struggle there is to be,) has been fired, and Federal power has received its first repulse.

About seven o'clock, yesterday morning, our citizens were startled by the firing of heavy guns in the direction of Sullivan's and Morris' Islands. It was at once surmised that the steamship "Star of the West," which had been reported by the special telegraphic correspondent of the Mercury as having left New York with reinforcements and stores for Major Anderson, had attempted to pass the battery on Morris' Island. Our reporters were immediately despatched to the entrance of the harbor, and, after visiting all the fortifications now occupied by our troops, the following facts were elicited :

Particulars of the Affair. — Yesterday morning, shortly after "reveille," the sentries on Morris Island reported a steamship standing in for the Ship Channel. The long roll was immediately beat, and all the troops were promptly under arms, Lieutenant Colonel J. L. Branch, of the Regiment of Rifles, commanding. These comprised the Vigilant Rifles, German Riflemen, Zouave Cadets, and a detachment of forty from the Citadel Cadet corps. The last named body were at once marched to the battery, commanding the Ship Channel, which, at this point, passes within from one-half to three-quarters of a mile of the beach. At seven o'clock, when the "Star of the West" had reached a point within range of the guns, Major Stevens fired a shot across her bows, as a signal for her to heave to. After waiting three or four minutes, no diminution in the speed or change in the course of the steamer could be noticed. A moment after, the United States flag was run up at her foremast. The " Star of the West" continuing thus defiantly to pursue her course towards Fort Sumter, the order was given to the men at the Morris' Island guns to open fire. Five rounds were accordingly discharged in quick succession. Two of these are reported to have taken effect, one forward and the other abaft the wheel. At the sixth discharge, the "Star of the West" rounded to, and steered outwards towards the Bar. At the same time, the ensign, which she displayed immediately after the warning gun, was lowered. Three more shots were fired from Fort Morris and three from Fort Moultrie; one of these latter, it is thought, took effect. A gentleman on the island reports that after the '' Star of the West" had cleared the Bar and proceeded a considerable distance beyond, a steam propeller, of about three hundred and fifty tons burthen, joined her, apparently as a tender, and they steamed off together in an E. N. E. direction.

Thus terminated the first attempt of the Federal Government to reinforce the great stronghold of coercion in our harbor. The approach of the "Star of the West" to Fort Sumter, taken in connection with the facts that her clearance was for New Orleans, and that her troops were smuggled aboard outside the harbor of New York, proves clearly enough that the President has chosen the coercion policy, and that his officials will not hesitate to promote its success.

To His Excellency, the Governor op South Carolina :

Sir : Two of your batteries fired this morning upon an unarmed vessel bearing the flag of my Government. As I have not been notified that war has been declared by South Carolina against the Government of the United States, I cannot but think that this hostile act was committed without your sanction or authority. Under that hope, and that alone, did I refrain from opening fire upon your batteries.

I have the honor, therefore, respectfully to ask whether the above-mentioned act — one I believe without a parallel in the history of our country, or of any other civilized Government — was committed in obedience to your instructions, and to notify you if it be not disclaimed, that I must regard it as an act of war, and that I shall not, after a reasonable time for the return of my messenger, permit any vessels to pass within range of the guns of my Fort.

In order to save, as far as in my power, the shedding of blood, I beg that you will have due notification of this my decision, given to all concerned.

Hoping, however, that your answer may be such as will justify a further continuance of forbearance on my part, I have the honor to be,

[THE GOVERNOR TO MAJOR ANDERSON]

Sir : Your letter has been received. In it you make certain statements which very plainly show that you have not been fully informed by your Government, of the precise relations which now exist between it and the State of South Carolina. Official information has been communicated to the Government of the United States that the political connection, heretofore existing between the State of South Carolina and the States which were known as the United States, had ceased; and that the State of South Carolina had resumed all the power it had delegated to the United States under the compact known as the Constitution of the United States. The right which the State of South Carolina possessed to change the political relations it held with other States, under the Constitution of the United States, has been solemnly asserted by the people of this State, in Convention, and now does not admit of discussion.

In anticipation of the Ordinance of Secession, of which the President of the United States had received official notification, it was understood by him, that sending any reinforcements of the troops of the United States in the harbor of Charleston, would be regarded by the constituted authorities of the State of South Carolina as an act of hostility; and, at the same time, it was understood by him that any change in the occupation of the forts in the harbor of Charleston would, in like manner, be regarded as an act of hostility. Either or both of these events occurring during the period in which the State of South Carolina constituted a part of the United States, was then distinctly notified to the President of the United States as an act or acts of hostility; because either or both would be regarded, and could only be intended, to dispute the right of the State of South Carolina to that political independence which she has always asserted, and will always maintain.

Whatever would have been, during the continuance of this State while a member of the United States, an act of hostility, became much more so, when the State of South Carolina had dissolved its connection with the Government of the United States.

After the secession of the State of South Carolina, Fort Sumter continued in the possession of troops of the United States. How that fort is at this time in the possession of the troops of the United States, is not now necessary to discuss. It will suffice to say that the occupancy of that fort has been regarded by the State of South Carolina as the first act of positive hostility committed by the troops of the United States within the limits of this State; and was in this light regarded as so unequivocal, that it occasioned the termination of the negotiations, then pending at Washington, between the Commissioners of the State of South Carolina and the President of the United States.

The attempt to reinforce the troops now at Fort Sumter, or to retake and resume possession of the forts within the waters of this State, which you have abandoned, after spiking the guns placed there, and doing otherwise much damage, cannot be regarded by the authorities of this State as indicative of any other purpose than the coercion of the State by the armed force of the Government. To repel such an attempt is too plainly its duty, to allow it to be discussed. But, while defending its waters, the authorities of the State have been careful so to conduct the affairs of the State that no act, however necessary for its defence, should lead to an useless waste of life. Special agents, therefore, have been off the bar, to warn all approaching vessels, if armed ; or unarmed and having troops to reinforce the forts on board ; not to enter the harbor of Charleston ; and special orders have been given to Commanders of all the forts and batteries not to fire at such vessels until a shot fired across their bows would warn them of the prohibition of the State.

