FEDERALIST No. 21
Other Defects of the Present Confederation
For the Independent Journal.
Wednesday, December 12, 1787
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
HAVING in the three last numbers taken a summary review of the principal
circumstances and events which have depicted the genius and fate of
other confederate governments, I shall now proceed in the enumeration of
the most important of those defects which have hitherto disappointed our
hopes from the system established among ourselves. To form a safe and
satisfactory judgment of the proper remedy, it is absolutely necessary
that we should be well acquainted with the extent and malignity of the
disease.
The next most palpable defect of the subsisting Confederation, is the
total want of a SANCTION to its laws. The United States, as now
composed, have no powers to exact obedience, or punish disobedience to
their resolutions, either by pecuniary mulcts, by a suspension or
divestiture of privileges, or by any other constitutional mode. There is
no express delegation of authority to them to use force against
delinquent members; and if such a right should be ascribed to the
federal head, as resulting from the nature of the social compact between
the States, it must be by inference and construction, in the face of
that part of the second article, by which it is declared, "that each
State shall retain every power, jurisdiction, and right, not EXPRESSLY
delegated to the United States in Congress assembled." There is,
doubtless, a striking absurdity in supposing that a right of this kind
does not exist, but we are reduced to the dilemma either of embracing
that supposition, preposterous as it may seem, or of contravening or
explaining away a provision, which has been of late a repeated theme of
the eulogies of those who oppose the new Constitution; and the want of
which, in that plan, has been the subject of much plausible
animadversion, and severe criticism. If we are unwilling to impair the
force of this applauded provision, we shall be obliged to conclude, that
the United States afford the extraordinary spectacle of a government
destitute even of the shadow of constitutional power to enforce the
execution of its own laws. It will appear, from the specimens which have
been cited, that the American Confederacy, in this particular, stands
discriminated from every other institution of a similar kind, and
exhibits a new and unexampled phenomenon in the political world.
The want of a mutual guaranty of the State governments is another
capital imperfection in the federal plan. There is nothing of this kind
declared in the articles that compose it; and to imply a tacit guaranty
from considerations of utility, would be a still more flagrant departure
from the clause which has been mentioned, than to imply a tacit power of
coercion from the like considerations. The want of a guaranty, though it
might in its consequences endanger the Union, does not so immediately
attack its existence as the want of a constitutional sanction to its
laws.
Without a guaranty the assistance to be derived from the Union in
repelling those domestic dangers which may sometimes threaten the
existence of the State constitutions, must be renounced. Usurpation may
rear its crest in each State, and trample upon the liberties of the
people, while the national government could legally do nothing more than
behold its encroachments with indignation and regret. A successful
faction may erect a tyranny on the ruins of order and law, while no
succor could constitutionally be afforded by the Union to the friends
and supporters of the government. The tempestuous situation from which
Massachusetts has scarcely emerged, evinces that dangers of this kind
are not merely speculative. Who can determine what might have been the
issue of her late convulsions, if the malcontents had been headed by a
Caesar or by a Cromwell? Who can predict what effect a despotism,
established in Massachusetts, would have upon the liberties of New
Hampshire or Rhode Island, of Connecticut or New York?
The inordinate pride of State importance has suggested to some minds an
objection to the principle of a guaranty in the federal government, as
involving an officious interference in the domestic concerns of the
members. A scruple of this kind would deprive us of one of the principal
advantages to be expected from union, and can only flow from a
misapprehension of the nature of the provision itself. It could be no
impediment to reforms of the State constitution by a majority of the
people in a legal and peaceable mode. This right would remain
undiminished. The guaranty could only operate against changes to be
effected by violence. Towards the preventions of calamities of this
kind, too many checks cannot be provided. The peace of society and the
stability of government depend absolutely on the efficacy of the
precautions adopted on this head. Where the whole power of the
government is in the hands of the people, there is the less pretense for
the use of violent remedies in partial or occasional distempers of the
State. The natural cure for an ill-administration, in a popular or
representative constitution, is a change of men. A guaranty by the
national authority would be as much levelled against the usurpations of
rulers as against the ferments and outrages of faction and sedition in
the community.
The principle of regulating the contributions of the States to the
common treasury by QUOTAS is another fundamental error in the
Confederation. Its repugnancy to an adequate supply of the national
exigencies has been already pointed out, and has sufficiently appeared
from the trial which has been made of it. I speak of it now solely with
a view to equality among the States. Those who have been accustomed to
contemplate the circumstances which produce and constitute national
wealth, must be satisfied that there is no common standard or barometer
by which the degrees of it can be ascertained. Neither the value of
lands, nor the numbers of the people, which have been successively
proposed as the rule of State contributions, has any pretension to being
a just representative. If we compare the wealth of the United
Netherlands with that of Russia or Germany, or even of France, and if we
at the same time compare the total value of the lands and the aggregate
population of that contracted district with the total value of the lands
and the aggregate population of the immense regions of either of the
three last-mentioned countries, we shall at once discover that there is
no comparison between the proportion of either of these two objects and
that of the relative wealth of those nations. If the like parallel were
to be run between several of the American States, it would furnish a
like result. Let Virginia be contrasted with North Carolina,
Pennsylvania with Connecticut, or Maryland with New Jersey, and we shall
be convinced that the respective abilities of those States, in relation
to revenue, bear little or no analogy to their comparative stock in
lands or to their comparative population. The position may be equally
illustrated by a similar process between the counties of the same State.
No man who is acquainted with the State of New York will doubt that the
active wealth of King's County bears a much greater proportion to that
of Montgomery than it would appear to be if we should take either the
total value of the lands or the total number of the people as a
criterion!
The wealth of nations depends upon an infinite variety of causes.
Situation, soil, climate, the nature of the productions, the nature of
the government, the genius of the citizens, the degree of information
they possess, the state of commerce, of arts, of industry, these
circumstances and many more, too complex, minute, or adventitious to
admit of a particular specification, occasion differences hardly
conceivable in the relative opulence and riches of different countries.
The consequence clearly is that there can be no common measure of
national wealth, and, of course, no general or stationary rule by which
the ability of a state to pay taxes can be determined. The attempt,
therefore, to regulate the contributions of the members of a confederacy
by any such rule, cannot fail to be productive of glaring inequality and
extreme oppression.
This inequality would of itself be sufficient in America to work the
eventual destruction of the Union, if any mode of enforcing a compliance
with its requisitions could be devised. The suffering States would not
long consent to remain associated upon a principle which distributes the
public burdens with so unequal a hand, and which was calculated to
impoverish and oppress the citizens of some States, while those of
others would scarcely be conscious of the small proportion of the weight
they were required to sustain. This, however, is an evil inseparable
from the principle of quotas and requisitions.
There is no method of steering clear of this inconvenience, but by
authorizing the national government to raise its own revenues in its own
way. Imposts, excises, and, in general, all duties upon articles of
consumption, may be compared to a fluid, which will, in time, find its
level with the means of paying them. The amount to be contributed by
each citizen will in a degree be at his own option, and can be regulated
by an attention to his resources. The rich may be extravagant, the poor
can be frugal; and private oppression may always be avoided by a
judicious selection of objects proper for such impositions. If
inequalities should arise in some States from duties on particular
objects, these will, in all probability, be counterbalanced by
proportional inequalities in other States, from the duties on other
objects. In the course of time and things, an equilibrium, as far as it
is attainable in so complicated a subject, will be established
everywhere. Or, if inequalities should still exist, they would neither
be so great in their degree, so uniform in their operation, nor so
odious in their appearance, as those which would necessarily spring from
quotas, upon any scale that can possibly be devised.
It is a signal advantage of taxes on articles of consumption, that they
contain in their own nature a security against excess. They prescribe
their own limit; which cannot be exceeded without defeating the end
proposed, that is, an extension of the revenue. When applied to this
object, the saying is as just as it is witty, that, "in political
arithmetic, two and two do not always make four." If duties are too
high, they lessen the consumption; the collection is eluded; and the
product to the treasury is not so great as when they are confined within
proper and moderate bounds. This forms a complete barrier against any
material oppression of the citizens by taxes of this class, and is
itself a natural limitation of the power of imposing them.
Impositions of this kind usually fall under the denomination of indirect
taxes, and must for a long time constitute the chief part of the revenue
raised in this country. Those of the direct kind, which principally
relate to land and buildings, may admit of a rule of apportionment.
Either the value of land, or the number of the people, may serve as a
standard. The state of agriculture and the populousness of a country
have been considered as nearly connected with each other. And, as a
rule, for the purpose intended, numbers, in the view of simplicity and
certainty, are entitled to a preference. In every country it is a
herculean task to obtain a valuation of the land; in a country
imperfectly settled and progressive in improvement, the difficulties are
increased almost to impracticability. The expense of an accurate
valuation is, in all situations, a formidable objection. In a branch of
taxation where no limits to the discretion of the government are to be
found in the nature of things, the establishment of a fixed rule, not
incompatible with the end, may be attended with fewer inconveniences
than to leave that discretion altogether at large.
PUBLIUS
FEDERALIST No. 22
The Same Subject Continued
(Other Defects of the Present Confederation)
From the New York Packet.
Friday, December 14, 1787.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
IN ADDITION to the defects already enumerated in the existing federal
system, there are others of not less importance, which concur in
rendering it altogether unfit for the administration of the affairs of
the Union.
The want of a power to regulate commerce is by all parties allowed to be
of the number. The utility of such a power has been anticipated under
the first head of our inquiries; and for this reason, as well as from
the universal conviction entertained upon the subject, little need be
added in this place. It is indeed evident, on the most superficial view,
that there is no object, either as it respects the interests of trade or
finance, that more strongly demands a federal superintendence. The want
of it has already operated as a bar to the formation of beneficial
treaties with foreign powers, and has given occasions of dissatisfaction
between the States. No nation acquainted with the nature of our
political association would be unwise enough to enter into stipulations
with the United States, by which they conceded privileges of any
importance to them, while they were apprised that the engagements on the
part of the Union might at any moment be violated by its members, and
while they found from experience that they might enjoy every advantage
they desired in our markets, without granting us any return but such as
their momentary convenience might suggest. It is not, therefore, to be
wondered at that Mr. Jenkinson, in ushering into the House of Commons a
bill for regulating the temporary intercourse between the two countries,
should preface its introduction by a declaration that similar provisions
in former bills had been found to answer every purpose to the commerce
of Great Britain, and that it would be prudent to persist in the plan
until it should appear whether the American government was likely or not
to acquire greater consistency.[1]
Several States have endeavored, by separate prohibitions, restrictions,
and exclusions, to influence the conduct of that kingdom in this
particular, but the want of concert, arising from the want of a general
authority and from clashing and dissimilar views in the State, has
hitherto frustrated every experiment of the kind, and will continue to
do so as long as the same obstacles to a uniformity of measures continue
to exist.
The interfering and unneighborly regulations of some States, contrary to
the true spirit of the Union, have, in different instances, given just
cause of umbrage and complaint to others, and it is to be feared that
examples of this nature, if not restrained by a national control, would
be multiplied and extended till they became not less serious sources of
animosity and discord than injurious impediments to the intcrcourse
between the different parts of the Confederacy. "The commerce of the
German empire[2] is in continual trammels from the multiplicity of the
duties which the several princes and states exact upon the merchandises
passing through their territories, by means of which the fine streams
and navigable rivers with which Germany is so happily watered are
rendered almost useless." Though the genius of the people of this
country might never permit this description to be strictly applicable to
us, yet we may reasonably expect, from the gradual conflicts of State
regulations, that the citizens of each would at length come to be
considered and treated by the others in no better light than that of
foreigners and aliens.
