Records Relating to Investigations of the Ft. Philip Kearney (or
Fetterman) Massacre
Testimony of Col. Henry B. Carrington - Page 2
M740 roll 1 of 1
National Archives & Records Administration
Transcribed by Billy Markland
On the 12th of August, Indians ran off horses and cattle
belonging to citizens encamped on the river bank, near Fort Reno,
were pursued by the mounted men of the command and some cattle were
recaptured. Horses and mules were not.
August 14th Joseph Postlewaite and
Stackly Williams were killed by Indians four miles
from Fort Reno.
August 17th Indians appeared in force at same post and
drove off seven government horses and seventeen government mules.
None recaptured.
I also addressed Colonel Maynadier at Fort Laramie, Commanding
District of the Platte, calling attention to these outrages, and
subsequently received the following answer.
Headquarters District of the Platte
Fort Laramie
August 19th 1866
Col. H.B. Carrington
Comd'g. Mount. District
I have just seen, on my return from Omaha, your letter of the 1[3?]
of July relative to loss of horses by Mr. Leighton. I agree with
you fully that the Indians who committed the depredations were
Sioux, and were probably among those recently at Laramie.
I am much astonished that after so many protestations of good
faith, substantiated by a long period of good behavior, they should
have so suddenly violated their pledges. I shall do all in my power
to make the chiefs restore the animals, or make ample restitution.
Two companies of cavalry will go from here shortly to reinforce
your command, and escort trains.
Please say to Mr. Leighton that I have received his letter, but
fear I can do nothing in the matter of claim against the
Government.
Your Obd't Servant
(sd) Henry E. Maynadier
Col. 5th U.S. Vols.
Comd'g
This communication evidently was based upon Special Order No. 51,
Head Quarters Department Platte, bearing date August
11th 1866, paragraph 3, which states.
"The telegraphic order of the 9th inst. from these Head
Quarters, to Colonel H.E. Maynadier, Commanding District of the
Platte, directing the detaching of one company of 2nd
Cavalry from Sedgwick temporarily to reinforce and assist Colonel
Carrington and emigration, is hereby confirmed."
I received a telegram bearing date Aug. 9th stated as
follows.
"Reinforcements have left St. Louis. Colonel Carrington must use
his judgment about establishing Fort C.F. Smith, "at
present".
Second telegram, same date, and also signed by General Cooke,
Department Commander, stated that "he was advised by General
Sherman that a regiment has left St. Louis", and giving
instructions to support me as follows.
Omaha
August 9th 1866
By telegram
Comd'g. Officer
Mountain District
Telegram from Lieutenant General Sherman authorizes me to command
all troops along valley of the Platte. Announces a regiment coming
from St. Louis, wishes posts beyond Laramie supported as much as
possible. Please telegraph me all reliable bad news.
(sd) Philip St. G. Cooke
Maj. Genl. Commanding
A telegram bearing date August 11th 1866 from General
Cooke in person, being confirmed by a copy in writing attested by
H.G. Litchfield Asst. Adjt. General, read as follows.
"Two companies of 2nd Cavalry have been ordered to
assist in the protection of the road. You are hereby authorized to
enlist not to exceed fifty Indian scouts. Pay and allowances of
cavalry soldiers. Let them use the ponies if you cant [sic] do
better".
"Be very cautious! Don't undertake unnecessary risky
detachments".
Meanwhile I had already advanced its designated garrison to
establish the post on Big Horn river, the command leaving early on
the morning of August 3rd 1866.
My action was judicious, and although afterwards General Cooke
authorized the withdrawal of the garrison, the follow letter of
Inspector General Hazen supported me. In fact with three hundred
tons of hay secured at that post, and a years supply of provisions,
the abandonment of that post would have required destruction of
most of the property. And here I remark that General Hazen, as he
passed, took one Officer and twenty six mounted men as escort, and
they were gone with him two months.
Fort Reno
August 20th 1866.
