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39th Congress,
2d Session |
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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
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Ex. Doc.
No. 71. |
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MASSACRE OF TROOPS NEAR FORT PHIL. KEARNEY.
LETTER
FROM
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
IN ANSWER TO
A resolution of the House of January 29, 1867, relative to Indian
massacre of United States troops near Fort Phil.Kearney.
FEBRUARY 5. 1867.--Referred to the Committee On Indian Affairs
and ordered to be printed.
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
Washington, D.C., February 5. 1867.
SIR: In obedience to the resolution of the House of
Representatives of the 29th ultimo, requesting the Secretary of
the Interior to furnish to the House "such information as he
my have in his possession in relation to the late massacre of
United States troops at Fort Philip Kearney, and the causes which
produced the same; and also as to the causes which, in his
judgment, have led to the present alarming condition of our
relations with the Indian tribes of the interior," I have
the honor herewith to transmit a report from the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs, dated the 4th instant, with twelve accompanying
papers, which contain all the information that has yet reached
this department, on the subject.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
O.H. BROWNING, Secretary.
Hon. Schuyler Colvax,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
Office Indian Affairs, February 4, 1867.
Sir: I have received from you the resolutions of the Senate and
House of Representatives in relation to the recent outbreak at
Fort Phil. Kearney. These resolutions contain three distinct
propositions, to each of which a separate answer is necessary. It
requires this department to furnish all the information in its
possession in relation to the late massacre at Fort Phil.
Kearney; secondly, the causes which produced the same; and
thirdly, the causes which have led to the present alarming
condition of our relations with the Indian tribes of the
Interior.
In answer to the first question, I will say that we had, prior to
the occurrence of this disaster, very reliable information of the
temper of the Indians in that section of the country, and
although this temper did not amount to a positive feeling of
hostility, yet I know from the various sources of information at
the command of this bureau that there was a feeling of
dissatisfaction growing out of the treaty of Fort Laramie of last
summer. That the tribes occupying the Powder river country had
great cause of dissatisfaction with the provisions of this treaty
is not peculiar. From the extract which I here furnish from the
special report of Agent Chandler, (marked No. 1,) it will be
easily understood why this dissatisfaction existed. Knowing that
this feeling existed among these Indians, it was my intention to
recommend the appointment, at an early day, of a commission of
good men to visit their country and consult with the leading
chiefs and headmen of these tribes and ascertain what their
condition really and justly required. It seems to me to be
unreasonable to require these people to abandon their hunting
grounds, while the chase is their only means of support, until
some other means of existence is provided for them. That another
means of support can be provided is beyond any doubt. The country
is extensive enough to give them a home and at the same time
remove them from the highway of the travel of the whites. It is
due, however, to the cause of truth to say that, however
injudicious the provisions of this treaty are, most of the bands
of Sioux Indians occupying that country were determined to abide
by it, and I have positive information that these well-disposed
Indians have faithfully adhered to this determination. Hence many
of the chiefs of different bands, such as Spotted Tail, Swift
Bear, One That Walks Under the Ground, and many others, have
actually moved to the south side of the Platte, where they are at
this time, to keep out of the way of any trouble. They are yet
friendly. Another leading chief, by the name of Iron Shell, is,
with his band, in the Sand Hills north of the Platte, and
friendly. With proper management, these friendly deposed bands
can be used to the best advantage by the government, and I am
anxious that nothing should occur to drive them from us. Although
these bands are friendly, it is nevertheless but too true that it
is more policy than anything else that makes them so. They feel
as if they were unjustly treated, and this feeling is universal
among them. From all the information I can get-and it is, I think
, pretty reliable-none of these chiefs had anything to do with
the affair at Fort Phil. Kearney. An order issued by General
Cooke, at Omaha, on the 31st day of July last
(herewith sent, marked No. 32,) in relation to arms and
ammunition, has had a very bad effect. I am satisfied that such
orders are not only unwise, but really cruel, and therefore
calculated to produce the very worst effect. Indians are men, and
when hungry will, like us, resort to any means to obtain food,
and as the chase is their only means of subsistence, if you
deprive them of the power of procuring it, you certainly produce
great dissatisfaction. [If?] it were true that arms and
ammunition could be accumulated by them, to war against us, it
certainly would be unwise to give it to them; but this is not the
fact. No Indian will buy two guns. One he absolutely needs, and
as he has no means of taking care of powder, he necessarily will
take, when offered to him, but a very limited quantity. It is
true that formerly they hunted with bows and arrows, killing
buffalo, antelope, and deer with the same; but to hunt
successfully with bow and arrow requires horses, and as the
valleys of that country are now more or less filled by white men
prospecting for gold and silver, their means of subsisting their
horses have passed away, and they now have but few horses. I
mention these facts so as to place before the country, as briefly
as briefly as possible, the condition as well as the wants of the
Indians.
I herewith send copies of two letters (marked 3 and 4) and my
report on same marked 4 ½) from the surgeon at the post of
Phil. Kearney, giving an account of the first difficulty on the
6th of December, and of the last one, on the
21st of the same month. Although these letters were
written by an officer at the post, with all his sympathies for
his comrades, it is very evident, from a careful perusal and a
just understanding of them, that these Indians did not come to
that fort in any very great force, nor with a view of making war.
To say that a wagon train was attacked by three hundred Indians,
and yet no one was killed, is simply ridiculous. There were,
perhaps some five or six men with this train, and if three
hundred Indians had really attacked them it is not doubted that
one or more of them would have been killed. But the report was
made of an attack by three hundred Indians; this led to a sortie
from the fort, and even then, it appears, the Indians did not
wish to fight, as they retreated, and no soldier was killed until
several Indians had been dispatched by our soldiers. It seems
that then some Indians hovered around the fort till the 21st, the
day of the fatal disaster. To say that they came to the fort to
challenge the force at that point to a fight, is simply absurd.
Nevertheless a fight did take place, and the facts are all set
forth in the letter marked No. 4, dated 1st of January of this
year.
Now, I understand this was the fact: These Indians being in
absolute want of guns and ammunition to make their winter hunt,
were on a friendly visit to the fort, desiring to communicate
with the commanding officer, to get the order refusing them guns
and ammunition rescinded, so that they might be enabled to
procure their winter supply of buffalo. It has been currently
reported that some 3,000 to 5,000 warriors were assembled to
invest this fort. This is not, and cannot by any possibility be
true, as this would pre-suppose a population of 21,000 to 35,000
Indians in that section of country (being one warrior in seven.)