The power of raising armies, by the most obvious construction of the
articles of the Confederation, is merely a power of making requisitions
upon the States for quotas of men. This practice in the course of the
late war, was found replete with obstructions to a vigorous and to an
economical system of defense. It gave birth to a competition between the
States which created a kind of auction for men. In order to furnish the
quotas required of them, they outbid each other till bounties grew to an
enormous and insupportable size. The hope of a still further increase
afforded an inducement to those who were disposed to serve to
procrastinate their enlistment, and disinclined them from engaging for
any considerable periods. Hence, slow and scanty levies of men, in the
most critical emergencies of our affairs; short enlistments at an
unparalleled expense; continual fluctuations in the troops, ruinous to
their discipline and subjecting the public safety frequently to the
perilous crisis of a disbanded army. Hence, also, those oppressive
expedients for raising men which were upon several occasions practiced,
and which nothing but the enthusiasm of liberty would have induced the
people to endure.
This method of raising troops is not more unfriendly to economy and
vigor than it is to an equal distribution of the burden. The States near
the seat of war, influenced by motives of self-preservation, made
efforts to furnish their quotas, which even exceeded their abilities;
while those at a distance from danger were, for the most part, as remiss
as the others were diligent, in their exertions. The immediate pressure
of this inequality was not in this case, as in that of the contributions
of money, alleviated by the hope of a final liquidation. The States
which did not pay their proportions of money might at least be charged
with their deficiencies; but no account could be formed of the
deficiencies in the supplies of men. We shall not, however, see much
reason to reget the want of this hope, when we consider how little
prospect there is, that the most delinquent States will ever be able to
make compensation for their pecuniary failures. The system of quotas and
requisitions, whether it be applied to men or money, is, in every view,
a system of imbecility in the Union, and of inequality and injustice
among the members.
The right of equal suffrage among the States is another exceptionable
part of the Confederation. Every idea of proportion and every rule of
fair representation conspire to condemn a principle, which gives to
Rhode Island an equal weight in the scale of power with Massachusetts,
or Connecticut, or New York; and to Deleware an equal voice in the
national deliberations with Pennsylvania, or Virginia, or North
Carolina. Its operation contradicts the fundamental maxim of republican
government, which requires that the sense of the majority should
prevail. Sophistry may reply, that sovereigns are equal, and that a
majority of the votes of the States will be a majority of confederated
America. But this kind of logical legerdemain will never counteract the
plain suggestions of justice and common-sense. It may happen that this
majority of States is a small minority of the people of America;[3]
and two thirds of the people of America could not long be persuaded,
upon the credit of artificial distinctions and syllogistic subtleties,
to submit their interests to the management and disposal of one third.
The larger States would after a while revolt from the idea of receiving
the law from the smaller. To acquiesce in such a privation of their due
importance in the political scale, would be not merely to be insensible
to the love of power, but even to sacrifice the desire of equality. It
is neither rational to expect the first, nor just to require the last.
The smaller States, considering how peculiarly their safety and welfare
depend on union, ought readily to renounce a pretension which, if not
relinquished, would prove fatal to its duration.
It may be objected to this, that not seven but nine States, or two
thirds of the whole number, must consent to the most important
resolutions; and it may be thence inferred that nine States would always
comprehend a majority of the Union. But this does not obviate the
impropriety of an equal vote between States of the most unequal
dimensions and populousness; nor is the inference accurate in point of
fact; for we can enumerate nine States which contain less than a
majority of the people;[4] and it is constitutionally possible that
these nine may give the vote. Besides, there are matters of considerable
moment determinable by a bare majority; and there are others, concerning
which doubts have been entertained, which, if interpreted in favor of
the sufficiency of a vote of seven States, would extend its operation to
interests of the first magnitude. In addition to this, it is to be
observed that there is a probability of an increase in the number of
States, and no provision for a proportional augmentation of the ratio of
votes.
But this is not all: what at first sight may seem a remedy, is, in
reality, a poison. To give a minority a negative upon the majority
(which is always the case where more than a majority is requisite to a
decision), is, in its tendency, to subject the sense of the greater
number to that of the lesser. Congress, from the nonattendance of a few
States, have been frequently in the situation of a Polish diet, where a
single VOTE has been sufficient to put a stop to all their movements. A
sixtieth part of the Union, which is about the proportion of Delaware
and Rhode Island, has several times been able to oppose an entire bar to
its operations. This is one of those refinements which, in practice, has
an effect the reverse of what is expected from it in theory. The
necessity of unanimity in public bodies, or of something approaching
towards it, has been founded upon a supposition that it would contribute
to security. But its real operation is to embarrass the administration,
to destroy the energy of the government, and to substitute the pleasure,
caprice, or artifices of an insignificant, turbulent, or corrupt junto,
to the regular deliberations and decisions of a respectable majority. In
those emergencies of a nation, in which the goodness or badness, the
weakness or strength of its government, is of the greatest importance,
there is commonly a necessity for action. The public business must, in
some way or other, go forward. If a pertinacious minority can control
the opinion of a majority, respecting the best mode of conducting it,
the majority, in order that something may be done, must conform to the
views of the minority; and thus the sense of the smaller number will
overrule that of the greater, and give a tone to the national
proceedings. Hence, tedious delays; continual negotiation and intrigue;
contemptible compromises of the public good. And yet, in such a system,
it is even happy when such compromises can take place: for upon some
occasions things will not admit of accommodation; and then the measures
of government must be injuriously suspended, or fatally defeated. It is
often, by the impracticability of obtaining the concurrence of the
necessary number of votes, kept in a state of inaction. Its situation
must always savor of weakness, sometimes border upon anarchy.
It is not difficult to discover, that a principle of this kind gives
greater scope to foreign corruption, as well as to domestic faction,
than that which permits the sense of the majority to decide; though the
contrary of this has been presumed. The mistake has proceeded from not
attending with due care to the mischiefs that may be occasioned by
obstructing the progress of government at certain critical seasons. When
the concurrence of a large number is required by the Constitution to the
doing of any national act, we are apt to rest satisfied that all is
safe, because nothing improper will be likely TO BE DONE, but we forget
how much good may be prevented, and how much ill may be produced, by the
power of hindering the doing what may be necessary, and of keeping
affairs in the same unfavorable posture in which they may happen to
stand at particular periods.
Suppose, for instance, we were engaged in a war, in conjunction with one
foreign nation, against another. Suppose the necessity of our situation
demanded peace, and the interest or ambition of our ally led him to seek
the prosecution of the war, with views that might justify us in making
separate terms. In such a state of things, this ally of ours would
evidently find it much easier, by his bribes and intrigues, to tie up
the hands of government from making peace, where two thirds of all the
votes were requisite to that object, than where a simple majority would
suffice. In the first case, he would have to corrupt a smaller number;
in the last, a greater number. Upon the same principle, it would be much
easier for a foreign power with which we were at war to perplex our
councils and embarrass our exertions. And, in a commercial view, we may
be subjected to similar inconveniences. A nation, with which we might
have a treaty of commerce, could with much greater facility prevent our
forming a connection with her competitor in trade, though such a
connection should be ever so beneficial to ourselves.
Evils of this description ought not to be regarded as imaginary. One of
the weak sides of republics, among their numerous advantages, is that
they afford too easy an inlet to foreign corruption. An hereditary
monarch, though often disposed to sacrifice his subjects to his
ambition, has so great a personal interest in the government and in the
external glory of the nation, that it is not easy for a foreign power to
give him an equivalent for what he would sacrifice by treachery to the
state. The world has accordingly been witness to few examples of this
species of royal prostitution, though there have been abundant specimens
of every other kind.
In republics, persons elevated from the mass of the community, by the
suffrages of their fellow-citizens, to stations of great pre-eminence
and power, may find compensations for betraying their trust, which, to
any but minds animated and guided by superior virtue, may appear to
exceed the proportion of interest they have in the common stock, and to
overbalance the obligations of duty. Hence it is that history furnishes
us with so many mortifying examples of the prevalency of foreign
corruption in republican governments. How much this contributed to the
ruin of the ancient commonwealths has been already delineated. It is
well known that the deputies of the United Provinces have, in various
instances, been purchased by the emissaries of the neighboring kingdoms.
The Earl of Chesterfield (if my memory serves me right), in a letter to
his court, intimates that his success in an important negotiation must
depend on his obtaining a major's commission for one of those deputies.
And in Sweden the parties were alternately bought by France and England
in so barefaced and notorious a manner that it excited universal disgust
in the nation, and was a principal cause that the most limited monarch
in Europe, in a single day, without tumult, violence, or opposition,
became one of the most absolute and uncontrolled.
A circumstance which crowns the defects of the Confederation remains yet
to be mentioned, the want of a judiciary power. Laws are a dead letter
without courts to expound and define their true meaning and operation.
The treaties of the United States, to have any force at all, must be
considered as part of the law of the land. Their true import, as far as
respects individuals, must, like all other laws, be ascertained by
judicial determinations. To produce uniformity in these determinations,
they ought to be submitted, in the last resort, to one SUPREME TRIBUNAL.
And this tribunal ought to be instituted under the same authority which
forms the treaties themselves. These ingredients are both indispensable.
If there is in each State a court of final jurisdiction, there may be as
many different final determinations on the same point as there are
courts. There are endless diversities in the opinions of men. We often
see not only different courts but the judges of the came court differing
from each other. To avoid the confusion which would unavoidably result
from the contradictory decisions of a number of independent
judicatories, all nations have found it necessary to establish one court
paramount to the rest, possessing a general superintendence, and
authorized to settle and declare in the last resort a uniform rule of
civil justice.
This is the more necessary where the frame of the government is so
compounded that the laws of the whole are in danger of being contravened
by the laws of the parts. In this case, if the particular tribunals are
invested with a right of ultimate jurisdiction, besides the
contradictions to be expected from difference of opinion, there will be
much to fear from the bias of local views and prejudices, and from the
interference of local regulations. As often as such an interference was
to happen, there would be reason to apprehend that the provisions of the
particular laws might be preferred to those of the general laws; for
nothing is more natural to men in office than to look with peculiar
deference towards that authority to which they owe their official
existence.
The treaties of the United States, under the present Constitution, are
liable to the infractions of thirteen different legislatures, and as
many different courts of final jurisdiction, acting under the authority
of those legislatures. The faith, the reputation, the peace of the whole
Union, are thus continually at the mercy of the prejudices, the
passions, and the interests of every member of which it is composed. Is
it possible that foreign nations can either respect or confide in such a
government? Is it possible that the people of America will longer
consent to trust their honor, their happiness, their safety, on so
precarious a foundation?
In this review of the Confederation, I have confined myself to the
exhibition of its most material defects; passing over those
imperfections in its details by which even a great part of the power
intended to be conferred upon it has been in a great measure rendered
abortive. It must be by this time evident to all men of reflection, who
can divest themselves of the prepossessions of preconceived opinions,
that it is a system so radically vicious and unsound, as to admit not of
amendment but by an entire change in its leading features and
characters.
The organization of Congress is itself utterly improper for the exercise
of those powers which are necessary to be deposited in the Union. A
single assembly may be a proper receptacle of those slender, or rather
fettered, authorities, which have been heretofore delegated to the
federal head; but it would be inconsistent with all the principles of
good government, to intrust it with those additional powers which, even
the moderate and more rational adversaries of the proposed Constitution
admit, ought to reside in the United States. If that plan should not be
adopted, and if the necessity of the Union should be able to withstand
the ambitious aims of those men who may indulge magnificent schemes of
personal aggrandizement from its dissolution, the probability would be,
that we should run into the project of conferring supplementary powers
upon Congress, as they are now constituted; and either the machine, from
the intrinsic feebleness of its structure, will moulder into pieces, in
spite of our ill-judged efforts to prop it; or, by successive
augmentations of its force an energy, as necessity might prompt, we
shall finally accumulate, in a single body, all the most important
prerogatives of sovereignty, and thus entail upon our posterity one of
the most execrable forms of government that human infatuation ever
contrived. Thus, we should create in reality that very tyranny which the
adversaries of the new Constitution either are, or affect to be,
solicitous to avert.