Col. H.B. Carrington
Comd'g. Mount. District
Dear Colonel
I am on my way through the District as Asst. Inspector General of
the Department, and will be at your post, as soon as cavalry escort
ordered to join me reaches here, say in about one week.
(Note. The Cavalry did not come, and General Hazen was furnished
mounted escort from Fort Phil Kearney, the same being absent two
months).
The mail going up will carry, from General Cooke, authority for you
to suspend establishing the extreme west post, (C.F. Smith) if you
think, from the condition of Indian Affairs, it is expedient. He
telegraphed me at Laramie, to consult with you about it, and since
coming within the theatre [sic] of Indian troubles, I am of the
opinion that there is no sufficient reason for longer delaying the
establishing of that post, but on the contrary, it should be
established without further delay.
I think there is no danger on the route to parties well organized,
and that do not straggle, but that the greatest caution will be
necessary, both on the route and at the posts, till the Indians are
thrashed.
I am
Very respectfully
(sd) W. B. Hazen
Bvt. Brig. Genl.
A.Insp. Dep. Platte
The protection of emigration simply to Fort Phil Kearney, which
indeed took the heart of the Indian hunting grounds, could furnish
no protection to travel through the valley of the Tongue river, and
westward to Virginia City. To refuse the advance to Big Horn
river, was to surrender the purpose of my entire
movement.
It subjected me to compliance with the very demands the Sioux had
made, and its importance is fully seen by my official
reports.
There had been, during the latter part of July, and early in
August, up to this date, few other Indian outrages, other than
those already named.
Mr. M.A. Nye, lost on July 22nd, while encamped
near Fort Phil Kearney, four animals. Mr. A. Axe, and Mr. I.
Dixon lost each respectively two mules the same date.
On the same date the train of Louis Cheney was attacked at the "Dry
Fork of the Cheyenne", and again at "Crazy Woman's Fork", by the
Indians, though his train was fully armed, one man killed, horses,
cattle and private property destroyed. During the same period there
was lost at Fort Philip Kearney seventy head of Government
stock.
From the middle or latter part of August, Indians appeared more
frequently about Fort Philip Kearney, and from that time I assumed
the condition of affairs to be decided, unequivocal hostility on
the part of Indian tribes about me.
On the 29th August, I made reports to the Department
Commander of the condition of Affairs, which read as follows, both
telegram and letter.
Fort Philip Kearney D.T.
Via Fort Laramie
August 29th. 1866
By telegram
Litchfield H.G. Major
A.A. Genl.
Omaha
Mail received. Indians were hostile early in the month, but have
lost at least thirty seven men in their operations, and keep more
distant. The aggregate of whites killed does not exceed thirty
three. Their demonstrations upon my post have cost me nothing, but
have cost them men and horses.
I send report by mail, and shall communicate weekly if I can keep
up horses. Trains with fifty well armed men who are prudent, are
safe. I think Yellowstone post should be established this fall. The
Big Horn post is successfully established. I need cavalry, but they
will here soon. If I had five more companies of infantry it would
be well to establish a sub post of Reno, at south Fork of the
Cheyenne, half way to the ferry, with one company, next to divide a
company between Crazy Woman's Fork and Dry Fork of the Cheyenne,
and to place one company on the mouth of Goose Creek on Tongue
river, and two at Yellowstone.
General Hazen leaves tomorrow with escort I furnish. He will
report to you in full. I have a saw mill in full operation but need
a shingle machine very much. Be assured the public need not fear to
follow this line of travel, using proper care and being well
armed.
Very respectfully
Your Obedient Servant
Henry B. Carrington
Col. 18th U.S. Infantry
Head Quarters Mountain District
Department Platte
Fort Philip Kearney, D.T.
August 29th 1866
Litchfield H.G. Brevet Major
A.A.A. General
Department of the Platte
Major
I have the honor to report as to the condition of Indian Affairs
within this command up to date, with remark [sic] that I shall
endeavor to keep up a weekly mail and send intermediate couriers if
emergency shall require the same, and
1st The route.
