Excerpt from the book:
"The Life of George Lord Anson"
Admiral of the Fleet; Vice-admiral of Great Britain; and First Lord Commissioner of the Admiralty; Previous to, and During, The Seven-Years' War
by Sir John Barrow, Bart., F.R.S.
(published by John Murray, Albemarle street, London, 1839)
BRILLIANT EXPLOITS OF THE NAVY
Rear-Admiral Hawke's Action of 1747[6]
* Sir John Barrow situates these events under '1747'
other historiens give the year as 1746
pages 170-177
Soon after the return of Admiral (now Lord) Anson, information was received at the Admiralty of a large fleet of merchant ships, preparing to sail from Basque Roads for the West Indies, under convoy of a strong squadron of ships of war, commanded by M. de Letendeur. Orders were immediately issued to prepare a sufficient force to intercept this convoy, and that active and gallant officer, Rear-Admiral Hawke, was directed to hoist his flag in the Devonshire, of sixty-six guns, and take the command of the squadron, which consisted of fourteen sail of the line, besides frigates.
Hawke at this time was an officer not much known, and from the year 1734, when he was made captain, had chiefly remained on shore until, in 1743, he was appointed to the Berwick, of seventy-four guns, and ordered to join Admiral Matthews. It therefore occasioned a good deal of surprise in the service, that so important a command should be given to so young a flag-officer, and one who had so little distinguished himself; but Anson had noted the character and conduct of the man, though the public had not, for his gallant bearing and brilliant success in the action of Matthews and Lestock, in 1744, in which so many officers were disgraced.
In the course of that action the El Poder, a Spanish ship, of sixty-four, had driven one of our ships out of the line, which Hawke, in the Berwick, perceiving, bore down upon her within pistol-shot, poured into her a broadside with such effect, that in a few minutes afterwards she struck, and was taken possession of by the Berwick, in the face of both the fleets, - the only capture that was made on that day; but a melancholy fate attended the El Poder. Being dismasted, and unable to follow the British fleet when they wore, she was retaken by the French squadron, while she had on board a lieutenant and twenty-three men, belonging to the Berwick: to prevent her falling again into the hands of the English, the French set her on fire, and abandoned her; and she blew up in the night. In the first Supplement to the Gazette no mention is made of the Berwick, or of the name of Hawke; it stated only that a ship of Navarre, of sixty-six guns, was obliged to surrender; and that of 900 men, only the captain and 200 were saved, when she was ordered to be burnt. In the subsequent Gazette, containing Mattews' despatch, nothing more is said of the Poder, except that Captain Hawke, of the Berwick, left her, but could not get his lieutenant and twenty-three men out of her; his first lieutenant having done all he could to persuade the men to quit her, but in vain.
If, for the moment, Anson caused some displeasure by the appointment of such a man, he obtained great credit for having got together this powerful squadron in so short a time, it being completely fitted and ready for sea the first week in August. On the 9th of that month, the rear-admiral put to sea from Plymouth, and lost no time in getting into a position, which appeared to him best calculated to intercept the enemy's fleet, which, however, did not leave Rochelle Road until the 8th October. There is in Hawke's narrative of his rencontre with the enemy, something so much more clear and circumstantial, than is usually the case in the description of naval battles, that no abridgment could be made without destroying in some degree its interest; and no apology therefore is necessary for giving it in extenso.
'At seven in the morning of the 14th October, being in the latitude of 47� 49' N. longitude, from Cape Finisterre 1� 2' W., the Edinburgh made the signal for seven sail in the south-east quarter. I immediately made the signal for all the fleet to chase.
About eight we saw a great number of ships, but so crowded together, that we could not count them.
At ten made the signal for the line-of-battle a-head.
The Louisa, being the headmost and weathermost ship, made the signal for discovering eleven sail of the enemy's convoy to crowd away with all the sail they could set, while their ships of war were endeavouring to form in a line astern of them, and hauled near the wind, under their topsails and foresails, and some with top-gallant sails set.