It has not a little contributed to the infirmities of the existing
federal system, that it never had a ratification by the PEOPLE. Resting
on no better foundation than the consent of the several legislatures, it
has been exposed to frequent and intricate questions concerning the
validity of its powers, and has, in some instances, given birth to the
enormous doctrine of a right of legislative repeal. Owing its
ratification to the law of a State, it has been contended that the same
authority might repeal the law by which it was ratified. However gross a
heresy it may be to maintain that a PARTY to a COMPACT has a right to
revoke that COMPACT, the doctrine itself has had respectable advocates.
The possibility of a question of this nature proves the necessity of
laying the foundations of our national government deeper than in the
mere sanction of delegated authority. The fabric of American empire
ought to rest on the solid basis of THE CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE. The
streams of national power ought to flow immediately from that pure,
original fountain of all legitimate authority.
PUBLIUS
1. This, as nearly as I can recollect, was the sense of his speech on
introducing the last bill.
2. Encyclopedia, article "Empire."
3. New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Delaware, Georgia, South
Carolina, and Maryland are a majority of the whole number of the States,
but they do not contain one third of the people.
4. Add New York and Connecticut to the foregoing seven, and they will be
less than a majority.
FEDERALIST No. 23
The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to
the Preservation of the Union
From the New York Packet.
Tuesday, December 18, 1787.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE necessity of a Constitution, at least equally energetic with the one
proposed, to the preservation of the Union, is the point at the
examination of which we are now arrived.
This inquiry will naturally divide itself into three branches -- the
objects to be provided for by the federal government, the quantity of
power necessary to the accomplishment of those objects, the persons upon
whom that power ought to operate. Its distribution and organization will
more properly claim our attention under the succeeding head.
The principal purposes to be answered by union are these -- the common
defense of the members; the preservation of the public peace as well
against internal convulsions as external attacks; the regulation of
commerce with other nations and between the States; the superintendence
of our intercourse, political and commercial, with foreign countries.
The authorities essential to the common defense are these: to raise
armies; to build and equip fleets; to prescribe rules for the government
of both; to direct their operations; to provide for their support. These
powers ought to exist without limitation, BECAUSE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO
FORESEE OR DEFINE THE EXTENT AND VARIETY OF NATIONAL EXIGENCIES, OR THE
CORRESPONDENT EXTENT AND VARIETY OF THE MEANS WHICH MAY BE NECESSARY TO
SATISFY THEM. The circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are
infinite, and for this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be
imposed on the power to which the care of it is committed. This power
ought to be coextensive with all the possible combinations of such
circumstances; and ought to be under the direction of the same councils
which are appointed to preside over the common defense.
This is one of those truths which, to a correct and unprejudiced mind,
carries its own evidence along with it; and may be obscured, but cannot
be made plainer by argument or reasoning. It rests upon axioms as simple
as they are universal; the MEANS ought to be proportioned to the END;
the persons, from whose agency the attainment of any END is expected,
ought to possess the MEANS by which it is to be attained.
Whether there ought to be a federal government intrusted with the care
of the common defense, is a question in the first instance, open for
discussion; but the moment it is decided in the affirmative, it will
follow, that that government ought to be clothed with all the powers
requisite to complete execution of its trust. And unless it can be shown
that the circumstances which may affect the public safety are reducible
within certain determinate limits; unless the contrary of this position
can be fairly and rationally disputed, it must be admitted, as a
necessary consequence, that there can be no limitation of that authority
which is to provide for the defense and protection of the community, in
any matter essential to its efficacy that is, in any matter essential to
the FORMATION, DIRECTION, or SUPPORT of the NATIONAL FORCES.
Defective as the present Confederation has been proved to be, this
principle appears to have been fully recognized by the framers of it;
though they have not made proper or adequate provision for its exercise.
Congress have an unlimited discretion to make requisitions of men and
money; to govern the army and navy; to direct their operations. As their
requisitions are made constitutionally binding upon the States, who are
in fact under the most solemn obligations to furnish the supplies
required of them, the intention evidently was that the United States
should command whatever resources were by them judged requisite to the
"common defense and general welfare." It was presumed that a sense of
their true interests, and a regard to the dictates of good faith, would
be found sufficient pledges for the punctual performance of the duty of
the members to the federal head.
The experiment has, however, demonstrated that this expectation was
ill-founded and illusory; and the observations, made under the last
head, will, I imagine, have sufficed to convince the impartial and
discerning, that there is an absolute necessity for an entire change in
the first principles of the system; that if we are in earnest about
giving the Union energy and duration, we must abandon the vain project
of legislating upon the States in their collective capacities; we must
extend the laws of the federal government to the individual citizens of
America; we must discard the fallacious scheme of quotas and
requisitions, as equally impracticable and unjust. The result from all
this is that the Union ought to be invested with full power to levy
troops; to build and equip fleets; and to raise the revenues which will
be required for the formation and support of an army and navy, in the
customary and ordinary modes practiced in other governments.
If the circumstances of our country are such as to demand a compound
instead of a simple, a confederate instead of a sole, government, the
essential point which will remain to be adjusted will be to discriminate
the OBJECTS, as far as it can be done, which shall appertain to the
different provinces or departments of power; allowing to each the most
ample authority for fulfilling the objects committed to its charge.
Shall the Union be constituted the guardian of the common safety? Are
fleets and armies and revenues necessary to this purpose? The government
of the Union must be empowered to pass all laws, and to make all
regulations which have relation to them. The same must be the case in
respect to commerce, and to every other matter to which its jurisdiction
is permitted to extend. Is the administration of justice between the
citizens of the same State the proper department of the local
governments? These must possess all the authorities which are connected
with this object, and with every other that may be allotted to their
particular cognizance and direction. Not to confer in each case a degree
of power commensurate to the end, would be to violate the most obvious
rules of prudence and propriety, and improvidently to trust the great
interests of the nation to hands which are disabled from managing them
with vigor and success.
Who is likely to make suitable provisions for the public defense, as
that body to which the guardianship of the public safety is confided;
which, as the centre of information, will best understand the extent and
urgency of the dangers that threaten; as the representative of the
WHOLE, will feel itself most deeply interested in the preservation of
every part; which, from the responsibility implied in the duty assigned
to it, will be most sensibly impressed with the necessity of proper
exertions; and which, by the extension of its authority throughout the
States, can alone establish uniformity and concert in the plans and
measures by which the common safety is to be secured? Is there not a
manifest inconsistency in devolving upon the federal government the care
of the general defense, and leaving in the State governments the
EFFECTIVE powers by which it is to be provided for? Is not a want of
co-operation the infallible consequence of such a system? And will not
weakness, disorder, an undue distribution of the burdens and calamities
of war, an unnecessary and intolerable increase of expense, be its
natural and inevitable concomitants? Have we not had unequivocal
experience of its effects in the course of the revolution which we have
just accomplished?
Every view we may take of the subject, as candid inquirers after truth,
will serve to convince us, that it is both unwise and dangerous to deny
the federal government an unconfined authority, as to all those objects
which are intrusted to its management. It will indeed deserve the most
vigilant and careful attention of the people, to see that it be modeled
in such a manner as to admit of its being safely vested with the
requisite powers. If any plan which has been, or may be, offered to our
consideration, should not, upon a dispassionate inspection, be found to
answer this description, it ought to be rejected. A government, the
constitution of which renders it unfit to be trusted with all the powers
which a free people ought to delegate to any government, would be an
unsafe and improper depositary of the NATIONAL INTERESTS. Wherever THESE
can with propriety be confided, the coincident powers may safely
accompany them. This is the true result of all just reasoning upon the
subject. And the adversaries of the plan promulgated by the convention
ought to have confined themselves to showing, that the internal
structure of the proposed government was such as to render it unworthy
of the confidence of the people. They ought not to have wandered into
inflammatory declamations and unmeaning cavils about the extent of the
powers. The POWERS are not too extensive for the OBJECTS of federal
administration, or, in other words, for the management of our NATIONAL
INTERESTS; nor can any satisfactory argument be framed to show that they
are chargeable with such an excess. If it be true, as has been
insinuated by some of the writers on the other side, that the difficulty
arises from the nature of the thing, and that the extent of the country
will not permit us to form a government in which such ample powers can
safely be reposed, it would prove that we ought to contract our views,
and resort to the expedient of separate confederacies, which will move
within more practicable spheres. For the absurdity must continually
stare us in the face of confiding to a government the direction of the
most essential national interests, without daring to trust it to the
authorities which are indispensible to their proper and efficient
management. Let us not attempt to reconcile contradictions, but firmly
embrace a rational alternative.
I trust, however, that the impracticability of one general system cannot
be shown. I am greatly mistaken, if any thing of weight has yet been
advanced of this tendency; and I flatter myself, that the observations
which have been made in the course of these papers have served to place
the reverse of that position in as clear a light as any matter still in
the womb of time and experience can be susceptible of. This, at all
events, must be evident, that the very difficulty itself, drawn from the
extent of the country, is the strongest argument in favor of an
energetic government; for any other can certainly never preserve the
Union of so large an empire. If we embrace the tenets of those who
oppose the adoption of the proposed Constitution, as the standard of our
political creed, we cannot fail to verify the gloomy doctrines which
predict the impracticability of a national system pervading entire
limits of the present Confederacy.
PUBLIUS
FEDERALIST No. 24
The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
For the Independent Journal.
Wednesday, December 19, 1787
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
TO THE powers proposed to be conferred upon the federal government, in
respect to the creation and direction of the national forces, I have met
with but one specific objection, which, if I understand it right, is
this, that proper provision has not been made against the existence of
standing armies in time of peace; an objection which, I shall now
endeavor to show, rests on weak and unsubstantial foundations.
It has indeed been brought forward in the most vague and general form,
supported only by bold assertions, without the appearance of argument;
without even the sanction of theoretical opinions; in contradiction to
the practice of other free nations, and to the general sense of America,
as expressed in most of the existing constitutions. The proprietory of
this remark will appear, the moment it is recollected that the objection
under consideration turns upon a supposed necessity of restraining the
LEGISLATIVE authority of the nation, in the article of military
establishments; a principle unheard of, except in one or two of our
State constitutions, and rejected in all the rest.
A stranger to our politics, who was to read our newspapers at the
present juncture, without having previously inspected the plan reported
by the convention, would be naturally led to one of two conclusions:
either that it contained a positive injunction, that standing armies
should be kept up in time of peace; or that it vested in the EXECUTIVE
the whole power of levying troops, without subjecting his discretion, in
any shape, to the control of the legislature.
If he came afterwards to peruse the plan itself, he would be surprised
to discover, that neither the one nor the other was the case; that the
whole power of raising armies was lodged in the LEGISLATURE, not in the
EXECUTIVE; that this legislature was to be a popular body, consisting of
the representatives of the people periodically elected; and that instead
of the provision he had supposed in favor of standing armies, there was
to be found, in respect to this object, an important qualification even
of the legislative discretion, in that clause which forbids the
appropriation of money for the support of an army for any longer period
than two years a precaution which, upon a nearer view of it, will appear
to be a great and real security against the keeping up of troops without
evident necessity.