After due reflection, I deemed best to establish the post on the
Big Horn river. I was led to this conclusion by the fact that the
Sioux had given me notice "that they would not leave a hoof" and
that I should go no further, and by the consideration that having
established a perfectly secure base, I had the means at command
reasonably to support the advance and find out whether I had
substantial opposition on the line.
The movement was without opposition, and timely, as the Indians had
robbed a citizens train of one hundred mules just before their
arrival.
The post is well located, and has already proved of substantial
value to emigration. I shall be able, by the next mail, to furnish
a map of the route with full details as to water courses.
2nd Hostile Operations
Indians have molested trains as far eastward as Wind river, in one
case leaving one man of twelve to escape unhurt. The total number
of whites killed has been thirty three (33) so far as advised, and
I have carefully sifted all the exagerated [sic] reports so current
at such times.
In no instance do I know of a train of good size having been
attacked when prudence was exercised in guarding stock and
stores.
In the case of Mr. Dillon, above referred to, the Sioux showed more
wickedness than usual. His eleven men had Henry and Spencer
rifles.
The Indians pretended friendship, shook hands with the party, and
suddenly turned to shooting their entertainers.
At Fort Reno, the Indians have stolen stock frequently.
At this post there have been but two demonstrations since last
report. In one case an attempt was made to show friendship towards
our drivers of timber trains, and then they attacked the rear
wagons, cutting loose a few mules.
Upon report of our picket on the western lookout a few men were
started in pursuit, rescuing the mules, killing one and wounding in
the hips, a second Indian.
They equally failed on their second visit. We have good assurance
of thirty seven killed and wounded on the line, and they now avoid
it.
They equally realize that the occupation of this line is certain
and permanent; and I feel certain that emigration next spring can
safely follow this route.
Indeed, a train of emigrants of fifty to sixty men which now
organize with prudence, is safe.
They must be cautious, but they need not avoid the route.
3rd Sub Posts
I deem it highly important that I be able to establish the
following sub posts under the control of nearest Post Commander,
viz: -
At South Fork of Cheyenne, midway
between Ferry of the Platte and Fort Reno.
There is timber, grass and water ample for the purpose on the
spot.
At Crazy Woman's Fork, where similar
advantages obtain.
At Mouth of Goose Creek, on Tongue river,
having similar advantages.
I also present the importance of establishing the Yellow
Stone post this fall.
In view of the importance of the route, and the character of Indian
operations, I do not believe a large force will be necessary to
maintain it, but natural, connected sequence of supporting posts
will guarantee its safety.
4th Character of Indian Operations.
They are bent on robbery.
They only fight when assured of personal security and remuneration
stealings.
They are divided among themselves. For example, the Sioux whipped
with bows several Cheyenne Chiefs who refused to unite in an attack
upon me, and on the other hand, nearly all the old men oppose any
contest with the whites.
The young warriors are repugnant to the surrender of the ground I
occupy, but this Laramie treaty has still more alienated some, who
received presents, from others who received none.
The hereditary chiefs are no more, and there is no possibility, as
it seems to me, of any Indian alliance that will bring on a general
war. They are too late. When my ammunition arrives they may
threaten all winter, but I shall be able to communicate with Head
Quarters and extend a good spring route for emigration to all who
seek it.
5th Force required.
My first opinion, formed at Fort Laramie, confirmed on the march
and since assured, I find no reason to change.
If I had left Laramie with two Battalions (sixteen companies) there
would been a clear road.
To ensure the route against all but a general war, I need five
companies of Infantry and four of cavalry to complete the route
suggested.
For the winter, if I established the Yellow Stone post, I can
protect posts and stores, and keep open my communications (on this
same basis) with two of Infantry and two of cavalry.
With two companies of cavalry, (not establishing the further post),
I can keep open my communication, protect all posts and hold my own
with positive injury to the Indians.