This number of Indians is not there, nor could that number of
warriors feed themselves and their horses at this season of the
year in that latitude. The whole is an exaggeration; and although
I regret the unfortunate death of so many brave soldiers, yet
there can be no doubt that it was owing to the foolish and rash
management of the officer in command at that post. Nevertheless,
there is a band of Sioux Indians in that country, of the
Ogallalla tribe, headed by a chief of the name of Red Cloud, that
are badly disposed. This is the only band, so far as I am
informed, that is hostile as a band ; but I have no doubt that
around him and under his banner are gathered all the badly
disposed Indians of the country. They flock to his standard as
individuals, not as tribes, and I think this band with its
adherents should be severely chastised by the military. With this
view, I have recommended to you the appointment of the
commissioners whose names you have presented to the President, to
proceed to that country at as early a day as possible, with the
view of finding all the facts which have led to the affair, and
of separating, if possible, the friendly from the unfriendly
tribes. By doing so we would be doing justice to those who are
innocent, and also avoid a general Indian war, which, if once
started, will extend over the entire country, from the Missouri
river to the Rocky mountains and from the mouth of the
Yellowstone to the Mexican line. This war should be avoided, if
possible, as it would cost millions of dollars, and last for many
years.
I submit to you a letter from the War Department, (No. 5,)
enclosing the extract from the report of General Sherman, (No.
6.) Such an order, in my opinion, would lead to the very result
it is designed to obviate. I submit to you the copy of my report
on this subject of the 23d of January, being document No. 7
herewith sent.
It cannot be doubted that the Indians have many just causes of
complaint. The policy heretofore pursued, I think, has been a bad
one; and bad as it was, it has not been justly carried out. Homes
should be provided for them, and we have territory enough to give
them; their annuities should be greatly increased, and goods of a
good quality and adapted to their wants should he furnished them,
and also at the proper season of the year. It is a notorious fact
that very inferior goods have for some years been given to them,
and also at a period too late.
In conclusion, permit me to say that I know of but one remedy for
all the evils now existing in our Indian relations. It is the
appointment of commissioners, without regard to the politics or
religion of the persons appointed, to be composed of men of high
character, to proceed to all the States and Territories
containing an Indian population; one commission, say of five
persons, for each of these States and Territories, to study the
Indian question in each one, viz., ascertain the number of
Indians, their present status, and how many can be aggregated on
one or two reservations, and to select these reservations, which
should be ample, and report to this department next fall. These
commissions should take all the time necessary to master the
subject, and, if necessary, spend months in mastering it. The
Indians should be then made to go on these reservations, and when
there, furnished with stocks of cattle and sheep to raise. At
first the cattle and sheep would he eaten by them; but it would
not be long before they would find out that the milk of the cow,
and the wool of the sheep, and the meat of the beef, as well as
the hide and tallow, are all very good things: and in place of
giving them large quantities of light and useless goods, paints,
and beads give them a reasonable allowance of heavy goods until
they can make them themselves, and furnish them with spinning and
weaving machines. Near this reservation, but not on it, I would
advise the location of a military garrison; not too near, for
well-known reasons, but within a distance which would secure to
the garrison all power to suppress and control the occupants of
the reservation, with a resident agent on the reservation, and in
the midst of them. After they are thus localized and made to
depend on their own care in raising their flocks of sheep and
herds of cattle, I would then introduce the schoolmaster and the
missionary, and not before. It is worse than useless to attempt
to educate and to christianize a few members of a tribe of
barbarians. Elevate the whole tribe together; it is slower, but
every step taken is maintained.
I have, perhaps, gone beyond the requirements of the resolution
submitted to me; nevertheless, I think the views herein suggested
are germane to the subject. The question is of the greatest
importance, and well worthy the attention of statesmen.
Since writing the above my attention has been called to one of
the city papers of to-day, containing what purports to be the
action of the military in relation to the question of furnishing
in limited quantities, to friendly Indians, arms and ammunition.
I enclose a slip from one of these papers, and if it be true that
the military has interfered in the way there stated, it accounts
fully for most of our Indian troubles, and this strengthens my
previous views, that it is owing to the unwarranted interference
of the military that we have the numerous conflicts with these
people. How anybody, military or civil, could possibly object to
the order given by Special Agents Irwin and Bogy to the trader
Butterfield, is indeed surprising. The law authorizes traders to
deal in arms and ammunition with tribes at peace, and this is all
that these special agents say. Their order is correct according
to law and reason, and the military should not be allowed to
interfere. In this case, as in all other cases coming under my
observation, this interference has been imperious, and unless it
is checked it will lead to the most disastrous consequences;
nothing less than the destruction of our entire western
settlements, including Nebraska, Kansas, Idaho, Montana, Utah,
Colorado, New Mexico, Dakota, Nevada, and Arizona, and the entire
column of western emigration. This I wish to avoid.
I enclose you copies of the letter of Governor Edmunds of the
26th September last, enclosing report of Agent Hanson
of the 15th of the same month, being document No. 8;
also copy of letter of Governor Faulk of the 9th
January last, enclosing report of the 31st December,
being document No. 9.
Permit me to call particular attention to these reports. The
reading of them will satisfy any one of the cause of our present
difficulties. All can be traced to the order of Genera! Cooke of
the 31st of July, forbidding the traders from dealing
in arms and ammunition; and if we have any trouble with the
Cheyennes and Arapahoes, now or very recently perfectly quiet,
all newspaper reports to the contrary notwithstanding, it can be
traced to the action of Major Douglass, sustained by his superior
officer. The special commissioners who visited these Indians last
fall were discreet and prudent men, and I am satisfied if their
action had not been interfered with that no trouble whatever
would exist there. As it is I look for an outbreak every day. The
newspaper reports daily seen are generally false. One of them
yesterday, connecting the name of Mr. Comstock, is known to be
one of the meanest and most worthless fellows on the frontier,
although reported to be an interpreter, scout, and guide, all of
which is false; he is neither one of these things but a gambler
and thief.
I also enclose you extracts from a letter of General Hancock to
Agent Leavenworth, as an evidence of the animus actuating these
military commanders, being document No. 10.
It is due to me, in final conclusion, to say that I entertain for
these different distinguished military officers the very highest
regard, and no one would go further to defend and protect them in
the discharge of their proper duties, but I honestly believe that
in relation to our Indian affairs and the tremendous efforts to
get possession of this branch of business they are wrong; and, so
believing, I am willing to declare it unhesitatingly.