Disappointed in his first surmise, the person I have supposed would be
apt to pursue his conjectures a little further. He would naturally say
to himself, it is impossible that all this vehement and pathetic
declamation can be without some colorable pretext. It must needs be that
this people, so jealous of their liberties, have, in all the preceding
models of the constitutions which they have established, inserted the
most precise and rigid precautions on this point, the omission of which,
in the new plan, has given birth to all this apprehension and clamor.
If, under this impression, he proceeded to pass in review the several
State constitutions, how great would be his disappointment to find that
TWO ONLY of them[1] contained an interdiction of standing armies in
time of peace; that the other eleven had either observed a profound
silence on the subject, or had in express terms admitted the right of
the Legislature to authorize their existence.
Still, however he would be persuaded that there must be some plausible
foundation for the cry raised on this head. He would never be able to
imagine, while any source of information remained unexplored, that it
was nothing more than an experiment upon the public credulity, dictated
either by a deliberate intention to deceive, or by the overflowings of a
zeal too intemperate to be ingenuous. It would probably occur to him,
that he would be likely to find the precautions he was in search of in
the primitive compact between the States. Here, at length, he would
expect to meet with a solution of the enigma. No doubt, he would observe
to himself, the existing Confederation must contain the most explicit
provisions against military establishments in time of peace; and a
departure from this model, in a favorite point, has occasioned the
discontent which appears to influence these political champions.
If he should now apply himself to a careful and critical survey of the
articles of Confederation, his astonishment would not only be increased,
but would acquire a mixture of indignation, at the unexpected discovery,
that these articles, instead of containing the prohibition he looked
for, and though they had, with jealous circumspection, restricted the
authority of the State legislatures in this particular, had not imposed
a single restraint on that of the United States. If he happened to be a
man of quick sensibility, or ardent temper, he could now no longer
refrain from regarding these clamors as the dishonest artifices of a
sinister and unprincipled opposition to a plan which ought at least to
receive a fair and candid examination from all sincere lovers of their
country! How else, he would say, could the authors of them have been
tempted to vent such loud censures upon that plan, about a point in
which it seems to have conformed itself to the general sense of America
as declared in its different forms of government, and in which it has
even superadded a new and powerful guard unknown to any of them? If, on
the contrary, he happened to be a man of calm and dispassionate
feelings, he would indulge a sigh for the frailty of human nature, and
would lament, that in a matter so interesting to the happiness of
millions, the true merits of the question should be perplexed and
entangled by expedients so unfriendly to an impartial and right
determination. Even such a man could hardly forbear remarking, that a
conduct of this kind has too much the appearance of an intention to
mislead the people by alarming their passions, rather than to convince
them by arguments addressed to their understandings.
But however little this objection may be countenanced, even by
precedents among ourselves, it may be satisfactory to take a nearer view
of its intrinsic merits. From a close examination it will appear that
restraints upon the discretion of the legislature in respect to military
establishments in time of peace, would be improper to be imposed, and if
imposed, from the necessities of society, would be unlikely to be
observed.
Though a wide ocean separates the United States from Europe, yet there
are various considerations that warn us against an excess of confidence
or security. On one side of us, and stretching far into our rear, are
growing settlements subject to the dominion of Britain. On the other
side, and extending to meet the British settlements, are colonies and
establishments subject to the dominion of Spain. This situation and the
vicinity of the West India Islands, belonging to these two powers create
between them, in respect to their American possessions and in relation
to us, a common interest. The savage tribes on our Western frontier
ought to be regarded as our natural enemies, their natural allies,
because they have most to fear from us, and most to hope from them. The
improvements in the art of navigation have, as to the facility of
communication, rendered distant nations, in a great measure, neighbors.
Britain and Spain are among the principal maritime powers of Europe. A
future concert of views between these nations ought not to be regarded
as improbable. The increasing remoteness of consanguinity is every day
diminishing the force of the family compact between France and Spain.
And politicians have ever with great reason considered the ties of blood
as feeble and precarious links of political connection. These
circumstances combined, admonish us not to be too sanguine in
considering ourselves as entirely out of the reach of danger.
Previous to the Revolution, and ever since the peace, there has been a
constant necessity for keeping small garrisons on our Western frontier.
No person can doubt that these will continue to be indispensable, if it
should only be against the ravages and depredations of the Indians.
These garrisons must either be furnished by occasional detachments from
the militia, or by permanent corps in the pay of the government. The
first is impracticable; and if practicable, would be pernicious. The
militia would not long, if at all, submit to be dragged from their
occupations and families to perform that most disagreeable duty in times
of profound peace. And if they could be prevailed upon or compelled to
do it, the increased expense of a frequent rotation of service, and the
loss of labor and disconcertion of the industrious pursuits of
individuals, would form conclusive objections to the scheme. It would be
as burdensome and injurious to the public as ruinous to private
citizens. The latter resource of permanent corps in the pay of the
government amounts to a standing army in time of peace; a small one,
indeed, but not the less real for being small. Here is a simple view of
the subject, that shows us at once the impropriety of a constitutional
interdiction of such establishments, and the necessity of leaving the
matter to the discretion and prudence of the legislature.
In proportion to our increase in strength, it is probable, nay, it may
be said certain, that Britain and Spain would augment their military
establishments in our neighborhood. If we should not be willing to be
exposed, in a naked and defenseless condition, to their insults and
encroachments, we should find it expedient to increase our frontier
garrisons in some ratio to the force by which our Western settlements
might be annoyed. There are, and will be, particular posts, the
possession of which will include the command of large districts of
territory, and facilitate future invasions of the remainder. It may be
added that some of those posts will be keys to the trade with the Indian
nations. Can any man think it would be wise to leave such posts in a
situation to be at any instant seized by one or the other of two
neighboring and formidable powers? To act this part would be to desert
all the usual maxims of prudence and policy.
If we mean to be a commercial people, or even to be secure on our
Atlantic side, we must endeavor, as soon as possible, to have a navy. To
this purpose there must be dock-yards and arsenals; and for the defense
of these, fortifications, and probably garrisons. When a nation has
become so powerful by sea that it can protect its dock-yards by its
fleets, this supersedes the necessity of garrisons for that purpose; but
where naval establishments are in their infancy, moderate garrisons
will, in all likelihood, be found an indispensable security against
descents for the destruction of the arsenals and dock-yards, and
sometimes of the fleet itself.
PUBLIUS
1 This statement of the matter is taken from the printed collection of
State constitutions. Pennsylvania and North Carolina are the two which
contain the interdiction in these words: "As standing armies in time of
peace are dangerous to liberty, THEY OUGHT NOT to be kept up." This is,
in truth, rather a CAUTION than a PROHIBITION. New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, Delaware, and Maryland have, in each of their bils of
rights, a clause to this effect: "Standing armies are dangerous to
liberty, and ought not to be raised or kept up WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF
THE LEGISLATURE"; which is a formal admission of the authority of the
Legislature. New York has no bills of rights, and her constitution says
not a word about the matter. No bills of rights appear annexed to the
constitutions of the other States, except the foregoing, and their
constitutions are equally silent. I am told, however that one or two
States have bills of rights which do not appear in this collection; but
that those also recognize the right of the legislative authority in this
respect.
FEDERALIST No. 25
The Same Subject Continued
(The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered)
From the New York Packet.
Friday, December 21, 1787.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
IT MAY perhaps be urged that the objects enumerated in the preceding
number ought to be provided for by the State governments, under the
direction of the Union. But this would be, in reality, an inversion of
the primary principle of our political association, as it would in
practice transfer the care of the common defense from the federal head
to the individual members: a project oppressive to some States,
dangerous to all, and baneful to the Confederacy.
The territories of Britain, Spain, and of the Indian nations in our
neighborhood do not border on particular States, but encircle the Union
from Maine to Georgia. The danger, though in different degrees, is
therefore common. And the means of guarding against it ought, in like
manner, to be the objects of common councils and of a common treasury.
It happens that some States, from local situation, are more directly
exposed. New York is of this class. Upon the plan of separate
provisions, New York would have to sustain the whole weight of the
establishments requisite to her immediate safety, and to the mediate or
ultimate protection of her neighbors. This would neither be equitable as
it respected New York nor safe as it respected the other States. Various
inconveniences would attend such a system. The States, to whose lot it
might fall to support the necessary establishments, would be as little
able as willing, for a considerable time to come, to bear the burden of
competent provisions. The security of all would thus be subjected to the
parsimony, improvidence, or inability of a part. If the resources of
such part becoming more abundant and extensive, its provisions should be
proportionally enlarged, the other States would quickly take the alarm
at seeing the whole military force of the Union in the hands of two or
three of its members, and those probably amongst the most powerful. They
would each choose to have some counterpoise, and pretenses could easily
be contrived. In this situation, military establishments, nourished by
mutual jealousy, would be apt to swell beyond their natural or proper
size; and being at the separate disposal of the members, they would be
engines for the abridgment or demolition of the national authority.
Reasons have been already given to induce a supposition that the State
governments will too naturally be prone to a rivalship with that of the
Union, the foundation of which will be the love of power; and that in
any contest between the federal head and one of its members the people
will be most apt to unite with their local government. If, in addition
to this immense advantage, the ambition of the members should be
stimulated by the separate and independent possession of military
forces, it would afford too strong a temptation and too great a facility
to them to make enterprises upon, and finally to subvert, the
constitutional authority of the Union. On the other hand, the liberty of
the people would be less safe in this state of things than in that which
left the national forces in the hands of the national government. As far
as an army may be considered as a dangerous weapon of power, it had
better be in those hands of which the people are most likely to be
jealous than in those of which they are least likely to be jealous. For
it is a truth, which the experience of ages has attested, that the
people are always most in danger when the means of injuring their rights
are in the possession of those of whom they entertain the least
suspicion.
The framers of the existing Confederation, fully aware of the danger to
the Union from the separate possession of military forces by the States,
have, in express terms, prohibited them from having either ships or
troops, unless with the consent of Congress. The truth is, that the
existence of a federal government and military establishments under
State authority are not less at variance with each other than a due
supply of the federal treasury and the system of quotas and
requisitions.
There are other lights besides those already taken notice of, in which
the impropriety of restraints on the discretion of the national
legislature will be equally manifest. The design of the objection, which
has been mentioned, is to preclude standing armies in time of peace,
though we have never been informed how far it is designed the
prohibition should extend; whether to raising armies as well as to
KEEPING THEM UP in a season of tranquillity or not. If it be confined to
the latter it will have no precise signification, and it will be
ineffectual for the purpose intended. When armies are once raised what
shall be denominated "keeping them up," contrary to the sense of the
Constitution? What time shall be requisite to ascertain the violation?
Shall it be a week, a month, a year? Or shall we say they may be
continued as long as the danger which occasioned their being raised
continues? This would be to admit that they might be kept up IN TIME OF
PEACE, against threatening or impending danger, which would be at once
to deviate from the literal meaning of the prohibition, and to introduce
an extensive latitude of construction. Who shall judge of the
continuance of the danger? This must undoubtedly be submitted to the
national government, and the matter would then be brought to this issue,
that the national government, to provide against apprehended danger,
might in the first instance raise troops, and might afterwards keep them
on foot as long as they supposed the peace or safety of the community
was in any degree of jeopardy. It is easy to perceive that a discretion
so latitudinary as this would afford ample room for eluding the force of
the provision.
The supposed utility of a provision of this kind can only be founded on
the supposed probability, or at least possibility, of a combination
between the executive and the legislative, in some scheme of usurpation.
Should this at any time happen, how easy would it be to fabricate
pretenses of approaching danger! Indian hostilities, instigated by Spain
or Britain, would always be at hand. Provocations to produce the desired
appearances might even be given to some foreign power, and appeased
again by timely concessions. If we can reasonably presume such a
combination to have been formed, and that the enterprise is warranted by
a sufficient prospect of success, the army, when once raised, from
whatever cause, or on whatever pretext, may be applied to the execution
of the project.