6th Expedition.
You may be assured that I will run no hazardous risk. I am daily
obtaining information of the country, the character of the opposing
and antagonist tribes, such as will enable me, with a moderate
force, to find out the exact relation of all Indians on Tongue
river and its tributaries, the Big Horn and the valley below
Reno.
I will make methods of communication so secure that you may be
fully advised, and knowing well your anxiety as to the route, will
endeavor to meet most fully your expectations.
7th Present Mail Facilities.
I learn that a mail will leave Fort Laramie for Ferry, each
Wednesday, and will make my arrangements accordingly.
8th General Hazen leaves tomorrow with escort of
mounted Infantry. He will probably report by this mail of his visit
to this post.
(sd) H.B. Carrington
Col. 18th U.S. Infantry
During this period, official communication from Fort C.F. Smith,
reported that there were two large villages of Crow Indians, are
encamped about seven miles from Fort C.F. Smith, and the other on
Pryor's Fork, and a small village at Clark's Fork, all
friendly.
I immediately sent James Beckwith (mulatto) who claimed to have
lived with the Crows as a Chief among them, and who married with
them, to communicate my views and wishes, and to learn their
disposition towards the whites and the occupation of the route, and
to induce them, if possible, to communicate with "Red Cloud"
quietly and learn the disposition of himself and the Sioux
of the Tongue river valley.
I also sent James Bridger, my chief guide, and especially familiar
with the Crow Indians, to have an interview with them for the same
purpose.
The substance of their report is given in the following
communication to Department Head Quarters, which is introduced
here, although not in order of date, but as nearly concurrent in
actual date of fact.
Fort Philip Kearney D.T.
November 5th. 1866.
Litchfield, H.G. Major
Asst. Adjt. General
Omaha
I have the honor to report that while commanding the Mountain
District, Department of the Platte, I sent James Bridger, Chief
guide, and guide Williams, to examine the whole line hence to
Virginia City, with view to an exact report of its condition and
resources and no less its susceptibility of being shortened by
proper cuts off.
I shall embody their reports in map form, by next weeks mail.
Lieutenant Bradley, in charge of escort to Captain Hazen, Brevet
Brigadier General U.S.A. and Inspector General Department Platte,
has also returned from Fort Benton.
The following is summary of events since last report.
1st. Mail party of twenty men, with seventeen miners,
returning westward, were attacked by nearly three hundred Indians
in the valley of Tongue river. The miners abandoned their pack[s],
lost four horses; but proceeded on the march.
2nd. Lieutenant Bradley's party, returning from Fort
Benton, and about thirty miles from Fort C.F. Smith, were attacked
by a large force of Sioux, about noon. Mr. Braman, guide, detached
for special duty on the trip, while leading the advance, with
Acting Assistant Surgeon McCleary, was suddenly attacked by a party
of Indians. Braman was killed and scalped. Dr. McCleary had his
horse shot and escaped. A skirmish fight lasted for several hours,
resulting in supposed loss to the Indians and their retreat, but no
soldier killed. Private Brooks, Company "H", was wounded, but not
fatally.
3rd. Bridger and Williams visited the Crow Indians as
instructed. This was at Clark's Fork. The village numbered five
hundred men.
"White Mouth", "Black Foot", "Rotten Tail", (Chiefs) insisted they
were at peace, and wished to be always. The young men, in some
cases wished to join the Sioux and compromise their old title to
this country, of which they had been robbed by the Cheyennes and
Sioux.
Red Cloud had visited their village and they had returned the
visit, but declined to join them on the war path against the
whites.
"The man afraid of his horses", who visited them saying "Tobacco
had been sent", he had been invited to go to Laramie to sign a
treaty, that he would go, that they must wait for his return.
This corresponds with statements in letter from Major Van Voast,
Commanding Fort Laramie.