With great respect, your obedient servant,
LEWIS V, BOGY, Commissioner.
Hon. O.H. BROWNING,
Secretary of the Interior.
Extracts from the report of Special Agent E.B. Chandler to
Superintendent H.B. Denman.
Fort Laramie, January 13, 1867
Sir : I have the honor to report my arrival at the Upper Platte
agency on the 29th ultimo.
I find in the immediate vicinity of Fort Laramie three hundred
and twenty Indians of various tribes and bands, and of whom the
greater part are squaws and children. Of the latter many of them
are half breeds.
Ten miles from this place is an encampment of one hundred and
sixty-five Ogallallas of the Bad Face band, whose chief is known
by the name of Big Mouth. Other small bands of the same Indians,
said to number one hundred and thirty persons in the aggregate,
are encamped at various places within a distance of fifteen miles
from the fort, who, together with those referred to above,
receive subsistence from the government. I have been unable to
visit all the camps of these small bands; therefore, of my own
knowledge, cannot definitely state their numbers; but from
observation and from information received from Agent Patrick and
Mr. Scott, the government interpreter for this agency, I have no
doubt that the whole number of professedly friendly Indians here
of all ages amount to six hundred persons.
Of the other friendly bands of Sioux who participated in the late
treaty, made at this place in June last, are those led by Spotted
Tail, Standing Elk, Swift Bear, The Man Who Walks Under the
Ground, and perhaps others of less reputation. I have been
informed by traders, who have been recently among them, that they
are encamped on the Republican river, at a point about one
hundred and forty miles from Fort Sedgwick, in Colorado
Territory, and that their numbers do not exceed eight hundred
persons of all ages, old men, women, and children largely
predominating. Their conduct is represented to be good, and, the
game in that vicinity being abundant, they live comfortably
without present need of aid from the government.
In compliance with your instructions to report upon the terms and
character of the treaty concluded by the late peace commissioners
at this place with the Sioux Indians, I have to say that I have
been unable to find a copy of that instrument at this post. A
treaty prepared and signed by said commissioners for the Arapaho
Indians is in the possession of Agent Patrick, and said to be
identical in terms with the Sioux and Cheyenne treaties, with the
only variance of different amounts of annuities to each. The
amount stipulated in the treaty with the Sioux tribe (as I have
been told by Mr. Patrick and others who heard the original treaty
read) is seventy thousand dollars annually for twenty years; the
Cheyennes fifteen thousand dollars for the same length of time
annually. This large amount was paid in consideration of the
provisions of article 3 of that instrument, which, if my
information be correct, is as follows:
"The said tribe represented in council shall withdraw from
the routes overland already established, or hereafter to be
established, through their country, and in consideration thereof
the government of the United States agree to pay to the said
tribe the sum of seventy thousand dollars annually for twenty
years, payable in such articles as the Secretary of the Interior
may direct: Provided, That the said tribe shall faithfully
conform to the provisions of this treaty."
The "routes overland" spoken of in said article 3
referred really to the Powder river road to Montana, the Indians,
as I am informed, being willing to concede the use of all others
now open through their country without remuneration. This they
claimed led through their best hunting ground, and they believed
the use of the same by the whites would result in driving out the
game, leaving them without the means of future subsistence, and
for a long time seemed indisposed to comply with this, the main
and most important condition of the treaty, upon any terms. At
the opening of the council, however, Colonel E. B. Tailor, in a
speech, promised the Indians that the travel on said road should
be confined strictly to the line thereof, and that emigrants and
travellers generally should not be allowed to molest or disturb
the game in the country through which they passed. With this
promise, impossible of performance, well calculated, and, as I
believe, designed to deceive them, the distribution of a large
amount of presents, and the obligation of the government to pay
an extravagant annuity, the treaty was at length concluded with
parties holding subordinate and irresponsible positions in the
tribe, and representing inconsiderable numbers. That they were
unable and did not control the action of the bands which they
assumed to represent, will be clearly proven by subsequent
facts.
That Red Cloud, Red Leaf, and the Man Afraid of His Horses were
the principal, leading and most influential chiefs of the tribe,
was well known and acknowledged by residents of the country
generally; that the commissioners considered Red Cloud the most
prominent chief of the Sioux tribe was clearly proven by the
pains taken to procure his attendance at the treaty, and the
distinguished consideration shown to him more than to any other
chief after his arrival, as well an by public acknowledgment of
the fact by one of said commissioners; that these commissioners
were determined to make a treaty upon some terms, either with or
without the consent of the tribe, was clearly apparent from all
their official acts; that Commissioner Taylor repeatedly asserted
that he was sent here by the government for the purpose of making
a treaty, and it should be accomplished if made with but two
Indians, can be proved by numerous officers and citizens at and
near this poet who heard him.
Within two weeks after the conclusion of the so-called treaty,
Spotted Tail, Standing Elk, (and all others of the professedly
friendly Indiana now on the Republican,) then on their way to
that place, told ranchmen and traders of their acquaintance whom
they met, that many of their young men had determined to go to
war, and had left them and gone to the Powder river country, and
they advised all who had occasion to go far from home to "go
prepared, and look out for their hair."
At their crossing of the South Platte river, some days
subsequently, parties who met and conversed with these Indians
report their numbers to be less than one hundred lodges, and
their party made up principally of old men, squaws, and children.
The statement of their chiefs at this time, in explaining the
absence of these young men, was substantially the same as given
before.
I am informed by Captain Besbee [sic](late of Fort Philip
Kearney) that early in the month of July last the troops at that
place, while pursuing hostile Indians who had stolen stock from
the fort, captured from them a horse loaded entirely with Indian
goods which had been distributed and brought from the Fort
Laramie treaty. He further states that, from information obtained
from scouts and mail-carriers, he believes there is a very large
body of hostile Indians in Tongue River valley, many of whom are
Sioux, and that for a long time past he considers the fort to
have been in a state of siege by them.
From the foregoing facts, and the statements of various parties
who were present at the treaty, and were well acquainted with the
facts and circumstances attending the same, giving to each the
weight which I believe it justly entitled to receive, I have
arrived clearly to the opinion that the so-called treaty with the
Sioux Indians, concluded at Fort Laramie in June last, was little
better than a farce, entitled to no consideration from the
government, and ought not to be ratified.
In relation to the treaty made with the Cheyennes, by order of
Colonel E.B. Taylor, on the 11th day of October last,
I am of the opinion that it ought not to be ratified by the
government, it having been made with but an inconsiderable
portion of the tribe, and signed by parties who were not then
principal chiefs and headmen.