Under these circumstances, the Star of the West, it is understood, this morning, attempted to enter this harbor, with troops on board ; and having been notified that she could not enter, was fired into. The act is perfectly justified by me.

In regard to your threat in regard to vessels in the harbor, it is only necessary to say, that you must judge of your responsibilities. Your position in this harbor has been tolerated by the authorities of the State. And while the act of which you complain is in perfect consistency with the rights and duties of the State, it is not perceived how far the conduct, which you propose to adopt, can find a parallel in the history of any country, or be reconciled with any other purpose of your Government, than that of imposing upon this State the condition of a conquered province.

To Major Robert Anderson,




To His Excellency, F. W. Pickens,

Sir : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of to-day, and to say that, under the circumstances, I have deemed it proper to refer the whole matter to my Government; and that I intend deferring the course indicated in my note of this morning until the arrival from Washington of the instructions I may receive. I have the honor, also, to express a hope that no obstructions will be placed in the way of, and that you will do me the favor to afford every facility to, the departure and return of the bearer, Lieut. T. Talbot, U. S. Army, who has been directed to make the journey.

To Major Kobert Anderson,

Sir : I have thought proper, under all the circumstances of the peculiar state of public affairs in the country at present, to appoint the Hon. A. G. Magrath and Gen. D. F. Jamison, both members of the Executive Council, and of the highest position in the State, to present to you considerations of the gravest public character, and of the deepest interest to all who deprecate the improper waste of life, to induce the delivery of Fort Sumter to the constituted authorities of the State of South Carolina, with a pledge, on its part, to account for such public property as is under your charge.

To His Excellency, F. W. Pickens,

Sir : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your demand for the surrender of this fort to the authorities of South Carolina, and to say, in reply, that the demand is one with which I cannot comply. Your Excellency knows that I have recently sent a messenger to Washington, and that it will be impossible for me to receive an answer to my despatches, forwarded by him, at an earlier date than next Monday. What the character of my instructions may be, I cannot foresee.

Should your Excellency deem fit, prior to a resort to arms, to refer this matter to Washington, it would afford me the sincerest pleasure to depute one of my officers to accompany any messenger you may deem proper to be the bearer of your demand.

Hoping to God that in this, and all other matters in which the honor, welfare and lives of our fellow-countrymen are concerned, we shall so act as to meet His approval ; and deeply regretting that you have made a demand of me with which I cannot comply,

Sir : At the time of the separation of the State of South Carolina from the United States, Fort Sumter was, and still is, in the possession of troops of the United States, under the command of Major Anderson. I regard that possession as not consistent with the dignity or safety of the State of South Carolina; and I have this day addressed to Major Anderson a communication to obtain from him the possession of that I'ort, by the authorities of this State. The reply of Major Anderson informs me that he has no authority to do what I required ; but he desires a reference of the demand to the President of the United States.

Under the circumstances now existing, and which need no comment by me, I have determined to send to you the Hon. I. W. Hayne, the Attorney General of the State of South Carolina, and have instructed him to demand the delivery of Fort Sumter, in the harbor of Charleston, to the constituted authorities of the State of South Carolina.

The demand I have made of Major Anderson, and which I now make of you, is suggested because of my earnest desire to avoid the bloodshed which a persistence in your attempt to retain the possession of that fort will cause; and which will be unavailing to secure you that possession, but induce a calamity most deeply to be deplored.

If consequences so unhappy shall ensue, I will secure for this State, in the demand which I now make, the satisfaction of having exhausted every attempt to avoid it.

In relation to the public property of the United States within Fort Sumter, the Hon. I. W. Hayne, who will hand you this communication, is authorized to give you the pledge of the State that the valuation of such property will be accounted for by this State, upon the adjustment of its relations with the United States, of which it was a part.

To THE President of the United States.

Sir : The Governor has considered it proper, in view of the grave questions which now affect the State of South Carolina and the United States, to make a demand upon the President of the United States, for the delivery to the State of South Carolina of Fort Sumter, now within the territorial limits of the State, and occupied by troops of the United States.

The Convention of the people of South Carolina authorized and empowered its Commissioners to enter into negotiations with the Government of the United States, for the delivery of forts, magazines, light houses, and other real estate within the limits of South Carolina.

The circumstances which caused the interruption of that negotiation are known to you : with the formal notification of its cessation, was the urgent expression of the necessity for the withdrawal of the troops of the United States from the harbor of Charleston.

The interruption of these negotiations left all matters connected with Fort Sumter and troops of the United States within the limits of this State, affected by the fact that the continued possession of the fort was not consistent with the dignity or safety of the State, and that an attempt to reinforce the troops at that fort would not be allowed. This, therefore, became a state of hostility in consequence of which the State of South Carolina was placed in a condition of defence. During the preparation for this purpose, an attempt was made to reinforce Fort Sumter, and repelled.

You are now instructed to proceed to "Washington, and there, in the name of the Government of the State of South Carolina, enquire of the President of the United States, whether it was by his order that troops of the United States were sent into the harbor of Charleston to reinforce Fort Sumter; if he avows that order, you will then enquire, whether he asserts a right to introduce troops of the United States within the limits of this State, to occupy Fort Sumter : and you will, in case of his avowal, inform him that neither will be permitted, and either will be regarded as his declaration of war against the State of South Carolina.

The Governor, to save life, and determined to omit no course of proceeding usual among civilized nations, previous to that condition of general hostilities which belongs to war ; and not knowing under what order, or by what authority, Fort Sumter is now held; demanded from Major Robert Anderson, now in command of that fort, its delivery to the State. That officer, in his reply, has referred the Governor to the Government of the United States at Washington. You will, therefore, demand from the President of the United States the withdrawal of the troops of the United States from that fort, and its delivery to the State of South Carolina.