These Crow Chiefs report that it took a half days ride to go
through the villages of the war parties on Tongue river. That "The
Sissetons, Bad Faces, O'Gallallas, (from the Missouri),
Minneconjous (from Black Hills), Mepapahs, Cheyennes, Arapahoes,
Gros Ventres, (Big Bellies) were together, indicating that they
would not touch the Fort on Powder river, ("last years fort") but
would destroy the two new forts in their hunting grounds", meaning
Fort Philip Kearney D.T. and Fort C.F. Smith, as these were
encroachments which they had not agreed to. They say, they will
have two big fights with the white soldiers on Pine Woods and Big
Horn.
"Iron Shell", is with the Minneconjous, the Brules are also with
them in part, though they made peace at Laramie, as it is
claimed.
The "Snakes", "Nez Perces" and "Flatheads" are persistently
friendly, but report the "Piegans" and "Bloods" as hostile.
The "Blackfeet", "Assinaboinus" and Crees are reported to be at
peace with the whites, and at the same time, on fair terms with the
hostile tribes. With all their friendly signs, however, all have
government stock, and intertrade stolen property.
4th. Beckwith, mulatto guide, has made a visit to the
same band of Crows. They sent for him, as he was formerly with
them. He says that two hundred and fifty Crows will join me on the
war path, this winter, if I wish it. He talks much. I doubt his
influence with them, but shall soon know the result of his visit.
Mr. Bridger thinks them ready to enlist.
5th. The Crows represent that a treaty was made with
them on the Upper Missouri, on board of [sic] the steamer "Ben
Johnson", whereby, for the sum of twenty five thousand dollars,
they surrendered a route to Montana, south of the Big Horn
mountains, that "Iron Shell" of the Crow nation was present at such
treaty, and that he does not regard the same as concerning the
present road north of the Big Horn range, but will keep peace until
the same is settled by intercourse with the whites. It is not
unlikely that an attack will be made this winter early, but I have
no doubt of their failure. If I had the two companies of infantry
and the two companies of cavalry, I shall be able to assure
communication, unless a general war shall ensue, which I do not
think the Indians will venture upon this winter.
6th. The Crows also say that the Sioux report a fight
with the white men at this fort, and give date and place
correctly.
I reported five Indians and one white man killed. They say they had
eight killed, five wounded who died of their wounds, and many shot
who will be well again.
I know their loss was heavy and the effect has been felt ever
since.
7th. Along the line there has been general Indian
hostilities, but few aggressive acts of any large force. On the
night of the 3rd instant, a citizen party gathered about
a fire playing cards, near the fort, and were fired upon, three
being wounded. I sent out a skirmishing party as soon as the shots
were heard, who found no Indians, and a case shot, exploded in the
midst of a signal fire soon lighted on a peak, west of the fort,
scattered them. They have not appeared since.
There is no doubt of this bitter hatred of our every movement, but
they do not understand the nature of our resources. For example,
Red Cloud informed the Crows, that by cutting off communications,
when bad weather set in, he would starve us out this winter.
He does not comprehend the idea of a years supplies, nor that we
are now prepared to not only pass the winter, but next spring and
summer, even if he takes the offensive.
On the whole, the condition of affairs is more favorable than I
expected would be the case, when I left Laramie. I had not the
slightest confidence in the result of the proposed treaty, and so
wrote you. And in fact the whole result of the negotiations there
was a mere temporary suspension of hostile acts, if it even
amounted to that.
I look for this month to determine their purpose, and hope yet to
be able to strike a blow which they will feel more than the last,
and not risk a single post on the line in the attempt.
In no case will any rash venture be made, or any that will not
meet the favor of the General Commanding.
What was intended and understood, his views, and those of General
Sherman, and the purpose I held on the march will be realized, and
the increase of troops, which will undoubtedly be furnished, will
ensure a safe spring emigration, and open a fine country, as well
as a short route to the far west.
I am
Very respectfully
Your Obd't Servt.