Respecting the tribes and bands of Indians now at war with the
United States, I think all north of the North Platte river may be
considered hostile. From information received by a friendly
Indian sent from here to the Powder river country, (and who
started home from the encampments of the hostile bands on the day
of the massacre at Fort Philip Kearney.) I learn the names of the
different tribes and bands then at war to be the Minne Conjous,
Brules, Ogallallas, Crows, Uncpapahs, Blackfeet, Sans Arcs,
Arapahoes, a portion of the Cheyennes, and some others whose
names I have now forgotten. His estimate of their strength at
that time was eleven thousand six hundred warriors. Later
estimates have been much higher, but I think his the most
reliable up to the present time. Since he was there, however, it
is probable that these Indians have been re-enforced. Red Cloud,
Red Leaf, and The Man Afraid of His Horses, are supposed to be
the principal instigators and leaders in the war.
Respecting the friendly Indians belonging to this agency, I would
recommend, with a view to justice alone, that they receive
protection and the necessary subsistence from the United States.
Their situation is such that I deem it hardly possible for them
to live upon their own resources for a considerable length of
time without returning north of the Platte river, where they
would not be permitted to maintain a neutrality, were they
otherwise so disposed. The hostility to the whites has become so
general among all the tribes in this portion of the country, and
their warriors are so numerous, that no small body of friendly
Indians will be tolerated within their reach. In my opinion,
then, the alternative of feeding or fighting them must soon be
chosen, as economy, as well as justice, would indicate the
adoption of the former policy. I have no hesitation in
recommending its adoption.
Besides the foregoing considerations in favor of liberal
treatment to them, the precedent of kindness and liberality, as
the reward of honesty and good faith [shown?] to those now
hostile to the government, would be eminently favorable to an
early and satisfactory peace.
Although I am fully satisfied that an extensive Indian war is
inevitable, and that severe chastisement must be inflicted before
they will make or abide a treaty, the conditions of which would
be acceptable to the government; yet, if a reservation should be
provided affording protection and subsistence, I have no doubt
that the comparatively small number who would now consent to be
put upon it would be rapidly and largely increased.
From the information which I have been able to obtain upon this
subject, I believe that two hundred lodges would come into this
arrangement at once. I am also equally certain that unless they
are provided for in a manner satisfactory to themselves, all will
soon be at war.
I would therefore earnestly recommend that a temporary
reservation within the protection of a military post be chosen at
an early day, and all Indians belonging to the Upper Platte
agency then at peace with the United States be invited to come
upon the same, subject to such rules, regulations, and
instructions as the honorable Secretary of the Interior
Department shall see fit to impose.
[General Order No. 10. ]
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PLATTE,
Omaha, Nebraska Territory,
July 31, 1866.
On information received that unauthorized persons sell arms and
ammunition to Indians, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs has
instructed Indian agents to prohibit traders from selling these
articles to the Indians, and all commanders of troops within the
department will co-operate in the enforcement of these
instructions, and will take vigilant and decisive measures
for the prevention of all sale, barter, or gift of arms or
ammunition to Indians within reach of their power.
By order of Brigadier General Cooke.
FORT PHIL. KEARNEY, DAKOTA TERRITORY,
December 15, 1866.
Dear John,
I am in the enjoyment of good health at this time. Lieutenant
Wands and family are in good health. I mess with them.
A few days ago a wagon train had gone up to the mountain five or
six miles from this post for the purpose of cutting pine timber
for buildings. On their return they were attacked by about 300
Indians. We have a mounted guard on post on top of a very high
point near the fort, who telegraphed to us by means of a flag of
the condition of the wood train. The mounted cavalry and infantry
were immediately ordered out to relieve them. They started in two
parties, Colonel Carrington and fourteen men going in one
direction, and about thirty in another. The larger party, among
whom was Captain Brown, Lieutenant Wands, (Lieutenant Grummond
was with the colonel,) Captain Fetterman, and Lieutenant Bingham,
who was a cavalry officer, came upon the Indians suddenly, and
charged them. The fight continued for a distance of eight miles
or more. Wands killed a horse and probably some Indians at one
time while dismounted; and in the fight the cavalry broke and
were brought back (some of them) by Captain Brown and Lieutenant
Wands levelling [sic] their guns at them, and telling them that
they would shoot them. Most of the men and officers had
breech-loading guns. While the fight was going on, Lieutenant
Bingham, of the cavalry, called out to the others, "Come
on," beckoned, and went off with some of the men in
the direction of the colonel, who was seen approaching at the
distance of half a mile. This was just what the Indians wanted.
Captains Brown and Fetterman, and Lieutenant Wands, with ten or
eleven men, remained and fought the whole of them, and whipped
them. Wands was slightly wounded in a finger. Lieutenant Grummond
left the colonel's party, and meeting Lieutenant Bingham,
they and three or four men started in the pursuit of about thirty
Indians, who were apparently retreating; an Indian's horse
had almost given out, and Lieutenant Bingham wounded the horse by
a pistol-shot, (Lieutenants Grummond and Bingham had nothing but
pistols.) The Indian then took to his heels, they following him,
cutting at him with their swords. Bingham lost one pistol, and
after firing the other, so excited did he become that he threw it
away. At this time they saw two large bodies of Indians flanking
them, when they concluded to run through them; drawing their
swords, they laid about them right and left. Lieutenant Bingham
did not follow the rest and was killed, stripped and scalped; two
sergeants and one more were wounded. Lieutenant Grummond ran
against the Indians, and cutting right and left with his sword,
got through with the balance. After a while they were surrounded
again by a large number of Indians, drawn in a circle around them
with spears, at a charge, and firing upon them; they halted, and
Lieutenant Grummond then told the rest to follow him; they did,
he using his sword as before. All got through; but Sergeant
Bowers no doubt turned around and fired upon his pursuers; they
overtook and put an arrow in him and split his skull open above
the eyes. They did not scalp him. Our people found him a short
time afterwards; he was living and in great agony, but died in a
short time. We buried Bingham with masonic honors so far as we
could. There were seven masons, one an enlisted man, in the
cavalry.
C. M. HINES.
FORT PHIL. KEARNEY, D.T.,
January 1, 1867.
Dear John,
Matters in this part of the country do not suit me. I have
written to you before that the treaty at Laramie did not amount
to anything; the three posts, Reno, Kearney, and C.F. Smith, are
really in a state of siege. All the Sioux, including those that
committed the atrocities in Minnesota, are in our neighborhood.
