CHAPTER XI
GUNNERY MUDDLE
Efforts towards Reform - Admiralty Obstruction - Waste of Ammunition - Official Reprimands - Two Gunnery Committees appointed - Conflicting Reports - The Centurion's Gun Sights - A Tardy Discovery - The Dawn of a New Era.
ON the 1st April, 1903, I was appointed Captain of H.M.S. Excellent, the School of Gunnery, and it was quickly brought home to me what a flood of opposition I should have against me if I attempted to improve the shooting of the Fleet. The officers of the Excellent were at first a little loth to believe that all they had been doing was wrong, but their ideas soon changed, and then they co-operated most loyally and heartily with me.
In a very short time we modernised the instruction given to officers and men. All the instructional machines that had proved so useful in China were brought into use, and the qualifications of the men as shots were decided on the number of hits made on a target.
At this time, although the Fleet had not the necessary instruments for the purpose, 1 long-range firing was being carried out. As to how it was to be done no instruction had been issued, and the Commanders-in- Chief were therefore left to carry
1 Of. Chapter IX.
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BROADSIDE FIRING
it out in any way that seemed fit to them. The Commanders-in-Chief on various stations held very diverse opinions on the method to be employed, and some strange battle practices resulted. In some cases the ammunition might just as well have been thrown overboard.
In order to help matters, I made some proposals to the Admiralty in December, 1903, and suggested that H.M.S. Drake, then commanded by Captain John Jellicoe, should be placed at my disposal to carry out certain experiments which were necessary before putting forward a complete scheme of practising for battle at what was then considered to be long range.
I asked for H.M.S. Drake because I considered that Captain Jellicoe 1 was at that time conspicuous for his knowledge of gunnery among the captains of the Fleet.
My scheme was exceedingly simple, it consisted of firing broadsides. In a former chapter I have pointed out that in the short-range practice it was no use men firing unless they could see whether their shot had hit or missed. This, of course, could not apply to long-range firing, for it would be impossible to see a hit either on a target or an enemy at four to five miles. In an action you might get an indication that you were hitting by the enemy kindly going down, blowing up, or catching fire, but you could not make a target which would perform these functions, so some new method had to be devised from which an assumption could be formed as to whether the target was being hit or not. To meet the case I suggested that broadsides
1 Afterwards Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa, O.M.
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GUNNERY MUDDLE
should be fired, for the following reason. When a volley, or broadside, say of six guns, is fired, the shots do not all go in the same place, but open out a little. Broadsides are sometimes very regular. If they spread as indicated in the diagram and a battleship is anywhere in the zone, she will evidently be hit in her vital part (shaded) by three out of the six shots.
Here was the solution of the problem, for if the observer saw one shot short of the target, he could assume that he was hitting with some of the others. This is what is called straddling the enemy.
That this was the only guide as to whether you were hitting or not was not accepted as a fact until 1909, so we lost six years of progress, and even when it was accepted it could not be put into practice because we had no means by which we could fire our guns in broadsides, so further progress was delayed.
The experiment I wanted carried out was in connection with what I have referred to as the zone. It was necessary to know into what space the shots would probably fall, and if some of them fell wide of the average, then the gun sights would require correction. I called it calibrating the guns. It had not been thought of before. Their Lordships would not allow me to carry out this experiment,
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ADMIRALTY DISAPPROVAL
and progress was hindered. 1 In my letter to the Admiralty applying for H.M.S. Drake I pointed out to their Lordships that before she could carry out the experiments it would be necessary to supply her with new gun sights. Since 1900 I had been pointing it out to them. Their Lordships well knew that the gun sights were inefficient, but they did not like being reminded of the fact. So on the 2nd March, 1904, they replied as follows :-
" Their Lordships strongly disapprove of the remark which distinctly implies that the Drake is not now furnished with serviceable sights, whereas the sights fitted to her guns had every improvement embodied in them when they were designed and made, and are of the same pattern as fitted to modern ships generally,"
Their Lordships did not approve of my endeavours to improve the gunnery of the Fleet, and no steps were taken as regards calibration until they went out of office. But though they frowned on my proposition to investigate the long-range firing question, a few months later they decided to form two committees, one presided over by Admiral Sir Reginald Custance, in the Venerable ; the other presided over by Admiral Sir Hedworth Lambton, 2 in the Victorious. The two committees were to have a free hand and fire what ammunition they liked ; they were to investigate thoroughly the whole subject of long-range firing ; and they were to draw up a scheme of target
1 This necessary experiment was delayed until 1905.
2 Admiral of the Fleet Sir Hedworth Meux, M.P.
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GUNNERY MUDDLE
practice, and decide what targets should be used. At the conclusion of their experiments the two bodies were to meet and send in one joint report.