If, to obviate this consequence, it should be resolved to extend the
prohibition to the RAISING of armies in time of peace, the United States
would then exhibit the most extraordinary spectacle which the world has
yet seen, that of a nation incapacitated by its Constitution to prepare
for defense, before it was actually invaded. As the ceremony of a formal
denunciation of war has of late fallen into disuse, the presence of an
enemy within our territories must be waited for, as the legal warrant to
the government to begin its levies of men for the protection of the
State. We must receive the blow, before we could even prepare to return
it. All that kind of policy by which nations anticipate distant danger,
and meet the gathering storm, must be abstained from, as contrary to the
genuine maxims of a free government. We must expose our property and
liberty to the mercy of foreign invaders, and invite them by our
weakness to seize the naked and defenseless prey, because we are afraid
that rulers, created by our choice, dependent on our will, might
endanger that liberty, by an abuse of the means necessary to its
preservation.
Here I expect we shall be told that the militia of the country is its
natural bulwark, and would be at all times equal to the national
defense. This doctrine, in substance, had like to have lost us our
independence. It cost millions to the United States that might have been
saved. The facts which, from our own experience, forbid a reliance of
this kind, are too recent to permit us to be the dupes of such a
suggestion. The steady operations of war against a regular and
disciplined army can only be successfully conducted by a force of the
same kind. Considerations of economy, not less than of stability and
vigor, confirm this position. The American militia, in the course of the
late war, have, by their valor on numerous occasions, erected eternal
monuments to their fame; but the bravest of them feel and know that the
liberty of their country could not have been established by their
efforts alone, however great and valuable they were. War, like most
other things, is a science to be acquired and perfected by diligence, by
perserverance, by time, and by practice.
All violent policy, as it is contrary to the natural and experienced
course of human affairs, defeats itself. Pennsylvania, at this instant,
affords an example of the truth of this remark. The Bill of Rights of
that State declares that standing armies are dangerous to liberty, and
ought not to be kept up in time of peace. Pennsylvania, nevertheless, in
a time of profound peace, from the existence of partial disorders in one
or two of her counties, has resolved to raise a body of troops; and in
all probability will keep them up as long as there is any appearance of
danger to the public peace. The conduct of Massachusetts affords a
lesson on the same subject, though on different ground. That State
(without waiting for the sanction of Congress, as the articles of the
Confederation require) was compelled to raise troops to quell a domestic
insurrection, and still keeps a corps in pay to prevent a revival of the
spirit of revolt. The particular constitution of Massachusetts opposed
no obstacle to the measure; but the instance is still of use to instruct
us that cases are likely to occur under our government, as well as under
those of other nations, which will sometimes render a military force in
time of peace essential to the security of the society, and that it is
therefore improper in this respect to control the legislative
discretion. It also teaches us, in its application to the United States,
how little the rights of a feeble government are likely to be respected,
even by its own constituents. And it teaches us, in addition to the
rest, how unequal parchment provisions are to a struggle with public
necessity.
It was a fundamental maxim of the Lacedaemonian commonwealth, that the
post of admiral should not be conferred twice on the same person. The
Peloponnesian confederates, having suffered a severe defeat at sea from
the Athenians, demanded Lysander, who had before served with success in
that capacity, to command the combined fleets. The Lacedaemonians, to
gratify their allies, and yet preserve the semblance of an adherence to
their ancient institutions, had recourse to the flimsy subterfuge of
investing Lysander with the real power of admiral, under the nominal
title of vice-admiral. This instance is selected from among a multitude
that might be cited to confirm the truth already advanced and
illustrated by domestic examples; which is, that nations pay little
regard to rules and maxims calculated in their very nature to run
counter to the necessities of society. Wise politicians will be cautious
about fettering the government with restrictions that cannot be
observed, because they know that every breach of the fundamental laws,
though dictated by necessity, impairs that sacred reverence which ought
to be maintained in the breast of rulers towards the constitution of a
country, and forms a precedent for other breaches where the same plea of
necessity does not exist at all, or is less urgent and palpable.
PUBLIUS
FEDERALIST No. 26
The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the
Common Defense Considered
For the Independent Journal.
Saturday, December 22, 1788
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
IT WAS a thing hardly to be expected that in a popular revolution the
minds of men should stop at that happy mean which marks the salutary
boundary between POWER and PRIVILEGE, and combines the energy of
government with the security of private rights. A failure in this
delicate and important point is the great source of the inconveniences
we experience, and if we are not cautious to avoid a repetition of the
error, in our future attempts to rectify and ameliorate our system, we
may travel from one chimerical project to another; we may try change
after change; but we shall never be likely to make any material change
for the better.
The idea of restraining the legislative authority, in the means of
providing for the national defense, is one of those refinements which
owe their origin to a zeal for liberty more ardent than enlightened. We
have seen, however, that it has not had thus far an extensive
prevalency; that even in this country, where it made its first
appearance, Pennsylvania and North Carolina are the only two States by
which it has been in any degree patronized; and that all the others have
refused to give it the least countenance; wisely judging that confidence
must be placed somewhere; that the necessity of doing it, is implied in
the very act of delegating power; and that it is better to hazard the
abuse of that confidence than to embarrass the government and endanger
the public safety by impolitic restrictions on the legislative
authority. The opponents of the proposed Constitution combat, in this
respect, the general decision of America; and instead of being taught by
experience the propriety of correcting any extremes into which we may
have heretofore run, they appear disposed to conduct us into others
still more dangerous, and more extravagant. As if the tone of government
had been found too high, or too rigid, the doctrines they teach are
calculated to induce us to depress or to relax it, by expedients which,
upon other occasions, have been condemned or forborne. It may be
affirmed without the imputation of invective, that if the principles
they inculcate, on various points, could so far obtain as to become the
popular creed, they would utterly unfit the people of this country for
any species of government whatever. But a danger of this kind is not to
be apprehended. The citizens of America have too much discernment to be
argued into anarchy. And I am much mistaken, if experience has not
wrought a deep and solemn conviction in the public mind, that greater
energy of government is essential to the welfare and prosperity of the
community.
It may not be amiss in this place concisely to remark the origin and
progress of the idea, which aims at the exclusion of military
establishments in time of peace. Though in speculative minds it may
arise from a contemplation of the nature and tendency of such
institutions, fortified by the events that have happened in other ages
and countries, yet as a national sentiment, it must be traced to those
habits of thinking which we derive from the nation from whom the
inhabitants of these States have in general sprung.
In England, for a long time after the Norman Conquest, the authority of
the monarch was almost unlimited. Inroads were gradually made upon the
prerogative, in favor of liberty, first by the barons, and afterwards by
the people, till the greatest part of its most formidable pretensions
became extinct. But it was not till the revolution in 1688, which
elevated the Prince of Orange to the throne of Great Britain, that
English liberty was completely triumphant. As incident to the undefined
power of making war, an acknowledged prerogative of the crown, Charles
II. had, by his own authority, kept on foot in time of peace a body of
5,000 regular troops. And this number James II. increased to 30,000; who
were paid out of his civil list. At the revolution, to abolish the
exercise of so dangerous an authority, it became an article of the Bill
of Rights then framed, that "the raising or keeping a standing army
within the kingdom in time of peace, UNLESS WITH THE CONSENT OF
PARLIAMENT, was against law."
In that kingdom, when the pulse of liberty was at its highest pitch, no
security against the danger of standing armies was thought requisite,
beyond a prohibition of their being raised or kept up by the mere
authority of the executive magistrate. The patriots, who effected that
memorable revolution, were too temperate, too wellinformed, to think of
any restraint on the legislative discretion. They were aware that a
certain number of troops for guards and garrisons were indispensable;
that no precise bounds could be set to the national exigencies; that a
power equal to every possible contingency must exist somewhere in the
government: and that when they referred the exercise of that power to
the judgment of the legislature, they had arrived at the ultimate point
of precaution which was reconcilable with the safety of the community.
From the same source, the people of America may be said to have derived
an hereditary impression of danger to liberty, from standing armies in
time of peace. The circumstances of a revolution quickened the public
sensibility on every point connected with the security of popular
rights, and in some instances raise the warmth of our zeal beyond the
degree which consisted with the due temperature of the body politic. The
attempts of two of the States to restrict the authority of the
legislature in the article of military establishments, are of the number
of these instances. The principles which had taught us to be jealous of
the power of an hereditary monarch were by an injudicious excess
extended to the representatives of the people in their popular
assemblies. Even in some of the States, where this error was not
adopted, we find unnecessary declarations that standing armies ought not
to be kept up, in time of peace, WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE LEGISLATURE.
I call them unnecessary, because the reason which had introduced a
similar provision into the English Bill of Rights is not applicable to
any of the State constitutions. The power of raising armies at all,
under those constitutions, can by no construction be deemed to reside
anywhere else, than in the legislatures themselves; and it was
superfluous, if not absurd, to declare that a matter should not be done
without the consent of a body, which alone had the power of doing it.
Accordingly, in some of these constitutions, and among others, in that
of this State of New York, which has been justly celebrated, both in
Europe and America, as one of the best of the forms of government
established in this country, there is a total silence upon the subject.
It is remarkable, that even in the two States which seem to have
meditated an interdiction of military establishments in time of peace,
the mode of expression made use of is rather cautionary than
prohibitory. It is not said, that standing armies SHALL NOT BE kept up,
but that they OUGHT NOT to be kept up, in time of peace. This ambiguity
of terms appears to have been the result of a conflict between jealousy
and conviction; between the desire of excluding such establishments at
all events, and the persuasion that an absolute exclusion would be
unwise and unsafe.
Can it be doubted that such a provision, whenever the situation of
public affairs was understood to require a departure from it, would be
interpreted by the legislature into a mere admonition, and would be made
to yield to the necessities or supposed necessities of the State? Let
the fact already mentioned, with respect to Pennsylvania, decide. What
then (it may be asked) is the use of such a provision, if it cease to
operate the moment there is an inclination to disregard it?
Let us examine whether there be any comparison, in point of efficacy,
between the provision alluded to and that which is contained in the new
Constitution, for restraining the appropriations of money for military
purposes to the period of two years. The former, by aiming at too much,
is calculated to effect nothing; the latter, by steering clear of an
imprudent extreme, and by being perfectly compatible with a proper
provision for the exigencies of the nation, will have a salutary and
powerful operation.
The legislature of the United States will be OBLIGED, by this provision,
once at least in every two years, to deliberate upon the propriety of
keeping a military force on foot; to come to a new resolution on the
point; and to declare their sense of the matter, by a formal vote in the
face of their constituents. They are not AT LIBERTY to vest in the
executive department permanent funds for the support of an army, if they
were even incautious enough to be willing to repose in it so improper a
confidence. As the spirit of party, in different degrees, must be
expected to infect all political bodies, there will be, no doubt,
persons in the national legislature willing enough to arraign the
measures and criminate the views of the majority. The provision for the
support of a military force will always be a favorable topic for
declamation. As often as the question comes forward, the public
attention will be roused and attracted to the subject, by the party in
opposition; and if the majority should be really disposed to exceed the
proper limits, the community will be warned of the danger, and will have
an opportunity of taking measures to guard against it. Independent of
parties in the national legislature itself, as often as the period of
discussion arrived, the State legislatures, who will always be not only
vigilant but suspicious and jealous guardians of the rights of the
citizens against encroachments from the federal government, will
constantly have their attention awake to the conduct of the national
rulers, and will be ready enough, if any thing improper appears, to
sound the alarm to the people, and not only to be the VOICE, but, if
necessary, the ARM of their discontent.