Fort Reno has a garrison of three companies of infantry, (not
full,) one piece of artillery; Fort Phil. Kearney, four pieces of
artillery, five companies of infantry, (one-half effective,) and
a few mounted men - all together, soldiers and employes [sic],
about 400 men, (effective;) Fort C.F. Smith, two pieces of
artillery, two companies of infantry (not full) and twenty eight
mounted men. So you can perceive that these forts are in a state
of siege. The mass of the Indians are on Tongue river about fifty
miles from this post. Our communications with Fort Smith are
entirely cut off. There are 1,500 lodges of Indians at that
point, and their confederates, Blackfeet, Cheyennes, Arapahoes,
&c. The whole number of warriors must amount to four or five
thousand, well mounted and armed. They have several times
attacked the wood trains of ours. Once we whipped them badly. For
some time back they were in the habit of coming on the bluffs
near this fort, calling out to us and challenging us to the
fight. Colonel Carrington shelled them, at one time killing a
poney [sic]. On Friday morning, 21st of December, they
made their appearance in small numbers near the fort, challenging
us in the usual manner. Colonel Carrington shelled them, killing
the poney I have mentioned, and driving about thirty Indians from
their covert. Captain and Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Fetterman,
Captain Brown and Lieutenant Grummond were ordered out by the
colonel to protect our wood train, which had been attacked.
Captain Fetterman commanded the infantry, Lieutenant Grummond the
cavalry, (twenty-seven men,) and Captain Brown some mounted
teamsters and citizens, the whole amounting to eighty-one men,
about fifty of whom were armed with the Spencer carbine and
pistols, one or two with Henry rifles, and the balance with the
Springfield musket. No men were better armed. Instead of obeying
orders, these officers (than whom there were none better or
braver in the service) allowed themselves to be decoyed from the
position ordered to be taken, and the whole command were
butchered, (eighty-one officers and men.) I was ordered by
Colonel Carrington, with one man, to go out to the wood train,
(five miles off,) and if I found them safe to join the other
command. I went out about three miles, when I saw that the wood
train was in no danger. I then, obeying orders, attempted to
reach the party under fire, and found it impossible. At that time
I had four men with me; sent to the fort for re-enforcements
[sic]; forty men, under the captain, were sent out, and we
reached the field just in time to see the last man killed. If I
had obeyed my instructions I would have been killed. These poor
fellows when killed, the greater number, were in one heap. We
brought in about fifty in wagons, like you see hogs brought to
market. I have no more to write at present. I will write more in
detail by next mail.
I remain, your brother,
C. M. HINES,
A.A. Surgeon U.S.A.
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, OFFICE INDIAN
AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.,
January 31, 1867.
SIR : Referring to a recent report from this office, dated 23d
instant, upon the subject of the existing disturbances in Western
Dakota, I have the honor to submit herewith, as confirming the
views therein set forth, a copy of a letter under date of the
1st instant from Acting Assistant Surgeon C. M. Hines,
on duty at Fort Phil. Kearney, giving an account of the reported
massacre of United States soldiers on the 21st ultimo.
A previous letter of Dr. Hines, written, like this, to his
brother in this city, had given an account of a slight skirmish
with the Indians on the 6th of December. It is proper
to state that the letter herewith is by the writer authorized to
be given to the public, so that its statements, being those of an
officer present at the time and familiar with the circumstances,
but written to a friend and unofficially, and without any
coloring beyond that which appears to have affected the minds of
the whole command, may be fairly taken as representing the true
state of feeling at the time and place. If I am correct in this
view of the case, then I feel justified in commenting freely upon
the facts presented. And first, I notice that the military
authorities appear to have had very little idea of their real
condition. With a respectable force in garrison, well armed and
well supplied, and with the "mass of the Indians on Tongue
river, fifty miles from" the post, the garrison felt itself
besieged. The tribes of Indians at hand are described as the
Sioux and "their confederates, Blackfeet, Cheyennes,
Arapahoes," &c , while, from the information obtained
from parties familiar with the tribes, their habits, and ordinary
ranges, I do not hesitate to express the opinion that not a
single warrior from the Blackfeet bands is or has been among the
Sioux; and as to the Arapahoes and Cheyennes, if there are any of
them in that quarter, they are isolated individuals only.
Further, as to the tribes represented, the writer says that the
"Sioux that committed the atrocities in Minnesota" are
in the neighborhood of the post; while, if the truth is ever
known, it will be found that not one of those bands of Sioux was
at the time less than about 500 miles distant. As to the numbers
of the Indians thus holding the posts under siege, the 1,500
lodges mentioned by the writer would represent a population of
some 9,000, while the "4,000 or 5,000 well mounted and armed
warriors" would represent a population of 24,000 to 30,000
Indians, an enormous exaggeration of the number which could by
any possibility be in that country, showing the terrible state of
demoralization into which the minds of the most intelligent men
must have fallen. If we note other items of the account, as the
alleged attack upon the wood train, which, after all, as would
appear from another portion of the letter, was not attacked, or,
if attacked, nobody was hurt, the challenge by the Indians, and
the result of the shelling by Colonel Carrington, being the
dislodging of some thirty Indians from their covert, and other
circumstances, the whole affair seems incredible, but for the sad
certainty of the bringing back to the post of the bodies of
officers and men killed in the conflict, and I find it difficult
to account for the tragedy upon any other theory than that
heretofore advanced by this office, to wit: that the Indians,
almost in a state of starvation having made repeated attempts at
a conference, that they might make peace and obtain supplies for
their families, and the rescinding of the order prohibiting them
from obtaining arms and ammunition, were rendered desperate, and
resorted to the stratagem which proved too successful. It seems
as if the officer commanding could have avoided the catastrophe;
and it seems also that men thus armed could have repelled an
attack by all the Indians in Western Dakota. I do not wish to
justify the Indians in their hostilities; but they are but men,
with the necessities of life for themselves and their families
staring them in the face; and if their overtures for peace are
continually and wantonly repelled, they go to war, and they wage
war after their own savage fashion. I have felt it my duty to
express frankly my opinions in transmitting the within letter;
and having done so, I have only to say that I see no surer or
better means of preventing such occurrences in the future than by
such measures as I have already recommended-a commission of
judicious men to visit the region in question, with proper powers
and instructions.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
LEWIS V. BOGY,
Commissioner.
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, January 18, 1867.