You are instructed not to allow any question of property claimed by the United States to embarrass the assertion of the political right of the State of South Carolina to the possession of Fort Sumter. The possession of that fort by the State is alone consistent with the dignity and safety of the State of South Carolina: but such possession is not inconsistent with a right to compensation in money in another Government, if it has against the State of South Carolina any just claim connected with that fort. But the possession of the fort cannot, in regard to the State of South Carolina, be compensated by any consideration of any kind from the Government of the United States, when the possession of it by the Government is invasive of the dignity and affects the safety of the State. That possession cannot become now a matter of discussion or negotiation. You will, therefore, require from the President of the United States a positive and distinct answer to your demand for the delivery of the fort. And you are further authorized to give the pledge of the State to adjust all matters which may be, and are in their nature, susceptible of valuation in money; in the manner most usual, and upon the principles of equity and justice always recognized by independent nations, for the ascertainment of their relative rights and obligations in such matters.

You are further instructed to say to the President of the United States, that the Governor regards the attempt of the President of the United States, if avowed, to continue the possession of Fort Sumter; as inevitably leading to a bloody issue, a question which, in the judgment of the Governor, can have but one conclusion, reconcilable with a due regard to the State of South Carolina, the welfare of the other States which now constitute the United States, and that humanity which teaches all men, but particularly those who in authority control the lives of others, to regard a resort to arms as the last which should be considered. To shed their blood in defence of their rights is a duty which the citizens of the State of South Carolina fully recognize. And in such a cause, the Governor, while deploring the stern necessity which may compel him to call for the sacrifice, will feel that his obligation to preserve inviolate the sacred rights of the State of South Carolina, justify the sacrifice necessary to secure that end. The Governor does not desire to remind the President of the responsibilities which are upon him.

To Hon. I. W. Hayne,



Hon. Isaac W. Hayne:

Sir : We are apprised that you visit Washington, as an Envoy from the State of South Carolina, bearing a communication from the Governor of your State to the President of the United States, in relation to Fort Sumter. Without knowing its contents, we venture to request you to defer its delivery to the President for a few days, or until you and he have considered the suggestions which we beg leave to submit.

We know that the possession of Fort Sumter by troops of the United States, coupled with the circumstances under which it was taken, is the chief, if not only, source of difficulty between the Government of South Carolina and that of the United States. We would add, that we, too, think it a just cause of irritation and of apprehension on the part of your State. But we have also assurances, notwithstanding the circumstances under which Major Anderson left Fort Moultrie and entered Fort Sumter with the forces under his command, that it was not taken, and is not held, with any hostile or unfriendly purpose towards your State; but merely as property of the United States, which the President deems it his duty to protect and preserve.

We will not discuss the question of right or duty on the part of either Government touching that property, or the late acts of either in relation thereto; but we think that, without any compromise of right or breach of duty on either side, an amicable adjustment of the matter of diflferences may and should be adopted. We desire to see such an adjustment, and to prevent war or the shedding of blood. We represent States which have already seceded from the United States, or will have done so before the first of February next, and which will meet your State in Convention on or before the fifteenth of that month. Our people feel that they have a common destiny with your people, and expect to form with them, in that Convention, a new Confederation and Provisional Government. We must and will share your fortunes, suffering with you the evils of war, if it cannot be avoided; and enjoying with you the blessings of peace, if it can be preserved. We, therefore, think it especially due from South Carolina to our States — to say nothing of other slaveholding States — that she should, as far as she can consistently with her honor, avoid initiating hostilities between her and the United States or any other power. We have the public declaration of the President that he has not the constitutional power or the will to make war on South Carolina, and that the public peace shall not be disturbed by any act of hostility towards your State.

We, therefore, see no reason why there may not be a settlement of existing difficulties, if time be given for calm and deliberate counsel with those States which are equally involved with South Carolina. We therefore trust that an arrangement will be agreed on between you and the President, at least till the fifteenth of February next; by which time your and our States may, in Convention, devise a wise, just and peaceable solution of existing difficulties.

In the meantime, we think your State should suffer Major Anderson to obtain necessary supplies of food, fuel or water, and enjoy free communication, by post or special messenger, with the President; upon the understanding that the President will not send him reinforcements during the same period. We propose to submit this proposition and your answer to the President.

If not clothed with power to make such arrangement, then we trust that you will submit our suggestions to the Governor of your State for his instructions. Until you have received and communicated his response to the President, of course your State will not attack Fort Sumter, and the President will not offer to reinforce it.

We most respectfully submit these propositions, in the earnest hope that you, or the proper authority of your State, may accede to them.

LOUIS T. WIGFALL, JOHN HEMPHILL, D. L. YULEE, S. R. MALLORY, JEFFERSON DAVIS, C. C. CLAY, Jr., BENJAMIN FITZPATRICK, A. IVERSON, JOHN SLIDELL, J. P. BENJAMIN.

GENTLEMEN : I have just received your communication, dated the 15th instant. You represent, you say. States which have already seceded from the United States, or will have done so before the 1st of February next, and which will meet South Carolina in Convention, on or before the 15th of that month: that your people feel they have a common destiny with our people, and expect to form with them in that Convention a new Confederacy and Provisional Government: that you must and will share our fortunes, suffering with us the evils of war, if it cannot be avoided, and enjoying with us the blessings of peace, if it can be preserved.

I am not clothed with power to make the arrangements you suggest, but provided you can get assurances, with which you are entirely satisfied, that no reinforcements will be sent to Fort Sumter in the interval, and that the public peace shall not be disturbed by buy act of hostility towards South Carolina, I will refer your communication to the authorities of South Carolina, and, withholding their communication, with which I am at present charged, will await further instructions.

I feel, gentlemen, the force of this appeal, and, so far as my authority extends, most cheerfully comply with your request.

I am not clothed with power to make the arrangements you suggest, but provided you can get assurances, with which you are entirely satisfied, that no reinforcements will be sent to Fort Sumter in the interval, and that the public peace shall not be disturbed by buy act of hostility towards South Carolina, I will refer your communication to the authorities of South Carolina, and, withholding their communication, with which I am at present charged, will await further instructions.

Major Anderson and his command, let me assure you, do now obtain all necessary supplies of food, (including fresh meat and vegetables,) and, I believe, fuel and water; and do now enjoy free communication, by post and special messengers, with the President, and will continue to do so, certainly, until the door to negotiation shall be closed.

If your proposition is acceded to, you may assure the President that no attack will be made on Fort Sumter, until a response from the Governor of South Carolina has been received by me, and communicated to him.