After wasting an enormous amount of ammunition the committees found themselves diametrically opposed on most of the important points, and instead of a joint report they sent in two separate documents.
Their Lordships decided that the suggestions and system put forward by Sir Reginald Custance, of the Venerable, should be adopted for use in all ships, but they added a clause "that alternative systems might be used instead of it."
The suggestions put forward by the Venerable committee were so impossible that all ships took advantage of the last paragraph of the Admiralty letter, and the battle practice remained a "go as you please" operation, every ship using any method it preferred for grouping and firing its guns, and every Commander-in-Chief adopting his own particular scheme. No rules were laid down by the Admiralty and there was no competition.
Reorganising the Gunnery School and teaching the men to shoot was quite an easy matter, but when I surveyed the general state of the gunnery in the Fleet I found it deplorable. And in the background was an apathetic Admiralty disinclined to improve it.
All the gun sights were inefficient ; we had no proper regulations for prize firing, no proper targets, no instruments for carrying out long-range firing, no authorised scheme for battle, no suitable target for long range. There was no scheme for testing the gun-sights, and we had no efficient sub-calibre
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AN OFFICIAL REPRIMAND
guns, and no efficient aiming rifle. The Germans at this period were far ahead of us.
Although the Scylla and Terrible had shown what could be done, and what was required, the Admiralty had taken no steps to improve matters. They had acted on none of the suggestions put forward, nor would they allow that the gun sights were inefficient.
In 1898 it had been demonstrated by H.M.S. Scylla that when firing with a telescope sight the man looked through the telescope with one eye and shut the other. As he had not a third eye, any corrections requiring to be applied to his sight, either elevation or deflection, had to be put on by another man. As explained in an earlier chapter, I supplemented the guns' crew by a man and christened him the " sight-setter." For this innovation I got a reprimand from the Admiralty, but about two years afterwards their Lordships recognised the essential point and allowed an additional man at each gun for sight-setting.
On inspecting some new gun sights on board H.M.S. Lancaster in 1903, I found no provision had been made for a sight-setter to work them, and since they had many other defects also, I referred to them in my report as inefficient. Their Lordships, on the 27th October, 1903, informed me that they did not approve of the tone of my letter. They strongly deprecated the use of such an expression as " inefficient " when applied to fittings which had been adopted by the Admiralty as the outcome of many years of experience and after consultations with eminent designers outside the Service. All the gun sights of the Fleet were,
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GUNNERY MUDDLE
nevertheless, inefficient, and every one knew it. The Admiralty knew it, but they did not want to do anything, and they boycotted every recommendation I put forward.
Lord Charles Beresford, the Commander-in-Chief of the Channel Fleet, had frequently referred to the inefficiency of our gun sights, and Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge expressed his opinion of them in the following language : "It would not be possible to characterise with more than deserved severity the atrocious scandal of our inefficient gun-sights ; the sights of H.M.S. Centurion's guns were so defective that she was not fit to go into action."
The story of H.M.S. Centurion is worth telling. In 1904 new gun sights were made for her. It was my duty as Captain of the Gunnery School to examine them and report whether they were serviceable or not. They were tested and found incorrect, so I could not pass them. The Admiralty tried to cajole me into passing them, but I would not, so they sent down one of their own officials who passed them, and the ship was sent to China with gun sights so defective that, as Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge stated, the ship was not fit to go into action.
As the Admiralty remained immovable, on the 11th January, 1904, I wrote the following letter to their Lordships :-
" The most important item of any gun mounting is the sighting appliance.