SIR : I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of a report
from General Grant, in relation to an official communication made
by Lieutenant General Sherman, having in view the restriction of
the Sioux Indians to districts lying north of the Platte, west of
the Missouri, and east of the new road to Montana; of the
Arapahoes, Cheyennes, Comanches, Kiowas, Apaches, and Navajoes to
the region south of the Arkansas and east of Fort Union.
This recommendation, as the Lieutenant General states, is made
with a view to keep open the great routes to the mountain
territories, to render safe the prosecution of work on the
Pacific railroads, and to prevent apprehension of Indian
depredations. General Grant approves the proposition, if it does
not conflict with treaty obligations.
I will thank you for an expression of your views upon the
subject, in order that if the course proposed shall be determined
upon, the necessary measures may at once be commenced.
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.
Hon. 0. H. BROWNING,
Secretary of the Interior.
HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
Washington, D.C.,
January 15, 1867
SIR: In a report by General Sherman, forwarded with my annual
report, dated November 21, 1866, the following passage
occurs:
"I propose the coming year, (with your consent, and with
that of the Secretary of the Interior, in whose control these
Indians are supposed to be,) to restrict the Sioux north of the
Platte. west of the Missouri river and east of the new road to
Montana, which starts from Laramie to Virginia City by way of
Forts Reno, Philip Kearney, C.F. Smith, &c.
"All Sioux found outside of these limits without a written
pass from some military commander defining clearly their object,
should be dealt with summarily. In like manner I would restrict
the Arapahoes, Cheyennes, Comanches, Kiowas, Apaches, and
Navajoes, south of the Arkansas and east of Fort Union. This
would leave for our people exclusively the use of the wide belt
east and west, between the Platte and the Arkansas in which lie
the two great railroads, and over which passes the bulk of travel
to the mountain Territories. As long as these Indians can hunt
the buffalo and antelope within the described limits, we will
have the depredations of last summer, and, worse yet, the
exaggerations of danger raised by our own people, often for a
very base purpose. It is our duty, and it shall be my study, to
make the progress of construction of the great Pacific railways
that lie in this belt of country as safe as possible, as also to
protect the stage and telegraph lines against any hostile bands;
but they are so long that to guard them perfectly is an
impossibility, unless we can restrict the Indians as herein
stated. I beg you will submit this proposition to the honorable
Secretary of the Interior, that we may know that we do not
violate some one of the solemn treaties made with these Indians,
who are very captious, and claim to the very letter the execution
on our part of those treaties, the obligation of which they seem
to comprehend perfectly.
*I approve this proposition of General Sherman, provided it does
not conflict with our treaty obligations with the Indians, nor
between the Platte and Arkansas rivers. The protection of the
Pacific railroad, so that not only the portion already completed
shall be entirely safe, but that the portion yet to be
constructed shall in no way be delayed either by actual or
apprehended danger, is indispensable.
"Aside from the great value of this road to the country
benefited by it, it has the strongest claims upon the military
service, as it will be one of its most efficient aids in the
control of the Indians in the vast regions through which it
passes.
I respectfully request that I may be informed at an early day
whether this proposition is approved by you and the Secretary of
the Interior, that measures may be taken to carry it into
effect.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
U.S. GRANT, General.
Hon. E.M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, OFFICE INDIAN
AFFAIRS,
January 23, 1867.
SIR. The letter of the Secretary of War of the 18th instant,
containing extracts from the report of General Sherman to General
Grant, with the approval of the same by General Grant, having
been referred to me for a report thereon, I beg leave to say:
General Sherman says, "that he proposes to restrict the
Sioux Indians to the district of country between the Platte, the
Missouri river, and the road to Montana, which starts from
Laramie for Virginia City, by the way of Forts Reno, Phil.
Kearney. and C.F. Smith, and that any Indian found outside of
these limits without a written pass shall be summarily dealt
with." He proposes also to restrict the Arapahoes and
Cheyennes, Comanches, Kiowas, Apaches, and Navajoes south of the
Arkansas and east of Fort Union; the object of this arrangement
being, to leave open the wide belt of country between the Platte
and the Arkansas.
That the belt of country lying between the Platte river on the
north and the Arkansas river on the south should be opened to the
whites by the removal of the Indians now occupying it, is a
necessity which cannot be doubted. The fact that railroads are
now being built through this country, and that it is the highway
for the thousands of emigrants going to our western territories,
imposes on the government the necessity of affording to them
complete protection. To effect this object, the removal of the
Indians from this strip of country is, therefore, an absolute
necessity. On this subject I agree with the view expressed by
General Sherman, but I entirely dissent from the position he
assumes in his report as to the mode of accomplishing this
object. As already said, the time has come when these Indians
must abandon this portion of country, and if they will not do so
willingly, when other homes are provided for them, force will
have to be used. The spread of our white settlements throughout
this vast section of country cannot and should not be checked, as
it cannot be prevented. The question now presenting itself is,
how is this to be accomplished? Will the order to be issued by
the commanding officer of the western department have this
magical effect? On the contrary, will it not lead to resistance
on the part of the Indians whom you thus undertake to remove from
the hunting grounds over which they and their forefathers have
roamed for generation? And will not this resistance lead to
trouble and war with them, in which the lives of thousands of
persons will be sacrificed, the railroads now already being far
advanced in the country destroyed, the profitable trade of the
prairies, even with these very Indians themselves, annihilated,
and the government involved in millions of dollar of expense?
This country yet belongs to these Indians; it has not been ceded
by them. Now cannot a policy be adopted which will effect the
same object without involving the disasters above enumerated? I
think such a policy could be devised. There is one fact which
cannot be denied by any one acquainted with Indians: it is, that
their chiefs are all superior men; they are always their best
men. No one becomes a chief until he has proven his valor in war
and wisdom in council. These chiefs control their different
tribes, with the exception of a few bad men found among them, as
among us. With proper means, I m satisfied that these chiefs can
all be made to see and fully understand their position, and the
necessity imposed upon the government of securing this belt of
country for the whites. Admitting you can satisfy them of this
fact, the next question is, can you induce them to remove to
another locality? I have no doubt that if proper steps are taken
this can be done. It is true they may not entirely abandon this
country this season, but they can be kept quiet-which is all that
is wanted for the present-and their minds directed to the new
home which you will provide for them. That this new home may be
in the district of country described by General Sherman is very
possible. In my opinion it is too late to abandon the system of
treaties with Indians. With judicious management, I think they
can all be made to abandon the country needed by our people, and
to settle down on reservations, which should be larger than
formerly made. Annuities ought to be increased, and stock, cattle
sheep, and horses given to them to raise. It is of little
consequence to this government if a few hundred thousand dollars,
more or less, per annum be expended, provided these people are
kept quiet, and, at the same time, means of subsistence be
furnished to them to support themselves for the few years which,
in all probability, they will yet exist.