After President Lincoln was inaugurated, he sent, in the latter part of March, a confidential agent, Mr. Fox, who was introduced by a gallant officer of our navy. He said he desired to visit Fort Sumter, and that his objects were "entirely pacific," Upon the guarantee of the officer introducing him. Captain Hartstene, he was permitted to visit Major Anderson, in company with Captain Hartstene, expressly upon the pledge of "pacific purposes." Notwithstanding this, he actually reported a plan for the reinforcement of the garrison by force, which was adopted. Major Anderson protested against it. I enclose with this a copy of papers, to be used under your wise discretion, which will place these facts beyond controversy.

In a very few days after, another confidential agent, Colonel Lamon, was sent by the President, who informed me that he had come to try and arrange for the removal of the garrison, and, when he returned from the fort, asked if a war vessel could not be allowed to remove them. I replied, that no war vessel could be allowed to enter the harbor on any terms. He said he believed Major Anderson preferred an ordinary steamer, and I agreed that the garrison might be thus removed. He said he hoped to return in a very few days for that purpose. Then, on the 8th of April, Mr. Chew, an official in the State Department, was sent, in company with Lieut. Talbot, and read to me a paper, which the President of the United States, he said, had directed him to read to me, in relation to sending in supplies to the fort. He gave me no information as to anything, but only read the paper, and said he was not even directed to ask my reply.

I am directed by the President of the United States to notify you to expect an attempt will be made to supply Fort Sumter with provisions only, and that if such attempt be not resisted, no effort to throw in men, arms or ammunition will be made, without further notice, or in case of an attack upon the fort.

The above was communicated to us on the evening of the eighth of April, by Robert S. Chew, of the State Department in Washington, and Captain Talbot stated that it was from the President of the United States, as did Mr. Chew, and was delivered to him on the sixth instant, at Washington; and this was read in their presence and admitted.

To Colonel L. Thomas, Adjutant General U. S. Army:

Colonel : I have the honor to report that the resumption of work yesterday, Sunday, at various points on Morris' Island, and the vigorous prosecution of it this morning, apparently strengthening all the batteries which are under the fire of our guns, shows that they either have just received some news from Washington, which has put them on the qui vive, or that they have received orders from Montgomery to commence operations here. I am preparing, by the side of my barbette guns, protection for our men from the shells which will be almost continually bursting over or in our work.

I had the honor to receive, by yesterday's mail, the letter of the Honorable Secretary of War, dated April 4th, and confess that what he there states surprises me very greatly — following, as it does, and contradicting so positively, the assurance Mr. Crawford telegraphed he was "authorized" to make. I trust that this matter will be at once put in a correct light; as a movement made now, when the South has been erroneously informed that none such would be attempted, would produce most disastrous results throughout our country. It is, of course, now too late for me to give any advice in reference to the proposed scheme of Capt. Fox. I fear that its result cannot fail to be disastrous to all concerned. Even with his boat at our walls, the loss of life (as I think I mentioned to Mr. Fox) in unloading her, will more than pay for the good to be accomplished by the expedition, which keeps us, if I can maintain possession of this work, out of position, surrounded by strong works, which must be carried to make this fort of the least value to the United States Government.

We have not oil enough to keep a light in the lantern for one night. The boats will have to, therefore, rely at night entirely upon other marks. I ought to have been informed that this expedition was to come. Col. Lamon's remark convinced me that the idea, merely hinted at to me by Capt. Fox, would not be carried out.

We shall strive to do our duty, though I frankly say that my heart is not in this war, which I see is to be thus commenced. That God will still avert it, and cause us to resort to pacific means to maintain our rights, is my ardent prayer.

I am. Colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

I have every reason, from information received by me in the most confidential manner, (not forbidding publication, however,) and through one very near the most intimate counsels of the President of the United States, to induce me to believe that the following article was submitted, as a proof sheet, to Mr. Lincoln and his Cabinet; that a proclamation, in conformity with its general views, was to be issued; and that a change in the decision of the Cabinet was made in one night, when exactly the contrary course was adopted. It is asserted in this article, (which, in all probability, is a proof-sheet from a confidential New York paper,) that if the President desired to excite and madden the whole North to a war of extermination against slavery, and in favor of the absolute plunder and conquest of the South, he had only to resolve that Major Anderson and his garrison at Fort Sumter should perish, as it appears was well known would have to be the case. Major Anderson and his men were to be used as fuel, to be thrown in to kindle the flames of fanaticism, and to force the Northern people into a united war, which would give the Abolition leaders absolute control over the Government and country. What must be the feelings of the civilized world, when it is known that the President of the United States and his Cabinet did so act, and with a view expressly to carry out this policy of exciting the whole Northern mind?

Major Anderson had officially informed the former Administration that he could hold Fort Sumter; and, of course, if the object of that Administration was to betray the Government into the hands of the secessionists, as is charged in the article, then Major Anderson must have been a party to the treason; and if he informed the new President, on the 4th of March, as is said to be the case, that he could not hold the fort, then he acted out his part fully in aiding to place Mr. Lincoln and his Cabinet exactly where they were, and to compel them to evacuate the fortress, or to use the garrison as victims, to be slaughtered on the unholy altar of blind fanaticism and mad ambition.

I know the fact from Mr. Lincoln's most intimate friend and accredited agent, Mr. Lamon, that the President of the United States professed a desire to evacuate Fort Sumter, and he (Mr. Lamon) actually wrote me, after his return to Washington, that he would be back in a few days to aid in that purpose. Major Anderson was induced to expect the same thing, as his notes to me prove. I know the fact that Mr. Fox, of the United States Navy, after obtaining permission from me, upon the express guarantee of a former gallant associate in the navy, to visit Major Anderson "for pacific purposes," planned the pretended attempt to relieve and reinforce the garrison by a fleet, and that Major Anderson protested against it. I now believe that it was all a scheme, and that Fox's disgraceful expedition was gotten up in concert with Mr. Lincoln, merely to delude the Northern public into the belief that they intended to sustain and protect Major Anderson, when, in fact, according to the article now published for the first time, they decided to do no such thing, and acted with the deliberate intention to let the garrison perish, that they might thereby excite the North, and rouse them to unite in this unholy and unnatural war, by which the desperate and profligate leaders of an infuriated and lawless party might gratify their vengeance and lust of power over the ruins of their country, and amid the blind passions of a maddened people.