Schemes to subvert the liberties of a great community REQUIRE TIME to
mature them for execution. An army, so large as seriously to menace
those liberties, could only be formed by progressive augmentations;
which would suppose, not merely a temporary combination between the
legislature and executive, but a continued conspiracy for a series of
time. Is it probable that such a combination would exist at all? Is it
probable that it would be persevered in, and transmitted along through
all the successive variations in a representative body, which biennial
elections would naturally produce in both houses? Is it presumable, that
every man, the instant he took his seat in the national Senate or House
of Representatives, would commence a traitor to his constituents and to
his country? Can it be supposed that there would not be found one man,
discerning enough to detect so atrocious a conspiracy, or bold or honest
enough to apprise his constituents of their danger? If such presumptions
can fairly be made, there ought at once to be an end of all delegated
authority. The people should resolve to recall all the powers they have
heretofore parted with out of their own hands, and to divide themselves
into as many States as there are counties, in order that they may be
able to manage their own concerns in person.
If such suppositions could even be reasonably made, still the
concealment of the design, for any duration, would be impracticable. It
would be announced, by the very circumstance of augmenting the army to
so great an extent in time of profound peace. What colorable reason
could be assigned, in a country so situated, for such vast augmentations
of the military force? It is impossible that the people could be long
deceived; and the destruction of the project, and of the projectors,
would quickly follow the discovery.
It has been said that the provision which limits the appropriation of
money for the support of an army to the period of two years would be
unavailing, because the Executive, when once possessed of a force large
enough to awe the people into submission, would find resources in that
very force sufficient to enable him to dispense with supplies from the
acts of the legislature. But the question again recurs, upon what
pretense could he be put in possession of a force of that magnitude in
time of peace? If we suppose it to have been created in consequence of
some domestic insurrection or foreign war, then it becomes a case not
within the principles of the objection; for this is levelled against the
power of keeping up troops in time of peace. Few persons will be so
visionary as seriously to contend that military forces ought not to be
raised to quell a rebellion or resist an invasion; and if the defense of
the community under such circumstances should make it necessary to have
an army so numerous as to hazard its liberty, this is one of those
calamaties for which there is neither preventative nor cure. It cannot
be provided against by any possible form of government; it might even
result from a simple league offensive and defensive, if it should ever
be necessary for the confederates or allies to form an army for common
defense.
But it is an evil infinitely less likely to attend us in a united than
in a disunited state; nay, it may be safely asserted that it is an evil
altogether unlikely to attend us in the latter situation. It is not easy
to conceive a possibility that dangers so formidable can assail the
whole Union, as to demand a force considerable enough to place our
liberties in the least jeopardy, especially if we take into our view the
aid to be derived from the militia, which ought always to be counted
upon as a valuable and powerful auxiliary. But in a state of disunion
(as has been fully shown in another place), the contrary of this
supposition would become not only probable, but almost unavoidable.
PUBLIUS
FEDERALIST No. 27
The Same Subject Continued
(The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to
the Common Defense Considered)
From the New York Packet.
Tuesday, December 25, 1787.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
IT HAS been urged, in different shapes, that a Constitution of the kind
proposed by the convention cannot operate without the aid of a military
force to execute its laws. This, however, like most other things that
have been alleged on that side, rests on mere general assertion,
unsupported by any precise or intelligible designation of the reasons
upon which it is founded. As far as I have been able to divine the
latent meaning of the objectors, it seems to originate in a
presupposition that the people will be disinclined to the exercise of
federal authority in any matter of an internal nature. Waiving any
exception that might be taken to the inaccuracy or inexplicitness of the
distinction between internal and external, let us inquire what ground
there is to presuppose that disinclination in the people. Unless we
presume at the same time that the powers of the general government will
be worse administered than those of the State government, there seems to
be no room for the presumption of ill-will, disaffection, or opposition
in the people. I believe it may be laid down as a general rule that
their confidence in and obedience to a government will commonly be
proportioned to the goodness or badness of its administration. It must
be admitted that there are exceptions to this rule; but these exceptions
depend so entirely on accidental causes, that they cannot be considered
as having any relation to the intrinsic merits or demerits of a
constitution. These can only be judged of by general principles and
maxims.
Various reasons have been suggested, in the course of these papers, to
induce a probability that the general government will be better
administered than the particular governments; the principal of which
reasons are that the extension of the spheres of election will present a
greater option, or latitude of choice, to the people; that through the
medium of the State legislatures which are select bodies of men, and
which are to appoint the members of the national Senate there is reason
to expect that this branch will generally be composed with peculiar care
and judgment; that these circumstances promise greater knowledge and
more extensive information in the national councils, and that they will
be less apt to be tainted by the spirit of faction, and more out of the
reach of those occasional ill-humors, or temporary prejudices and
propensities, which, in smaller societies, frequently contaminate the
public councils, beget injustice and oppression of a part of the
community, and engender schemes which, though they gratify a momentary
inclination or desire, terminate in general distress, dissatisfaction,
and disgust. Several additional reasons of considerable force, to
fortify that probability, will occur when we come to survey, with a more
critical eye, the interior structure of the edifice which we are invited
to erect. It will be sufficient here to remark, that until satisfactory
reasons can be assigned to justify an opinion, that the federal
government is likely to be administered in such a manner as to render it
odious or contemptible to the people, there can be no reasonable
foundation for the supposition that the laws of the Union will meet with
any greater obstruction from them, or will stand in need of any other
methods to enforce their execution, than the laws of the particular
members.
The hope of impunity is a strong incitement to sedition; the dread of
punishment, a proportionably strong discouragement to it. Will not the
government of the Union, which, if possessed of a due degree of power,
can call to its aid the collective resources of the whole Confederacy,
be more likely to repress the FORMER sentiment and to inspire the
LATTER, than that of a single State, which can only command the
resources within itself? A turbulent faction in a State may easily
suppose itself able to contend with the friends to the government in
that State; but it can hardly be so infatuated as to imagine itself a
match for the combined efforts of the Union. If this reflection be just,
there is less danger of resistance from irregular combinations of
individuals to the authority of the Confederacy than to that of a single
member.
I will, in this place, hazard an observation, which will not be the less
just because to some it may appear new; which is, that the more the
operations of the national authority are intermingled in the ordinary
exercise of government, the more the citizens are accustomed to meet
with it in the common occurrences of their political life, the more it
is familiarized to their sight and to their feelings, the further it
enters into those objects which touch the most sensible chords and put
in motion the most active springs of the human heart, the greater will
be the probability that it will conciliate the respect and attachment of
the community. Man is very much a creature of habit. A thing that rarely
strikes his senses will generally have but little influence upon his
mind. A government continually at a distance and out of sight can hardly
be expected to interest the sensations of the people. The inference is,
that the authority of the Union, and the affections of the citizens
towards it, will be strengthened, rather than weakened, by its extension
to what are called matters of internal concern; and will have less
occasion to recur to force, in proportion to the familiarity and
comprehensiveness of its agency. The more it circulates through those
channls and currents in which the passions of mankind naturally flow,
the less will it require the aid of the violent and perilous expedients
of compulsion.
One thing, at all events, must be evident, that a government like the
one proposed would bid much fairer to avoid the necessity of using
force, than that species of league contend for by most of its opponents;
the authority of which should only operate upon the States in their
political or collective capacities. It has been shown that in such a
Confederacy there can be no sanction for the laws but force; that
frequent delinquencies in the members are the natural offspring of the
very frame of the government; and that as often as these happen, they
can only be redressed, if at all, by war and violence.
The plan reported by the convention, by extending the authority of the
federal head to the individual citizens of the several States, will
enable the government to employ the ordinary magistracy of each, in the
execution of its laws. It is easy to perceive that this will tend to
destroy, in the common apprehension, all distinction between the sources
from which they might proceed; and will give the federal government the
same advantage for securing a due obedience to its authority which is
enjoyed by the government of each State, in addition to the influence on
public opinion which will result from the important consideration of its
having power to call to its assistance and support the resources of the
whole Union. It merits particular attention in this place, that the laws
of the Confederacy, as to the ENUMERATED and LEGITIMATE objects of its
jurisdiction, will become the SUPREME LAW of the land; to the observance
of which all officers, legislative, executive, and judicial, in each
State, will be bound by the sanctity of an oath. Thus the legislatures,
courts, and magistrates, of the respective members, will be incorporated
into the operations of the national government AS FAR AS ITS JUST AND
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY EXTENDS; and will be rendered auxiliary to the
enforcement of its laws.[1] Any man who will pursue, by his own
reflections, the consequences of this situation, will perceive that
there is good ground to calculate upon a regular and peaceable execution
of the laws of the Union, if its powers are administered with a common
share of prudence. If we will arbitrarily suppose the contrary, we may
deduce any inferences we please from the supposition; for it is
certainly possible, by an injudicious exercise of the authorities of the
best government that ever was, or ever can be instituted, to provoke and
precipitate the people into the wildest excesses. But though the
adversaries of the proposed Constitution should presume that the
national rulers would be insensible to the motives of public good, or to
the obligations of duty, I would still ask them how the interests of
ambition, or the views of encroachment, can be promoted by such a
conduct?
PUBLIUS
1. The sophistry which has been employed to show that this will tend to
the destruction of the State governments, will, in its will, in its
proper place, be fully detected.
FEDERALIST No. 28
The Same Subject Continued
(The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to
the Common Defense Considered)
For the Independent Journal.
Wednesday, December 26, 1787
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THAT there may happen cases in which the national government may be
necessitated to resort to force, cannot be denied. Our own experience
has corroborated the lessons taught by the examples of other nations;
that emergencies of this sort will sometimes arise in all societies,
however constituted; that seditions and insurrections are, unhappily,
maladies as inseparable from the body politic as tumors and eruptions
from the natural body; that the idea of governing at all times by the
simple force of law (which we have been told is the only admissible
principle of republican government), has no place but in the reveries of
those political doctors whose sagacity disdains the admonitions of
experimental instruction.
Should such emergencies at any time happen under the national
government, there could be no remedy but force. The means to be employed
must be proportioned to the extent of the mischief. If it should be a
slight commotion in a small part of a State, the militia of the residue
would be adequate to its suppression; and the national presumption is
that they would be ready to do their duty. An insurrection, whatever may
be its immediate cause, eventually endangers all government. Regard to
the public peace, if not to the rights of the Union, would engage the
citizens to whom the contagion had not communicated itself to oppose the
insurgents; and if the general government should be found in practice
conducive to the prosperity and felicity of the people, it were
irrational to believe that they would be disinclined to its support.
If, on the contrary, the insurrection should pervade a whole State, or a
principal part of it, the employment of a different kind of force might
become unavoidable. It appears that Massachusetts found it necessary to
raise troops for repressing the disorders within that State; that
Pennsylvania, from the mere apprehension of commotions among a part of
her citizens, has thought proper to have recourse to the same measure.
Suppose the State of New York had been inclined to re-establish her lost
jurisdiction over the inhabitants of Vermont, could she have hoped for
success in such an enterprise from the efforts of the militia alone?
Would she not have been compelled to raise and to maintain a more
regular force for the execution of her design? If it must then be
admitted that the necessity of recurring to a force different from the
militia, in cases of this extraordinary nature, is applicable to the
State governments themselves, why should the possibility, that the
national government might be under a like necessity, in similar
extremities, be made an objection to its existence? Is it not surprising
that men who declare an attachment to the Union in the abstract, should
urge as an objection to the proposed Constitution what applies with
tenfold weight to the plan for which they contend; and what, as far as
it has any foundation in truth, is an inevitable consequence of civil
society upon an enlarged scale? Who would not prefer that possibility to
the unceasing agitations and frequent revolutions which are the
continual scourges of petty republics?