Finding we lost time in forming our line, while the enemy was standing away from us, at eleven made the signal for the whole squadron to chase: half an hour after, observing our headmost ships to be within a proper distance, I made the signal to engage, which was immediately obeyed.
The Lion and Princess Louisa began the engagement, and were followed by the rest of the squadron as they could come up, and went from rear to van.
The enemy having the weather-gage of us, and a smart and constant fire being kept on both sides, the smoke prevented my seeing the number of the enemy, or what happened on either side for some time.
In passing on to the first ship we could get near, we received many fires at a distance, till we came close to the Severne, of fifty guns, which we soon silenced, and left to be taken up by the frigates astern. Then perceiving the Eagle and Edinburgh (who had lost her fore-topmast) engaged, we kept our wind as close as possible, in order to assist them.
This attempt of ours was frustrated by the Eagle's falling twice on board us, having had her wheel shot to pieces, and all the men at it killed, and all her braces and bowlines gone. This drove us to leeward, and prevented our attacking Le Monarche, of seventy-four, and the Tonnant, of eighty guns, within any distance to do execution. However, we attempted both, especially the latter.
While we were engaged with her, the breechings of all our lower-deck guns broke, and the guns flew fore and aft, which obliged us to shoot a-head, for our upper and quarter-deck guns could not reach her. Captain Harland in the Tilbury, observing that she fired single guns at us, in order to dismast us, stood on the other tack, between her and the Devonshire, and gave her a very smart fire. By the time the new breechings were all seized I was got almost alongside the Trident, of sixty-four guns, whom I engaged as soon as possible, and silenced by as brisk a fire as I could make.
Just before I attacked her, observing the Kent, which seemed to have little or no damage, at some distance astern of the Tonnant, I flung out Captain Fox's pendant, to make sail a-head to engage her, as I saw it was in her power to get close up with her, she being somewhat disabled, having lost her main-topmast.
Seeing some of our ships at that time not so closely engaged as I could have wished, and not being well able to distinguish who they were, I flung out the signal for coming to a closer engagement.
Soon after I got alongside, within musket-shot of the Terrible, of seventy-four guns, and 700 men. Near seven at night she called out for quarter.
Thus far I have been particular with regard to the share the Devonshire bore in the action of that day. As to the other ships, as far as fell within my notice, their commanders, officers, and companies behaved with the greatest spirit and resolution, in every respect like Englishmen. Only I am sorry to acquaint their Lordships that I must except Captain Fox, whose conduct on that day I beg they would give directions for inquiring into at a court-martial.
Having observed that six of the enemy's ships had struck, and it being very dark, and our own ships dispersed, I thought it best to bring to for that night; and seeing a great firing a long way a-stern of me, I was in hopes to have seen more of the enemy's ships taken in the morning; but instead of that, I received the melancholy account of Captain Saumarez being killed, and that the Tonnant had escaped in the night by the assistance of the Intrepide, which, by having the wind of our ships, had received no damage that I could perceive. Immediately I called a council of war.
As to the French convoy's escaping, it was not possible for me to detach any ships after them at first, or during the action, except the frigates, and that, I thought, would have been imprudent, as I observed several large ships of war among them; and, to confirm me in this opinion, I have since learned that they had the Content of sixty-four guns, and many frigates from thirty-six guns downwards; however, I took a step which seemed to me the most probable to intercept them; for, as soon as I could man and victual the Weazel sloop, I detached her with an express to Commodore Legge (Leeward Islands).
As the enemy's ships were large, except the Severne, they took a great deal of drubbing, and lost all their masts, excepting two, who had their foremasts left: this has obliged me to lay by these two days past, in order to put them into a condition to be brought into port, as well as our own, which have suffered greatly.
I have sent this express by Captain Moore of the Devonshire, in the Hector; and it would be doing great injustice to merit not to say that he signalised himself greatly in the action.'
The following are the lists of the two squadrons engaged in the action:-
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