The document now published, and the peculiar circumstances, show the basest and most infamous motives that ever actuated the rulers of any nation, except, perhaps, in the days of the first French revolution, when history shows that wholesale murder was often planned by insurrectionists in Paris, under the deliberate guidance of malignant leaders, whose whole objects were universal plunder and murder, in order to exterminate one party and ride into power themselves.

A moment's review of the line of argument pursued in the article, will show that the policy finally adopted in regard to Fort Sumter was intended and desired by Mr. Lincoln and his advisers to lead to a war, not to be regulated by the rules and usages among civilized and enlightened people, but to one of rapine, murder, and utter extermination of the people against whom it was intended to be waged, founded upon no principle of right, seeking not to reestablish any disputed authority, or accomplish any other object than to gratify a lust for power and revenge.

For the purpose of directly proving the motives and impulses of the United States Government in the inauguration of this war, it is only necessary to make several extracts from the article in question, as they will serve, also, to direct the special attention of the public to those portions which most vividly prove the unhallowed purposes of President Lincoln and his advisers.

One of the chief ends of the article seems to have been the proof of treason on the part of President Buchanan, and through all of it runs the oft repeated "alternative" left them by him, of "permitting Major Anderson and his command to starve within fifteen days, or of ignominiously abandoning it to a nest of traitors," &c. This "alternative" is dwelt upon as if to direct special attention to it; and this very "alternative" proves, above all the rest, the purpose which they had in view when they adopted their final policy. It is argued, and very elaborately, too, that the purpose of President Lincoln was to "preserve peace," not to "make war;" to "protect the sacred Constitution" confided to his keeping, and to gain over, by his avowedly peaceful objects, those who had defied that "Constitution" and broken its laws. It is asserted that President Lincoln could not suppress the "tears" of anguish which his signing the order for the evacuation of Fort Sumter called forth, and it is said, too, that he desired to "discharge his duty to humanity;" and yet he has chosen to "discharge" that "duty" in the singular way of resolving on a policy which, in his own words, he knew would "raise throughout the mighty North a feeling of indignation which, in ninety days, would have emancipated every slave on the continent, and driven their masters into the sea."

The sacrifice was made; Anderson and his command were forced to become liable as victims of fanaticism; Fort Sumter was wrapt in flames; and yet, forsooth, they tell us that the only man who could have prevented it was "resolved to discharge his duty to humanity," and that his purpose was "peace" — his aversion "war." His "purpose" was changed, and he resolved to bring on this unhallowed war. It is a Government actuated with these feelings that we are to defend ourselves against; it is this kind of war, then, that the people of the South are to meet; and, under these circumstances, it becomes my duty to publish the article in question, for the information of the people of the Confederate States, and for the cool and unbiassed contemplation of the civilized world.

A war thus inaugurated — from such motives and under such circumstances — surely can never meet with the favor of Heaven. A people educated and trained up to constitutional liberty can never, for any length of time, sustain such a war.

There are periods in the history of nations and individuals, when the force of even this proverb is illustrated. The law, or rather the demands of justice, self-respect, national honor, and the vindication of our nationality in the eyes of Europe, all demand that we should retain possession of Fort Sumter at any and every sacrifice ; and no man in this nation is more deeply impressed with the paramount importance of so doing than is Abraham Lincoln, the President of the United States. He feels and recognizes his duty in the premises, but the law of necessity steps in, puts at defiance his wishes and his duty, and sternly forbids his attempting to hold or relieve the noble fortress so promptly snatched from the hands of the rebels and traitors of Charleston by the timely action of Major Anderson. Buchanan and his traitor Cabinet had deliberately planned the robbing of our arsenals under the superintendence of, and with the connivance of, the miserable fellow Floyd, whose portrait now hangs so conspicuously in the Rogues' Gallery of our city police; and we all know that when Major Anderson took possession of Fort Sumter, Floyd demanded its restoration to the rebels, and Buchanan actually yielded to the demand, until threatened with danger to his person if he ventured upon any such act of treachery. He yielded to a stern necessity ; but in yielding, he determined to accomplish by management and finesse what he had not the courage to do openly. He accordingly refused to permit the fort to be reinforced, as it could have been in those days, with the necessary men and stores to enable it to hold out for a year, at least, against any force which could be brought against it; and it was not until after Morris' Island had been fortified, that he sanctioned the abortive attempt at succor made by the Star of the West, and even countermanded that order before it was carried into effect.

From Christmas until the 4th of March, the traitors and rebels of Charleston and the cotton States received every countenance and support from Mr. Buchanan which could be afforded them ; and when he retired from office, on the 4th instant, he gloated over the conviction that he had fostered rebellion and treason until they had become so rampant that they were beyond the control of his successor. And the one great source of his glorification was, that Fort Sumter was without provisions; and that of necessity, the garrison must surrender from starvation before it would be in the power of the Republican Administration to relieve and reinforce it.

Of course Abraham Lincoln could know nothing of this treason; and when in his inaugural he spoke of occupying the public forts and collecting the revenue, he little dreamed that his predecessor had treasonably arranged to make the abandonment of Fort Sumter a political necessity. He was soon apprised, however, that the treason of his predecessor had cunningly devised for him the most serious mortification that could be inflicted; and that he had presented to him the alternative of permitting Anderson and his command to starve, or promptly to withdraw them, and ignominiously permit the fort to fall into the hands of the rebels. To reinforce the garrison, or to supply them with provisions, are officially impossible, for James Buchanan and his associate traitors designedly refused to do so while it was in their power to do it, and compelled the Commandant of the fort quietly to permit the construction of works in his immediate vicinity and under the range of his guns, which would effectually prevent his being relieved when an honest man assumed the Government, on the 4th of March. Buchanan's final act of treason has been consummated. He prevented the last Congress from passing a law giving power to the Executive to call for volunteers to occupy and re-capture the public forts and arsenals, and he designedly left Fort Sumter in a position which renders relief physically impossible without an army of from ten to twenty thousand men, and the employment of a naval force greater than we can command ; and he and his myrmidons now exultingly and tauntingly say to the Republican President: "Do your worst. We have designedly withheld from you the means of relieving and holding Fort Sumter, and we invite you to the pleasing alternative of permitting Anderson and his command to starve within fifteen days, or of ignominiously abandoning it to a nest of traitors and rebels, whom we have nursed into existence as the only certain mode of destroying the Republican party."