Let us pursue this examination in another light. Suppose, in lieu of one
general system, two, or three, or even four Confederacies were to be
formed, would not the same difficulty oppose itself to the operations of
either of these Confederacies? Would not each of them be exposed to the
same casualties; and when these happened, be obliged to have recourse to
the same expedients for upholding its authority which are objected to in
a government for all the States? Would the militia, in this supposition,
be more ready or more able to support the federal authority than in the
case of a general union? All candid and intelligent men must, upon due
consideration, acknowledge that the principle of the objection is
equally applicable to either of the two cases; and that whether we have
one government for all the States, or different governments for
different parcels of them, or even if there should be an entire
separation of the States, there might sometimes be a necessity to make
use of a force constituted differently from the militia, to preserve the
peace of the community and to maintain the just authority of the laws
against those violent invasions of them which amount to insurrections
and rebellions.
Independent of all other reasonings upon the subject, it is a full
answer to those who require a more peremptory provision against military
establishments in time of peace, to say that the whole power of the
proposed government is to be in the hands of the representatives of the
people. This is the essential, and, after all, only efficacious security
for the rights and privileges of the people, which is attainable in
civil society.[1]
If the representatives of the people betray their constituents, there is
then no resource left but in the exertion of that original right of
self-defense which is paramount to all positive forms of government, and
which against the usurpations of the national rulers, may be exerted
with infinitely better prospect of success than against those of the
rulers of an individual state. In a single state, if the persons
intrusted with supreme power become usurpers, the different parcels,
subdivisions, or districts of which it consists, having no distinct
government in each, can take no regular measures for defense. The
citizens must rush tumultuously to arms, without concert, without
system, without resource; except in their courage and despair. The
usurpers, clothed with the forms of legal authority, can too often crush
the opposition in embryo. The smaller the extent of the territory, the
more difficult will it be for the people to form a regular or systematic
plan of opposition, and the more easy will it be to defeat their early
efforts. Intelligence can be more speedily obtained of their
preparations and movements, and the military force in the possession of
the usurpers can be more rapidly directed against the part where the
opposition has begun. In this situation there must be a peculiar
coincidence of circumstances to insure success to the popular
resistance.
The obstacles to usurpation and the facilities of resistance increase
with the increased extent of the state, provided the citizens understand
their rights and are disposed to defend them. The natural strength of
the people in a large community, in proportion to the artificial
strength of the government, is greater than in a small, and of course
more competent to a struggle with the attempts of the government to
establish a tyranny. But in a confederacy the people, without
exaggeration, may be said to be entirely the masters of their own fate.
Power being almost always the rival of power, the general government
will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state
governments, and these will have the same disposition towards the
general government. The people, by throwing themselves into either
scale, will infallibly make it preponderate. If their rights are invaded
by either, they can make use of the other as the instrument of redress.
How wise will it be in them by cherishing the union to preserve to
themselves an advantage which can never be too highly prized!
It may safely be received as an axiom in our political system, that the
State governments will, in all possible contingencies, afford complete
security against invasions of the public liberty by the national
authority. Projects of usurpation cannot be masked under pretenses so
likely to escape the penetration of select bodies of men, as of the
people at large. The legislatures will have better means of information.
They can discover the danger at a distance; and possessing all the
organs of civil power, and the confidence of the people, they can at
once adopt a regular plan of opposition, in which they can combine all
the resources of the community. They can readily communicate with each
other in the different States, and unite their common forces for the
protection of their common liberty.
The great extent of the country is a further security. We have already
experienced its utility against the attacks of a foreign power. And it
would have precisely the same effect against the enterprises of
ambitious rulers in the national councils. If the federal army should be
able to quell the resistance of one State, the distant States would have
it in their power to make head with fresh forces. The advantages
obtained in one place must be abandoned to subdue the opposition in
others; and the moment the part which had been reduced to submission was
left to itself, its efforts would be renewed, and its resistance revive.
We should recollect that the extent of the military force must, at all
events, be regulated by the resources of the country. For a long time to
come, it will not be possible to maintain a large army; and as the means
of doing this increase, the population and natural strength of the
community will proportionably increase. When will the time arrive that
the federal government can raise and maintain an army capable of
erecting a despotism over the great body of the people of an immense
empire, who are in a situation, through the medium of their State
governments, to take measures for their own defense, with all the
celerity, regularity, and system of independent nations? The
apprehension may be considered as a disease, for which there can be
found no cure in the resources of argument and reasoning.
PUBLIUS
1. Its full efficacy will be examined hereafter.
FEDERALIST No. 29
Concerning the Militia
From the New York Packet.
Wednesday, January 9, 1788
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE power of regulating the militia, and of commanding its services in
times of insurrection and invasion are natural incidents to the duties
of superintending the common defense, and of watching over the internal
peace of the Confederacy.
It requires no skill in the science of war to discern that uniformity in
the organization and discipline of the militia would be attended with
the most beneficial effects, whenever they were called into service for
the public defense. It would enable them to discharge the duties of the
camp and of the field with mutual intelligence and concert an advantage
of peculiar moment in the operations of an army; and it would fit them
much sooner to acquire the degree of proficiency in military functions
which would be essential to their usefulness. This desirable uniformity
can only be accomplished by confiding the regulation of the militia to
the direction of the national authority. It is, therefore, with the most
evident propriety, that the plan of the convention proposes to empower
the Union "to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the
militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the
service of the United States, RESERVING TO THE STATES RESPECTIVELY THE
APPOINTMENT OF THE OFFICERS, AND THE AUTHORITY OF TRAINING THE MILITIA
ACCORDING TO THE DISCIPLINE PRESCRIBED BY CONGRESS."
Of the different grounds which have been taken in opposition to the plan
of the convention, there is none that was so little to have been
expected, or is so untenable in itself, as the one from which this
particular provision has been attacked. If a well-regulated militia be
the most natural defense of a free country, it ought certainly to be
under the regulation and at the disposal of that body which is
constituted the guardian of the national security. If standing armies
are dangerous to liberty, an efficacious power over the militia, in the
body to whose care the protection of the State is committed, ought, as
far as possible, to take away the inducement and the pretext to such
unfriendly institutions. If the federal government can command the aid
of the militia in those emergencies which call for the military arm in
support of the civil magistrate, it can the better dispense with the
employment of a different kind of force. If it cannot avail itself of
the former, it will be obliged to recur to the latter. To render an army
unnecessary, will be a more certain method of preventing its existence
than a thousand prohibitions upon paper.
In order to cast an odium upon the power of calling forth the militia to
execute the laws of the Union, it has been remarked that there is
nowhere any provision in the proposed Constitution for calling out the
POSSE COMITATUS, to assist the magistrate in the execution of his duty,
whence it has been inferred, that military force was intended to be his
only auxiliary. There is a striking incoherence in the objections which
have appeared, and sometimes even from the same quarter, not much
calculated to inspire a very favorable opinion of the sincerity or fair
dealing of their authors. The same persons who tell us in one breath,
that the powers of the federal government will be despotic and
unlimited, inform us in the next, that it has not authority sufficient
even to call out the POSSE COMITATUS. The latter, fortunately, is as
much short of the truth as the former exceeds it. It would be as absurd
to doubt, that a right to pass all laws NECESSARY AND PROPER to execute
its declared powers, would include that of requiring the assistance of
the citizens to the officers who may be intrusted with the execution of
those laws, as it would be to believe, that a right to enact laws
necessary and proper for the imposition and collection of taxes would
involve that of varying the rules of descent and of the alienation of
landed property, or of abolishing the trial by jury in cases relating to
it. It being therefore evident that the supposition of a want of power
to require the aid of the POSSE COMITATUS is entirely destitute of
color, it will follow, that the conclusion which has been drawn from it,
in its application to the authority of the federal government over the
militia, is as uncandid as it is illogical. What reason could there be
to infer, that force was intended to be the sole instrument of
authority, merely because there is a power to make use of it when
necessary? What shall we think of the motives which could induce men of
sense to reason in this manner? How shall we prevent a conflict between
charity and conviction?
By a curious refinement upon the spirit of republican jealousy, we are
even taught to apprehend danger from the militia itself, in the hands of
the federal government. It is observed that select corps may be formed,
composed of the young and ardent, who may be rendered subservient to the
views of arbitrary power. What plan for the regulation of the militia
may be pursued by the national government, is impossible to be foreseen.
But so far from viewing the matter in the same light with those who
object to select corps as dangerous, were the Constitution ratified, and
were I to deliver my sentiments to a member of the federal legislature
from this State on the subject of a militia establishment, I should hold
to him, in substance, the following discourse:
"The project of disciplining all the militia of the United States is as
futile as it would be injurious, if it were capable of being carried
into execution. A tolerable expertness in military movements is a
business that requires time and practice. It is not a day, or even a
week, that will suffice for the attainment of it. To oblige the great
body of the yeomanry, and of the other classes of the citizens, to be
under arms for the purpose of going through military exercises and
evolutions, as often as might be necessary to acquire the degree of
perfection which would entitle them to the character of a well-regulated
militia, would be a real grievance to the people, and a serious public
inconvenience and loss. It would form an annual deduction from the
productive labor of the country, to an amount which, calculating upon
the present numbers of the people, would not fall far short of the whole
expense of the civil establishments of all the States. To attempt a
thing which would abridge the mass of labor and industry to so
considerable an extent, would be unwise: and the experiment, if made,
could not succeed, because it would not long be endured. Little more can
reasonably be aimed at, with respect to the people at large, than to
have them properly armed and equipped; and in order to see that this be
not neglected, it will be necessary to assemble them once or twice in
the course of a year.
"But though the scheme of disciplining the whole nation must be
abandoned as mischievous or impracticable; yet it is a matter of the
utmost importance that a well-digested plan should, as soon as possible,
be adopted for the proper establishment of the militia. The attention of
the government ought particularly to be directed to the formation of a
select corps of moderate extent, upon such principles as will really fit
them for service in case of need. By thus circumscribing the plan, it
will be possible to have an excellent body of well-trained militia,
ready to take the field whenever the defense of the State shall require
it. This will not only lessen the call for military establishments, but
if circumstances should at any time oblige the government to form an
army of any magnitude that army can never be formidable to the liberties
of the people while there is a large body of citizens, little, if at
all, inferior to them in discipline and the use of arms, who stand ready
to defend their own rights and those of their fellow-citizens. This
appears to me the only substitute that can be devised for a standing
army, and the best possible security against it, if it should exist."
Thus differently from the adversaries of the proposed Constitution
should I reason on the same subject, deducing arguments of safety from
the very sources which they represent as fraught with danger and
perdition. But how the national legislature may reason on the point, is
a thing which neither they nor I can foresee.
There is something so far-fetched and so extravagant in the idea of
danger to liberty from the militia, that one is at a loss whether to
treat it with gravity or with raillery; whether to consider it as a mere
trial of skill, like the paradoxes of rhetoricians; as a disingenuous
artifice to instil prejudices at any price; or as the serious offspring
of political fanaticism. Where in the name of common-sense, are our
fears to end if we may not trust our sons, our brothers, our neighbors,
our fellow-citizens? What shadow of danger can there be from men who are
daily mingling with the rest of their countrymen and who participate
with them in the same feelings, sentiments, habits and interests? What
reasonable cause of apprehension can be inferred from a power in the
Union to prescribe regulations for the militia, and to command its
services when necessary, while the particular States are to have the
SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE APPOINTMENT OF THE OFFICERS? If it were possible
seriously to indulge a jealousy of the militia upon any conceivable
establishment under the federal government, the circumstance of the
officers being in the appointment of the States ought at once to
extinguish it. There can be no doubt that this circumstance will always
secure to them a preponderating influence over the militia.