Henry B. Carrington
Col. 18th U.S. Infantry
Comd'g.
On the 9th of August, the train going to the woods was
attacked. The Indians at first secured four mules which had been
abandoned by one of the citizen government drivers. A party sent
from the fort, under Corporal George Phillips,
regained the mules, killed an Indian and wounded another.
From the latter part of August, Indian depredations became more
frequent, and by larger parties.
September 8th at 6 a.m. they made an attack upon a
citizen train lying east of the fort driving off twenty mules
during a very severe storm.
On the 10th, a party of twenty Indians attacked ten
government herders, a mile south of the fort, driving off thirty
three horses and seventy eight mules. They were pursued promptly,
but night and broken down horses, rendered pursuit hopeless.
September 13th, at midnight, I was called upon by
couriers from citizen hay party at Goose Creek, about eighty in
number, to send military aid, as they had been attacked by Indians,
one man killed, mowing machines and hay burned, and two hundred and
nine cattle driven off.
This party consisted of government contractors to put up hay for
the post, and had with them, at the time, a sergeant and ten men
from my command.
I directed Captain Ten Eyck, Post Commander, to send forty infantry
in wagons, to their relief, under Brevet Captain Adair.
He returned, reporting that their estimate of Indians at several
hundred, was fully sustained by those plainly within sight.
The same day at 9 o'clock, the Indians stampeded a government herd
near the post, wounding two of the herders. Captain Ten Eyck and
Lieutenant Wands pursued them till late at night, without
success.
On the 14th, Private Allande Gilchrist, of the
18th Infantry, is supposed to have been killed by
Indians, as a portion of his cloths were found bloody, without his
body.
September 16th, Private Peter Johnson 18th
Infantry, being a few rods in advance of the hay party, returning
from the Lake, was cut off by a party, as he entered a ravine,
killed, scalped and his body carried off by the Indians.
September 17th, a large party of Indians made a
demonstration against Government stock, from the east. They took
forty eight head of cattle. All were recaptured upon pursuit.
September 20th, the Indians made an attack upon a
citizen outfit lying in the angle of the two Pineys, but were
repulsed with aid from the fort, and one Indian killed and one
wounded.
September 23rd, Indians attacked and drove off twenty
four head of cattle, the property of a government contractor.
Captain Brown, with a few mounted men, a few volunteer citizens, in
all twenty three men, pursued the Indians, overtaking them about
ten miles from the post. A sharp skirmish ensued in which the
Indians, numbering not far from one hundred and fifty, repeatedly
charged, and were themselves charged, until compelled to abandon
the cattle, all of which were brought back safely to the
post.
The same date Lieutenant Matson, 18th Infantry, returned
from Goose Creek, where the contractor's hay party was at work,
bringing in their machinery and stock.
He reported the Indians as in considerable force and the citizens
demoralized and unwilling to work. He was surrounded compelled to
corrall [sic] his train until relieved.
He was then joined by Captain North, so called, a mountaineer. He
also found upon the road, killed and scalped, Mr. Gruell, and two
teamsters, who had been to Fort Smith with Government supplies
under contract.
This party had been to Fort Smith with twenty soldiers and
seventeen miners, the latter seeking employment, but had been met
by a superior force of Indians, had fought for two days, as
reported by Brevet Lieutenant Colonel N.C. Kinney, had been
compelled to abandon their packs securely to reach that post, and
losing four horses.
During the same week, to wit, on the 17th,
21st and 23rd days of September, the Indians
operated about Fort Reno.
1st Attacking the herders of that post, driving off two
government horses.
2nd Attacking the working party and herders and driving
off five government horses and two mules.
3rd Driving off cattle of citizens, in which instance
the cattle were recaptured, but Captain H. Walsh was killed. The
afternoon of the 21st also, at Reno, they attacked a
citizen train eight miles from the post, in the Dry Fork of the
Cheyenne, and citizens W. R. Petty and A.G. Overholt were
wounded.