Such are the simple facts of the case as they are presented to the new President upon his assuming the reins of Government; and we speak advisedly and from knowledge when we say that while the country has been wickedly made to believe that the time of the Administration has been occupied with the disposal of offices, four-fifths of all the hours spent in consultation by the Cabinet have been devoted to the consideration of the all-important question — how to save Fort Sumter, and avert from the Government the dishonor of abandoning it to the miserable traitors who, for months, have been in open rebellion against the authority of the Government. Generals Scott and Totten, and all the military and naval chiefs at Washington, have been consulted ; every plan which military science could conceive, or military daring suggest, has been attentively considered and maturely weighed, with a hope, at least, that the work of the traitor Buchanan was not so complete as he and his associates supposed. But all in vain. There stands the isolated, naked fact — Fort Sumter cannot be relieved because of the treason of the late Administration, and Major Anderson and his command must perish by starvation unless withdrawn.

What, then, is to be done? Could the President leave them to starve? Cui bono? Would the sacrifice of a handful of gallant men to the treason of thieves and rebels, have been grateful to their countrymen? But, says the indignant yet thoughtless patriot, "think of the humiliation and dishonor of abandoning Sumter to the rebels." We do think of it, and weep tears of blood over the humiliation thus brought upon the country by the traitor President who has just retired to Wheatland to gloat over his consummated treason. And we are assured, too, and do not doubt the truth of the assurance, that when Abraham Lincoln was compelled to yield his reluctant consent to this most humiliating concession to successful treason, he did not attempt to suppress the sorrow and tears which it called forth. But he had no alternative. '^ Necessity knows no law ;" and to save the lives of the gallant men who have so long held Fort Sumter against an overwhelming force of heartless traitors and wicked and unprincipled rebels, whose treason has been steeped in fraud and theft, vulgarly known as "Southern chivalry," the President of the United States, in the discharge of a duty to humanity, has signed the order for the evacuation of Sumter.

Had war, not peace, been his object — had he desired to raise throughout the mighty North a feeling of indignation, which, in ninety days, would have emancipated every slave on the continent and driven their masters into the sea if needs be — he had only to have said : "let the garrison of Fort Sumter do their duty and perish beneath its walls; and on the heads of the traitors and rebels of the slavery propagandists be the consequences." Such a decision would have carried joy to the bosoms of Phillips and Garrison and their fanatical associates, who so justly consider abolitionism and disunion synonymous ', but it would have brought upon the country such scenes of horror as the mind shrinks from contemplating. Verily, the blood of the martyrs would have been the seed of "negro emancipation."

For every patriot soldier thus sacrificed to the revival of the African slave trade and the establishment of a hideous slaveocracy at the South, ten thousand negro slaves would have been emancipated, and as many of their masters been driven into the ocean to expiate their crimes on earth.

But Mr. Lincoln desired to rouse no such feeling of revenge among the people of the free States. He knew — no man knew better — that he had but to hold on to Fort Sumter, agreeably to the plainly expressed will of the people, and leave its gallant garrison to the fate prepared for them by the rebels and traitors, to insure qn uprising which would at once wipe out slavery from the face of the country, and with it all engaged in this atrocious rebellion against the Government. But his purpose is peace, not war. His object is to restore, to re-build and to preserve the Government and the Constitution which enacted it; and his great aim is, while maintaining the Constitution and enforcing the laws, to bring back good men to their allegiance, and leave the thieves, and rogues, and braggarts who compose the great mass of the rebels, under the cognomen of "Southern chivalry," to the uninterrupted enjoyment of their own precious society and the reflections which time must awake even in them. He is mindful of hi.s oath, "registered in heaven," to preserve the Constitution and enforce the laws; and he feels that his mission is to reclaim and not extinguish, or most assuredly he could have left Fort Sumter to its fate; and that fate would have been speedy, certain and absolute annihilation to the traitors now in rebellion against the Government, and to the very existence of tho institution of slavery on the American continent. But he ha.'* been faithful to his oath of office and to the Constitution ; and by yielding to tho necessity of the case and listening to the cry of humanity, slavery has had accorded to it its last victory over freedom and the Constitution of the United States.

The deed has been accomplished ; the sacrifice has been made; traitors and rebels are again triumphant; and the Stars and Stripes are again to be dishonored in the sight of the nation and of astonished Europe. The flag of the Union is to be pulled down, and the bloody banner of pirates, freebooters, rebels and traitors, is to be run up to wave triumphantly over Sumter and be saluted from hundreds of guns in the rebel camp, amid the cheers of thousands whose senseless gasconade and braggadocio vauntings have long since disgusted brave men and honest citizens. And yet, we approve the act. A traitor President rendered it a necessity; and humanity demanded that Abraham Lincoln should sacrifice all personal feelings, and gracefully yield to that necessity and the deliberately planned treason upon which it is based. His countrymen will sustain him in this discharge of a humiliating but imperative duty ; but with him they feel that the account is now closed with treason. There is nothing now to yield to traitors — nothing more to sacrifice in order to give slavery and the slave trade the odor of nationality. In future the President of the United States has only laws to enforce and a Constitution to sustain ; and woe be to them who thwart him in the performance of his duty, and to himself, if he dares to shrink from the performance of his whole duty.

Gentlemen : I am in very poor condition for speaking in this open air, in such a noisy place, with the passing of vehicles before us. But I thank you, gentlemen, for the very kind manner in which you have been pleased to welcome me. It is indeed a glorious and exulting occasion that has called you together. It is an occasion well calculated to awaken the proudest and most glorious feelings that can belong to any free people. The events of the last day or two are well calculated to fill the heart with gratitude to a superintending Providence for his kindness in protecting so many brave and good men from misfortunes incident to all. Although, fellow citizens, I do not pretend to say that the triumphant and victorious results are in any degree scarcely attributable to any skill of mine, yet I will say that there has been no citizen in this wide spread land who, for the last three months, has felt such a deep and intense anxiety as I have. There has not been a single day, nor a single night, which has passed over me, that has not filled my heart with the deepest anxiety for my beloved country.