I would therefore suggest that you, as the officer of the
government having the Indians in charge, inform the military
authorities of your disapproval of this contemplated order. I
would also suggest that one of the greatest difficulties, and,
indeed, I think the greatest difficulty I encounter, in
administering the affairs of this bureau, is the constant
interference on the part of the military with all Indian
affairs.
That there is a misapprehension on their part in relation to this
matter is beyond doubt, otherwise such constant interference by
them would not occur. The commanders of the different forts
throughout the whole Indian country claim and exercise the right
of controlling the Indian agents, and of issuing orders in
relation to the trade with the Indians by the licensed traders.
From observation, both in this bureau and as a citizen of the
west, I am, and have been for years, satisfied that this was the
cause of most of our Indian wars. The military should be made to
understand that they are in that country merely as a police, to
aid the agent in the discharge of his duties, and not to control
him. The law regulates the trade with Indians and no military
commander should be allowed to interfere. I am satisfied that the
recent troubles at Forts Laramie and Phil. Kearney grew out of
injudicious military interference. I am informed that General
Cooke, commandant at Omaha, issued an order prohibiting the
traders to sell to the Indians arms and ammunition. Such
prohibitions I believe to be unwise, as the Indian has to depend
upon the chase for his subsistence and that of his wife and
children. Arms and ammunition are of absolute necessity; he will
therefore, if possible and no matter at what cost, procure them.
Then, again, it is perfectly idle to say that he will accumulate
them to make war on the whites. No Indian will buy two guns; one
he will and ought to have; nor will be lay up any large quantity
of powder, as he has no means of keeping it. He needs one gun and
a little powder, and this is his only means of subsistence.
In conclusion, I will take this occasion to say that, in my
opinion, the time has come when all the Indians throughout this
country should be taken on large reservations, with fair
annuities paid to them, and stock of cattle and sheep furnished
them to raise. In this way the country needed by the whites can
be relieved from their occupation, Indian wars prevented, vast
expenditures to the government thereby saved, and a future,
although limited, provided for these poor people.
If this system is not adopted, I see nothing for them but total
and speedy destruction; and if this be the policy, it should be
avowed openly and carried out with energy. Either destroy them at
once, or do for them that which their necessities plainly
require.
Very respectfully. your obedient servant,
LEWIS V.BOGY,
Commissioner.
Hon. 0. H. BROWNING,
Secretary of the Interior.
Extract from letter of ex-Governor Edmunds, of Dakota, dated
September 26, 1866, transmitting Agent Hanson's report of
September 15, 1866.
"…I also have the honor to enclose a letter from
Agent Hanson, in relation to the military order prohibiting the
sale of ammunition, &c., to the Indians under his charge, and
beg leave to recommend that you give this matter early attention,
as it is one of great importance to those Indians. I am clearly
of the opinion that those Indians ought not to be included as
among those to whom arms and ammunition are prohibited, and am
fearful that it will have a tendency to complicate and embarrass
their management.
Your obedient servant,
NEWTON EDMUNDS,
Ex-officio Superintendent of Indian Affairs.
CROW CREEK AGENCY, Dakota Territory,
September 15, 1866.
SIR: My attention has recently been called to military General
Order No. 10, dated Headquarters Department of the Platte, Omaha,
Nebraska, July 31, 1866, being, in brief, an order prohibiting
traders and others selling or disposing of, in any manner, arms
of all description and ammunition to Indians.
It has been only a few days since I was made aware that the sale
of ammunition to these Indians had been prohibited. My
instructions from the superintendent, received 22d ultimo, in
relation to this subject, did not include ammunition, but only
mentioned "arms of all description."
I have now the honor to object to the enforcement of such an
order within this agency. There never has been a time, to my
knowledge, when the Indians of this agency have given more
satisfactory evidence of friendship and complete acquiescence in
the authority of the government than since I have been their
agent. The sincerity of their cause has been tested by the most
trying of all ordeals - actual starvation. The history of the
while race scarcely furnishes a parallel instance of such a body
of people enduring such an amount of misery with such
forbearance. What better evidence does the government ask before
it is willing to cease treating these Indians as alien enemies,
and deal with them as with a people in amity with its authority?
Since the formation of the new treaties have they committed any
overt act of hostility? If not, is it right to treat these
often-abused people as enemies purely upon speculation as to
their further intentions? That the order is well enough when
applied to some sections of the military district, where war
still exists, is apparent, but that the Indians of this agency
should be held responsible or made to pay any share of the
penalty for the continued hostility of the Indians of the Platte,
or elsewhere, is not just.
The government has furnished many of these Indians with
double-barrel shotguns. This spring I distributed eighteen, and
the commission about as many more. These went into the hands of
Indians who always have been friendly to the government, and to
now refuse to permit them to purchase ammunition for these same
guns is, under existing circumstances, without any sufficient
reason that I am able to observe.
A large delegation of the Lower Brule, Lower Yanctonais, and Two
Kettle bands called on me yesterday, and asked me to have this
matter changed; I have thereupon to request that the order above
referred to may be so far modified as to place the sale of
ammunition within this agency to Indians within my control. In
this way none but reliable ones will get such, and only in such
quantities as in my judgment, they may need for their hunting
purposes.
I desire to draw your attention to one other military order, now
being enforced at Forts Sully and Rice, which prohibits Indians
and traders stopping in these reservations. This order I have not
yet been able to see; but the Indians have counseled with me
concerning it, and they complain that it does not allow them to
camp within eight or ten miles of Fort Sully, and thus excludes
them from the timber along the Missouri, where they have been for
many years accustomed to seek shelter from the freezing winter
blasts of this region.
While I am of the opinion that the military forces within this
agency should be as far separated as possible from the Indians,
for reasons of a moral nature, if no other, I see no necessity,
and but gross injustice, in this military order. Surely, a
military reservation extending from fifteen to twenty miles along
both sides of the Missouri river, embracing all the best timbered
lands between Forts Sully and Rice, is large enough to spare to
these Indians a wintering place, and I trust your department of
the government is generous enough to accord to them this
right.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J.R. HANSON,
United States Indian Agent.