" Our sighting appliances for all natures of guns are, I consider, at present most inefficient, and my opinion is that all the guns in the Navy should be re-sighted.
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INEFFICIENT GUN SIGHTS
" It is unnecessary for me to specify the defects, as I have so often done so during the last five years. It is unnecessary for me to recapitulate the facts which have led to our gun sights being in their present condition. I only wish to again urge the importance of consideration being given to the matter.
" I feel it my duty as Captain of the Excellent to continue urging, and to place on record that I have urged the matter to the utmost of my power and ability, for in the event of war, and our inefficiency in sighting proving disastrous to the Fleet, had the Captain of the Excellent not called the attention of the authorities to the deficiency he would have been criminally in fault."
This letter was too much for the Admiralty. They did not reprimand me nor did they appear to mind my again using the expression "inefficient." They were obliged to do something, so they had a conference and discovered (what every one else knew) that all the gun sights of the Fleet were inefficient, and that the guns of the whole Fleet would have to be re-sighted.
Vitally important as the question was, their Lordships proceeded in their usual dilatory and unbusinesslike way, and consequently very little was done towards re-sighting in 1904.
On February 24th, 1904, H.M. King Edward VII. came to Portsmouth and visited Whale Island. We had a sham fight and my motor-car took part in the attack. It was covered in so as to represent an armoured car, and a Maxim gun was mounted beside the driver. Like all authors of new ideas I was laughed at, but His Majesty
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informed me that he considered that armed motor-cars would be a feature in future warfare. The soundness of that view was fully demonstrated during the late war, which saw the armed motor-car develop under the pressure of events into the now famous tank.
My two years as Captain of the Excellent were one continuous battle with the Admiralty. They were as determined that the gunnery of the Fleet should not be improved as I was determined to improve it. Every suggestion that they could possibly delay, or turn down, they did. They ruined the gun layers' test by increasing the range to such an extent that the men could not see whether they were hitting or missing ; they issued such ridiculous instructions as regards the King's Medal for good shooting that on some occasions it had to be tossed for. During this period of maladministration Lord Selborne, who was the First Lord of the Admiralty, was stumping the country, and declaring in his speeches that, " Gunnery, gunnery," was considered by the Admiralty to be of vital importance. And on the 24th March, 1904, he wrote to me as follows : "The Lords of the Admiralty have for long devoted and are still devoting their whole heart and soul to the question of improving the gunnery of the Fleet."
Fortunately for the country, shortly afterwards, before they could do any further harm to gunnery, Lord Selborne and his Board were replaced at the Admiralty, and, as Punch rightly surmised, there was no more " Gunnery Hash."
I may perhaps refer here to an incident in my career which was not naval. On the 13th June,
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LL.D. OF CAMBRIDGE
1903, I was made an Honorary LL.D. of Cambridge. The other recipients were the Duke of Connaught, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Lord Grenfell, and Sir John French. We were all assembled in one of the colleges, where we were provided with red gowns, and thence marched in a procession across the grounds to the Senate House.
The Senate House was crowded with undergraduates, who gave us a wonderful reception, and made some very funny remarks on our combination of full dress uniform and red gowns. The Duke of Devonshire, who was Chancellor, stood on a raised platform, and taking each recipient by the hand made a speech in Latin. What he said about me, translated into English, is as follows :
" Captain Percy Scott had distinguished himself in naval warfare off the mouths of the Niger, the Congo, and the Nile. As Commander of H.M.S. Terrible, he had reached the coast of Natal at a critical moment, when his ingenuity and resourcefulness had made it possible for the great naval guns of that vessel to be effectively used on land, and thus supplied our soldiers with absolutely unexpected reinforcements at a time when they were sorely needed. He had since distinguished himself in a similar manner off the coast of China, and had brought his formidable cruiser safely back to the harbours of England amid scenes of enthusiastic congratulation. He was the fittest recipient of the final crown of that day's ceremony.
" ' Ceu presssæ cum iam portum tetigere carinæ puppibus et lætæ nautæ imposuere coronas.'"
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The ceremony was followed by a luncheon, a reception, a dinner, and a dance. Professor Sir Alfred and Lady Ewing took me into their house and made my couple of days at Cambridge very enjoyable.
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