When I reflected that so many brave and patriotic young men, who, called to the rescue of the State, were placed somewhat under my care, and that they composed the flower, the hope and the pride of South Carolina, I confess to you that often, often at night, my heart has sunk under me with the deep responsibilities under which I labored. I know I have often been blamed by the impetuous and the zealous because I have not been quick enough to attempt an attack upon Sumter, and to bring these young men under her raking fire. But, fellow-citizens, believe me when I tell you that I abstained because I clearly saw that the day was coming when we would triumph beyond the power of man to put us down.

When I was called upon to preside over the destinies of this State, after an absence of three or four years from home, I felt that the heaviest and most painful situation of my life had come. But, so far as I was concerned, as long as I was Chief Magistrate of South Carolina, I was determined to maintain our separate independence and freedom at any and at every hazard. I felt that the State was in a peculiar position ; that we were immediately and at the first thrown upon the most scientific and expensive branches of modern warfare. We were then but ill-prepared to meet the sudden issues that might be forced upon us, so that our cause had to present firmness and decision on the one side, with great caution and forbearance on the other. We were, in fact, walking alone over a dangerous gulf. The least misstep or want of coolness might have precipitated our great cause into endless ruin. With the heavy ordnance we had to procure, and the heavy batteries that we were compelled to erect, I felt under these circumstances it required time, exact calculation and high science, and it would have been madness, it would have been folly, to have rushed the brave and patriotic men in my charge upon a work that was pronounced the Gibraltar of the South. But when the proper time had come, when I knew we were prepared, there was not a moment that I was not anxious and ready to strike the blow for my State and the independence of my country, let it lead to what it might, even if it led to blood and ruin. Thank God the day has come — thank God the war is open, and we will conquer or perish. They have vauntingly arrayed their twenty millions of men against us; they have «xultingly, also, arrayed their navy, and they have called us but a handful of men, a weak and isolated State full of pride, and what they call chivalry, and with the hated institution of slavery, as they supposed a source of weakness, too, but which, in fact, is a source of strength in war; and they have defied us. But we have rallied; we have met them, and met them in the issues they have tendered in their stronghold, by which they expected to subjugate our country. We have met them and we have conquered. We have defeated their twenty millions, and we have made the proud flag of the stars and stripes, that never was lowered before to any nation on this earth — we have lowered it in humility before the Palmetto and the Con- federate flags, and we have compelled them to raise by their side the white flag, and ask for an honorable surrender.

They have surrendered, and this proud fortress that was attempted to be a fortress for despotism, has now become, as its name indicates, a fortress for our independence. Besides, one of their most scientific officers, on the 26th of last December, escaped from what he called a weak and untenable fort, and went over to this strong and powerful position, because he could maintain himself, and because it was pronounced the key of the harbor. He left Fort Moultrie because it was untenable and at the mercy of Sumter. He chose Sumter as his fortress. We took the one he had deserted, and with it whipped him to his heart's content. And this proud fort of ours, so consecrated in the history of our country, has again, on the 13th day of April, achieved our independence as it did in the memorable days of the revolution. Yes, it was exultingly proclaimed that we had not the power to do it. We were ridiculed, and we were held up as the chivalry of this country, and they attempted to throw upon us even scorn and contempt.

Fellow-citizens, the danger may not yet be over, and I would be the last man to counsel any premature or extreme measures. I never would counsel my fellow-citizens in the day of proud victory to exhibit anything else but a noble forbearance and a manly generosity. The man who defended that fort has many of the attributes of a brave soldier. Let us not only show that we are a brave people, but that we are also generous and magnanimous, and that we would not use any extreme or exulting language calculated to be looked upon as unworthy of a high-toned and chivalrous race. Remember that the danger is not yet over. We, perhaps, may have just commenced the opening of events that may not end in our day and generation. Remember that there is now a hostile fleet of seven sail off your harbor, directed by bitter and malignant foes. They have come here proudly scorning and contemning your position. They may attempt to enter, but I say to them this night in defiance, let them come, let them come. If they do, although we may not wrap them in flames, as we have Sumter, we will wrap them in the waves and sink them too deep ever to be reached by pity or mercy.

But three months ago I was ridiculed for attempting to fortify the Channel on Morris' Island, and I was ridiculed for attempting to hold Fort Moultrie under the fire of Sumter. I was ridiculed, too, for attempting to keep out what they call the United States Navy. Many men, although our best men, thought it was a fruitless undertaking. But in the short period of three months we have the Channel fortified, so that at this moment it defies the proud Navy of the United States.

We have had a great many delicate and peculiar relations since the 20th of December last. We took the lead in coming out of the old Union and in forming- this new Confederacy. We therefore had certain relations to those who were to come out and stand by our side. We owed a great deal to those who were expected to come with us. We were bound to consult their feelings and their interests, and it was due that we should be forbearing as well as free. We are now one of the Confederate States, and they have sent us a brave and scientific officer, to whom much of the credit of this day's triumph is due. He has led you to victory, and will lead you to more if occasion offers.

I hope on to-morrow, Sabbath though it be, that under the protection of Providence, and under the orders of General Beauregard, Commander of our forces from the Confederate States, you shall have the proud gratifcation of seeing the Palmetto flag raised upon that fortress, and the Confederate flag of these free and independent States side by side with it; and there they shall float forever, in defiance of any power that man can bring against them. We have humbled the flag of the United States, and as long as I have the honor to preside as your Chief Magistrate, so help me God, there is no power on this earth shall ever lower from that fortress those flags, unless they be lowered and trailed in a sea of blood. I can here say to you it is the first time in the history of this country that the stars and stripes have been humbled. They have triumphed for seventy years, but today, on the 13th day of April, they have been humbled, and humbled before the glorious little State of South Carolina. The stars and stripes have been lowered before your eyes this day, but there are no flames that shall ever lower the flag of South Carolina while I have the honor to preside as your Chief Magistrate. And I pronounce here, before the civilized world, your independence is baptized in blood, your freedom is won upon a glorious battle-field, and you are free now and forever, in defiance of a world in arms.