Extract of report of Governor Faulk, of January 9 1867,
transmitting monthly report of Agent Hanson of December 31,
1866.
The question of supplying the friendly Sioux Indians with the
small amount of ammunition necessary to procure their subsistence
is also worthy of your attention. My own experience in the Indian
country leads me to favor such a course. When they have the arms
and ammunition necessary for ordinary hunting purposes, they are
more contented and friendly, and are more self-sustaining. I have
no doubt that the order referred to by Major Hanson, prohibiting
the sale of arms and ammunition, should be revoked or in some way
modified so as to relieve friendly tribes from the danger of
starvation on that account, and from the necessity of carrying
their peltry to British traders to exchange for such purposes.
The whole subject seems to be worthy of your early
attention.
I have the honor to be your obedient servant,
A.J. FAULK
Governor and ex-officio Superintendent of Indian Affairs.
Hon. Lewis V. Bogy,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs.
Extract from monthly report of Agent Hanson, of December 31,
1866.
During my recent trip to Fort Sully and Fort Rice, I found the
universal complaint of friendly Indians to be regarding the
prohibition of the sale of ammunition. Under date of
15th September last, I wrote the Hon. Commissioner of
Indian Affairs upon the subject. I have the honor to again draw
attention of the Commissioner to that communication. I have
advised with all the military officers within this agency from
Crow creek to Fort Rice, and I have not yet found one not in
favor of setting this order aside. The Indians who gather at
these different points are friendly to the government and enemies
to the hostile Indians, and fear them as enemies. They say they
are willing to help protect the whites if they can only be
permitted to purchase the means with which to do it. The Indians
inimical to the government procure all the ammunition they desire
from traffic with the Red River half-breeds. This the friendly
Indians understand, and tell me this prohibition has driven many
of their young men into the hostile camp; and again, it is now
approaching the season of the year when the Indians settled along
the Missouri river, must subsist to a great extent upon such
small game as cannot be successfully hunted with bows and arrows.
Justice to these Indians requires that the order be immediately
abrogated. I think it a very dangerous order to enforce among
these Indians. At this place, Fort Sully and Fort Rice, the
Indians of known friendship should be permitted to purchase
ammunition in small quantities, sufficient for hunting purposes.
An arrangement as to the quantity and manner of purchase can
easily be made between the commander of the district, with whom I
have conferred upon this subject, and the agent. I trust this
subject may be regarded of sufficient importance to command
immediate attention.
J.R. Hanson,
United States Indian Agent of Upper Missouri Sioux
Extract from a letter to Colonel J.H Leavenworth, United
States Indian agent, from Winfield S. Hancock, major general
commanding.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,
January 17, 1867.
It is not unlikely that a demand will be made before long upon
the Cheyennes to redress some grievances. When that time arrives
you will be notified of the fact.
They will be allowed some time to consider and talk over the
matter. If you have any fear of the result leading to
hostilities, you had better place yourself at Fort Larned or Fort
Dodge, as you may think best.
If you can get any evidence concerning the reported murder of the
Kaw by Bent's band of Cheyenne, please furnish the same to
me, as I am collecting all the evidence I can in relation to the
outrages committed by that tribe.
Your remark that Indians should not be allowed to visit military
posts save on business is perfectly correct as a rule, and I will
call attention to that matter.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WINFIELD S. HANCOCK,
Major General Commanding
[From the Washington Chronicle, February 4, 1867.]
Sale of arms under authority of the Indian Bureau.- Interesting
correspondence.- Opinions of Generals Grant and Sherman.-
Necessity of transferring the bureau to the War Department.
The Secretary of War has addressed a communication to
Representative Schenck, chairman of the Committee on Military
Affairs, enclosing, for the information of the committee a copy
of a letter from Major Douglass, commanding Fort Dodge, dated
January 13, in relation to the issue of large numbers of arms,
with ammunition, to the Kiowas and other Indians, and expressing
his apprehension of Indian hostilities in consequence thereof.
The anxiety of the Indians for such articles is not caused by the
lack of supply, because they have plenty to last for some time,
but everything tends to show that the Indians are laying in large
supplies preparatory to an outbreak.
Major Douglass represents the Indians to be in an unsettled
condition, with much dissatisfaction on account of the unequal
distribution of presents.
General Grant, on the 1st instant, enclosed a letter
from Lieutenant General Sherman to the Secretary of War. General
Grant says the letter shows the urgent necessity for an immediate
transfer of the Indian Bureau to the War Department, and the
abolition of the civil Indian agents and licensed traders.
"If," he says, "the present practice is to he
continued, I do not see that any course is left open to us but to
withdraw our troops to the settlements, and call upon Congress to
provide means and troops to carry on formidable hostilities
against the Indians, until all the Indians or all the whites on
the great plains, and between the settlements on the Missouri and
the Pacific slope, are exterminated. The course General Sherman
has pursued in this matter, in disregarding the permit of Mr.
Bogy and others, is just right. I will instruct him to enforce
his order until it is countermanded by the President or yourself.
I would also respectfully ask that this matter be placed before
the President, and his disapproval of licensing the sale of arms
to Indians be asked. We have treaties with all tribes from time
to time. If the rule is to be followed that all tribes with which
we have treaties and to which we pay annuities can procure such
articles without stint or limit, it will not be long before the
matter becomes perfectly understood by the Indians, and they
avail themselves of it to equip perfectly for war. They will get
arms either by making treaties themselves or through tribes who
have such treaties."
General Sherman's letter is dated January 21st
last, and addressed to General Hancock, commanding the military
division of the Missouri, in which he says: "We, the
military, are held responsible for the peace of the frontier, and
it is an absurdity to attempt it if Indian agents and traders can
legalize and encourage so dangerous a traffic." He says he
regards the paper enclosed, addressed to Mr. D.A. Butterfield,
and signed by Charles Bogy, W.R. Irwin, J.H. Leavenworth, and
others, as an outrage upon our rights and supervision of the
matters, and authorizes General Hancock to disregard that paper,
and at once stop the practice.
This paper, addressed to Mr. Butterfield, is as follows:
"SIR: You having requested verbally to be informed in regard
to your right to sell arms and ammunition to Indians, we have to
state as follows: You, as an Indian trader, licensed for that
purpose by the United States government are authorized to trade
or sell arms and ammunition to any Indians that are at peace with
and receiving annuities from the United States government. This
rule of course applies to any other regularly licensed trader as
well as yourself."
H. Ex. Doc. 71--2