In reading many of the publications against the Constitution, a man is
apt to imagine that he is perusing some ill-written tale or romance,
which instead of natural and agreeable images, exhibits to the mind
nothing but frightful and distorted shapes --
"Gorgons, hydras, and chimeras dire";
discoloring and disfiguring whatever it represents, and transforming
everything it touches into a monster.
A sample of this is to be observed in the exaggerated and improbable
suggestions which have taken place respecting the power of calling for
the services of the militia. That of New Hampshire is to be marched to
Georgia, of Georgia to New Hampshire, of New York to Kentucky, and of
Kentucky to Lake Champlain. Nay, the debts due to the French and Dutch
are to be paid in militiamen instead of louis d'ors and ducats. At one
moment there is to be a large army to lay prostrate the liberties of the
people; at another moment the militia of Virginia are to be dragged from
their homes five or six hundred miles, to tame the republican contumacy
of Massachusetts; and that of Massachusetts is to be transported an
equal distance to subdue the refractory haughtiness of the aristocratic
Virginians. Do the persons who rave at this rate imagine that their art
or their eloquence can impose any conceits or absurdities upon the
people of America for infallible truths?
If there should be an army to be made use of as the engine of despotism,
what need of the militia? If there should be no army, whither would the
militia, irritated by being called upon to undertake a distant and
hopeless expedition, for the purpose of riveting the chains of slavery
upon a part of their countrymen, direct their course, but to the seat of
the tyrants, who had meditated so foolish as well as so wicked a
project, to crush them in their imagined intrenchments of power, and to
make them an example of the just vengeance of an abused and incensed
people? Is this the way in which usurpers stride to dominion over a
numerous and enlightened nation? Do they begin by exciting the
detestation of the very instruments of their intended usurpations? Do
they usually commence their career by wanton and disgustful acts of
power, calculated to answer no end, but to draw upon themselves
universal hatred and execration? Are suppositions of this sort the sober
admonitions of discerning patriots to a discerning people? Or are they
the inflammatory ravings of incendiaries or distempered enthusiasts? If
we were even to suppose the national rulers actuated by the most
ungovernable ambition, it is impossible to believe that they would
employ such preposterous means to accomplish their designs.
In times of insurrection, or invasion, it would be natural and proper
that the militia of a neighboring State should be marched into another,
to resist a common enemy, or to guard the republic against the violence
of faction or sedition. This was frequently the case, in respect to the
first object, in the course of the late war; and this mutual succor is,
indeed, a principal end of our political association. If the power of
affording it be placed under the direction of the Union, there will be
no danger of a supine and listless inattention to the dangers of a
neighbor, till its near approach had superadded the incitements of
self-preservation to the too feeble impulses of duty and sympathy.
PUBLIUS
FEDERALIST No. 30
Concerning the General Power of Taxation
From the New York Packet.
Friday, December 28, 1787.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
IT HAS been already observed that the federal government ought to
possess the power of providing for the support of the national forces;
in which proposition was intended to be included the expense of raising
troops, of building and equipping fleets, and all other expenses in any
wise connected with military arrangements and operations. But these are
not the only objects to which the jurisdiction of the Union, in respect
to revenue, must necessarily be empowered to extend. It must embrace a
provision for the support of the national civil list; for the payment of
the national debts contracted, or that may be contracted; and, in
general, for all those matters which will call for disbursements out of
the national treasury. The conclusion is, that there must be interwoven,
in the frame of the government, a general power of taxation, in one
shape or another.
Money is, with propriety, considered as the vital principle of the body
politic; as that which sustains its life and motion, and enables it to
perform its most essential functions. A complete power, therefore, to
procure a regular and adequate supply of it, as far as the resources of
the community will permit, may be regarded as an indispensable
ingredient in every constitution. From a deficiency in this particular,
one of two evils must ensue; either the people must be subjected to
continual plunder, as a substitute for a more eligible mode of supplying
the public wants, or the government must sink into a fatal atrophy, and,
in a short course of time, perish.
In the Ottoman or Turkish empire, the sovereign, though in other
respects absolute master of the lives and fortunes of his subjects, has
no right to impose a new tax. The consequence is that he permits the
bashaws or governors of provinces to pillage the people without mercy;
and, in turn, squeezes out of them the sums of which he stands in need,
to satisfy his own exigencies and those of the state. In America, from a
like cause, the government of the Union has gradually dwindled into a
state of decay, approaching nearly to annihilation. Who can doubt, that
the happiness of the people in both countries would be promoted by
competent authorities in the proper hands, to provide the revenues which
the necessities of the public might require?
The present Confederation, feeble as it is intended to repose in the
United States, an unlimited power of providing for the pecuniary wants
of the Union. But proceeding upon an erroneous principle, it has been
done in such a manner as entirely to have frustrated the intention.
Congress, by the articles which compose that compact (as has already
been stated), are authorized to ascertain and call for any sums of money
necessary, in their judgment, to the service of the United States; and
their requisitions, if conformable to the rule of apportionment, are in
every constitutional sense obligatory upon the States. These have no
right to question the propriety of the demand; no discretion beyond that
of devising the ways and means of furnishing the sums demanded. But
though this be strictly and truly the case; though the assumption of
such a right would be an infringement of the articles of Union; though
it may seldom or never have been avowedly claimed, yet in practice it
has been constantly exercised, and would continue to be so, as long as
the revenues of the Confederacy should remain dependent on the
intermediate agency of its members. What the consequences of this system
have been, is within the knowledge of every man the least conversant in
our public affairs, and has been amply unfolded in different parts of
these inquiries. It is this which has chiefly contributed to reduce us
to a situation, which affords ample cause both of mortification to
ourselves, and of triumph to our enemies.
What remedy can there be for this situation, but in a change of the
system which has produced it in a change of the fallacious and delusive
system of quotas and requisitions? What substitute can there be imagined
for this ignis fatuus in finance, but that of permitting the national
government to raise its own revenues by the ordinary methods of taxation
authorized in every well-ordered constitution of civil government?
Ingenious men may declaim with plausibility on any subject; but no human
ingenuity can point out any other expedient to rescue us from the
inconveniences and embarrassments naturally resulting from defective
supplies of the public treasury.
The more intelligent adversaries of the new Constitution admit the force
of this reasoning; but they qualify their admission by a distinction
between what they call INTERNAL and EXTERNAL taxation. The former they
would reserve to the State governments; the latter, which they explain
into commercial imposts, or rather duties on imported articles, they
declare themselves willing to concede to the federal head. This
distinction, however, would violate the maxim of good sense and sound
policy, which dictates that every POWER ought to be in proportion to its
OBJECT; and would still leave the general government in a kind of
tutelage to the State governments, inconsistent with every idea of vigor
or efficiency. Who can pretend that commercial imposts are, or would be,
alone equal to the present and future exigencies of the Union? Taking
into the account the existing debt, foreign and domestic, upon any plan
of extinguishment which a man moderately impressed with the importance
of public justice and public credit could approve, in addition to the
establishments which all parties will acknowledge to be necessary, we
could not reasonably flatter ourselves, that this resource alone, upon
the most improved scale, would even suffice for its present necessities.
Its future necessities admit not of calculation or limitation; and upon
the principle, more than once adverted to, the power of making provision
for them as they arise ought to be equally unconfined. I believe it may
be regarded as a position warranted by the history of mankind, that, IN
THE USUAL PROGRESS OF THINGS, THE NECESSITIES OF A NATION, IN EVERY
STAGE OF ITS EXISTENCE, WILL BE FOUND AT LEAST EQUAL TO ITS RESOURCES.
To say that deficiencies may be provided for by requisitions upon the
States, is on the one hand to acknowledge that this system cannot be
depended upon, and on the other hand to depend upon it for every thing
beyond a certain limit. Those who have carefully attended to its vices
and deformities as they have been exhibited by experience or delineated
in the course of these papers, must feel invincible repugnancy to
trusting the national interests in any degree to its operation. Its
inevitable tendency, whenever it is brought into activity, must be to
enfeeble the Union, and sow the seeds of discord and contention between
the federal head and its members, and between the members themselves.
Can it be expected that the deficiencies would be better supplied in
this mode than the total wants of the Union have heretofore been
supplied in the same mode? It ought to be recollected that if less will
be required from the States, they will have proportionably less means to
answer the demand. If the opinions of those who contend for the
distinction which has been mentioned were to be received as evidence of
truth, one would be led to conclude that there was some known point in
the economy of national affairs at which it would be safe to stop and to
say: Thus far the ends of public happiness will be promoted by supplying
the wants of government, and all beyond this is unworthy of our care or
anxiety. How is it possible that a government half supplied and always
necessitous, can fulfill the purposes of its institution, can provide
for the security, advance the prosperity, or support the reputation of
the commonwealth? How can it ever possess either energy or stability,
dignity or credit, confidence at home or respectability abroad? How can
its administration be any thing else than a succession of expedients
temporizing, impotent, disgraceful? How will it be able to avoid a
frequent sacrifice of its engagements to immediate necessity? How can it
undertake or execute any liberal or enlarged plans of public good?
Let us attend to what would be the effects of this situation in the very
first war in which we should happen to be engaged. We will presume, for
argument's sake, that the revenue arising from the impost duties answers
the purposes of a provision for the public debt and of a peace
establishment for the Union. Thus circumstanced, a war breaks out. What
would be the probable conduct of the government in such an emergency?
Taught by experience that proper dependence could not be placed on the
success of requisitions, unable by its own authority to lay hold of
fresh resources, and urged by considerations of national danger, would
it not be driven to the expedient of diverting the funds already
appropriated from their proper objects to the defense of the State? It
is not easy to see how a step of this kind could be avoided; and if it
should be taken, it is evident that it would prove the destruction of
public credit at the very moment that it was becoming essential to the
public safety. To imagine that at such a crisis credit might be
dispensed with, would be the extreme of infatuation. In the modern
system of war, nations the most wealthy are obliged to have recourse to
large loans. A country so little opulent as ours must feel this
necessity in a much stronger degree. But who would lend to a government
that prefaced its overtures for borrowing by an act which demonstrated
that no reliance could be placed on the steadiness of its measures for
paying? The loans it might be able to procure would be as limited in
their extent as burdensome in their conditions. They would be made upon
the same principles that usurers commonly lend to bankrupt and
fraudulent debtors, with a sparing hand and at enormous premiums.
It may perhaps be imagined that, from the scantiness of the resources of
the country, the necessity of diverting the established funds in the
case supposed would exist, though the national government should possess
an unrestrained power of taxation. But two considerations will serve to
quiet all apprehension on this head: one is, that we are sure the
resources of the community, in their full extent, will be brought into
activity for the benefit of the Union; the other is, that whatever
deficiences there may be, can without difficulty be supplied by loans.
The power of creating new funds upon new objects of taxation, by its own
authority, would enable the national government to borrow as far as its
necessities might require. Foreigners, as well as the citizens of
America, could then reasonably repose confidence in its engagements; but
to depend upon a government that must itself depend upon thirteen other
governments for the means of fulfilling its contracts, when once its
situation is clearly understood, would require a degree of credulity not
often to be met with in the pecuniary transactions of mankind, and
little reconcilable with the usual sharp-sightedness of avarice.
Reflections of this kind may have trifling weight with men who hope to
see realized in America the halcyon scenes of the poetic or fabulous
age; but to those who believe we are likely to experience a common
portion of the vicissitudes and calamities which have fallen to the lot
of other nations, they must appear entitled to serious attention. Such
men must behold the actual situation of their country with painful
solicitude, and deprecate the evils which ambition or revenge might,
with too much facility, inflict upon it.
PUBLIUS