We have gone through, under the guidance of Providence, so far, successfully and triumphantly. We have met the danger and the peril amid the storm and the booming of cannon ; and yet, wonderful to say, triumphant and glorious as the result has been, there has not been a single human being sacrificed in this cause so much identified with the liberty and the independence of our country. This must be the finger of Providence. We at first stood alone, but we are now in a new Confederacy of States, calculated to protect the peace and independence of our country, and at the same time to exercise a wise forbearance and generous and manly conduct towards all other nations.

All we ask is plain justice, liberality, honor and truth from others, and all we ever shall submit to is, and, I trust, we ever shall extend to all others, the liberality, the justice, the forbearance and moderation which become an enlightened and a great people.

In the events which have developed themselves in the last few days, we are at least without blame. This fort was held up as the fortress by which we were to be subjugated and kept permanently under the control of a Government we had repudiated and that was odious to us. We made every advance that reasonable men could make to ask for its possession, and there was nothing but the desire to subjugate that could at all make it an object of such importance to be possessed by a Government from which we had withdrawn. It was peremptorily refused, and I was informed from the highest quarters that it was to be supplied, and that those supplies should be sustained, if necessary, by force.

Under these circumstances, there was no alternative but to make the last sad appeal to arms and the God of Battles, and the result of this day has triumphantly shown that we were right and our opponents wrong.

Now, fellow-citizens, go to your homes. Be moderate, and abstain from every act and every sentiment of extreme language or unworthy violence. Show that you are not only really free, but that you deserve to be free ; keep cool, keep firm, keep united. A brave people are always generous and always magnanimous. We can meet our foes clad in steel and make them feel the weight of our metal upon any field of battle, but at the same time we can treat them with that liberality and noble magnanimity that always belong to a generous and a brave people.

I said, on the 17th of December last, on an occasion similar to this, that true. South Carolina stood alone, but in this there was nothing to fear, for she had on a memorable occasion previous to the declaration of independence itself, stood alone and fought the battle of Fort Moultrie, where she had sunk the ships of one of the proudest nations of the earth. And I said to you that, on the bloody battle field of Churubusco, our noble regiment had marched across that field under a fiery storm such as has seldom been seen, and that if need be she could now stand alone again and fight alone for her independence and her liberty. And now, fellow-citizens, on this, the 13th day of April, 1861, she has again fought alone and defeated an arrogant and assuming power, and she has gloriously triumphed alone, and thus again Fort Moultrie, which was so dear in our independence of 1776, has again answered, and is consecrated and baptized over again in our independence and freedom of 1861.

I studiously declined receiving volunteers, who so nobly and so gallantly offered themselves, from other States, because we had so many among ourselves who desired a place of danger and of peril, and demanded it as a right. I desired besides, as we had begun it first and alone without consultation, and as some said, rashly, I desired under these circumstances, that if we had to fight for our independence again that the battle should be fought and won by South Carolina alone, upon the same bloody field where she had fought for her independence in the days of her first revolution. True, true, we owe much to science and to the gallantry of Gen. Beauregard, who was sent to us by the President of the Confederate States. We do owe to him all honor and all gratitude for his high and manly bearing and noble conduct; but as far as our own companies, our battalions, our regiments and our men were concerned, the triumphs of this day have been due literally to South Carolina troops alone. I do not mean to say this by way of exultation, but as due to the truth of history, and I say it because South Carolina has been peculiarly singled out, abused, traduced and sneered at as being too weak and too small to defend herself, and was accused, too, of arrogance and presumption. But this day shows that, weak as we were supposed to be, we have defied the power of our enemies, and defeated them upon their sought and chosen battle field.

And now I here, in the name of South Carolina, return the gratitude of the State to those gallant and intelligent officers who have come forward and so generously served their State in this her day of trial. And they are too numerous even to mention in detail ; and I return the thanks and the gratitude of the State to those brave, true and patriotic young men who have left their business, who have sacrificed their greatest interests to come forward and to seek eagerly to defend their country when it was supposed that peril, danger, and even death, were inevitable. It is indeed to them not only a glorious day of triumph, but I, too, with feelings of deep gratitude, am enabled to return them back to their fond homes and kindred uninjured, and with the proud consciousness that the honor of their State has been unstained, and that their gallantry has been shown by the noble manner in which they have manned the batteries for their country's independence. It is to those men and those officers that we owe everything; and I do not pretend to claim anything myself, except that m}^ heart has been filled with deep anxiety, and T have spent my nights in painful and constant examination of all the details and all the points that might be necessary, not only to save the lives of our brave men, but to defend the independence of my country, and when the day had come, at the proper time to strike, and to strike for her independence, at any and at every hazard, let the consequences be what they may.

We have now taught a great lesson to this Confederacy. It is now clear that for all purposes of justice, of equality, and of common liberty, our American institutions are as strong 83 any that have ever been offered for the government of man. But when they are perverted to the purposes of injustice and fanaticism, of insult and wrong, that those same institutions are powerless ; and that when they lose that power which comes from right, that as far as the American people arc concerned they arc impotent and imbecile, because the heart, the great heart of the American people in reality, beats for what is right. We then stand upon the right. We stand upon the inalienable right of a people to choose their own institutions, and that all just government rests upon the consent of the governed, and that any Government that attempts to exercise power without this consent not only is unjust to a brave, true and patriotic people, but that people can defy that power, and they can conquer, and they can triumph.

But let me say again, fellow-citizens, that I am in rather a poor condition to speak at this time of night, under the confusion that comes from a noisy street, and I return you my thanks, and hope that- there may be no events to sadden the future, but that the present glorious day will ever be remembered and sink so deep into the hearts of a grateful people as to show that by virtue and firmness, they can not only be free, but can prove to the world that they deserve to be free.

Note. — The above speech was delivered by Grovernor Pickens, from the balcony of the Charleston Hotel, on the evening of the surrender of Fort Sumter, to a large assemblage of the citizens of Charleston, and is published just as it was reported at the time for the Charleston Courier, with the exception of the long and continued cheering which greeted the speaker at every interval of the address.