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matters over which captains of ships have no jurisdiction ; they are settled by the senior admiral present.

One very important rule attached to the conduct of a fleet ; whenever the senior officer's ship did anything, all the rest of the ships in the fleet had to do likewise, and if the senior officer's ship forgot to do what she ought to do, then the other ships must not do it. Any one can see how this makes for efficiency ! I remember coming up on deck once and finding that, although it was pouring with rain, the guns were not covered. I pitched into the officer of the watch, but got the worst of it; he informed me that he could not cover the guns as the flagship had not yet covered hers. It is the rule of the Service that a senior officer can do no wrong. We preserve our manners at the cost of efficiency.

Special permission could, under some circumstances, be obtained from the senior officer for not following his example, but wireless telegraphy has introduced a difficulty in deciding who the senior officer is. On the occasion when I was senior officer at Portland, an Admiral, junior to me, came into the harbour with some washed clothes hanging up to dry. Seeing that my flagship had no washed clothes hanging up to dry, he made a signal, "Permission is requested to keep my washed clothes hanging up, as they are not dry." I granted him the permission, but a heated argument took place afterwards as to whether I was right or wrong in so doing, as an officer, senior to me, was about ten miles out to sea, and I could have passed the request out to him by wireless telegraphy. No

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decision had been arrived at on this important point before I gave up command of the squadron. The introduction of drying rooms for washed clothes in H.M. ships has greatly reduced the amount of signalling with regard to where and how clothes are to be hung up.

One of my captains pointed out to me that on account of the structure of his ship he sometimes required an awning spread when the senior officer's ship did not. I had to inform him that, although I was in command of the squadron to which his ship belonged, I had no authority to grant him permission to spread an awning, but I could forward his request on to the senior officer present.

Signalmen in all ships were trained to keep a smart look-out to see if any ship had a pair of trousers hanging in the wrong place. I suggested that it would have been of more war value if they were trained to find the periscope of a submarine. Such an idea was considered very ridiculous ; no departure could be made from the old and obsolete notions which obtained throughout the Service. Our brains and energy were not used in training for war ; housemaiding the ships was to remain as it had been the paramount consideration.

This is the training for war we all had, and the expression "all" included, as a rule, their Lordships the Commissioners of the Admiralty. Hence it is not surprising that when war did come, the Admiralty was in a state of dislocation and confusion. One department was wiring to a squadron of ships to do one thing, while another department was giving it contrary orders. There was little organisation and little method, and we allowed the

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German cruisers in Far Eastern waters to get out of port and prey upon our commerce, with the result that we had to employ ships for several months in rounding them up, whereas a little intelligence properly directed would have blockaded them all in their harbours on the day war was declared or forced them to fight.

In addition, we had no up-to-date mine layers, nor an efficient mine ; no properly fitted mine sweepers ; no arrangements for guarding our ships against mines ; no efficient method of using our guns at night ; no anti-Zeppelin guns ; no anti-submarine precautions ; no safe harbour for our Fleet, and only a few ships (eight) were partly fitted with a proper method of firing their guns. Our torpedoes were so badly fitted that in the early days of the war they went under the German ships instead of hitting them. This was very galling to our submarine officers and men, who displayed great gallantry in getting at the German ships.

Training naval officers and men as housemaids is not good for war ; brains are required. But, however faulty our training in peace may have been, it did not affect the character of the British naval officer and seaman. Whether in a ship, submarine, balloon, aeroplane, motor-car, tank, or as a soldier, the men who bore an anchor on their caps, and others who wore a sou'-wester, fought with bravery not surpassed by any men in the world. Of the many thousand who went to the bottom of the ocean, a large number might be alive now if in peace-time our legislators had attended to the war preparedness of ships instead of chiefly to the housemaiding of them. I once heard

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a statement that "the blunders of our politicians and legislators are paid for with the blood of our sailors and soldiers." How terribly the War has demonstrated the truth of this statement !

I return from this digression to resume my narrative of the Good Hope. Having practically no command of my squadron, I employed my time in trying to improve the shooting, and I succeeded so well that the Good Hope became, like the Scylla and Terrible in other years, top ship of the Navy.

My senior officer, the Commander-in-Chief of the Channel Fleet, was Admiral Lord Charles Beresford, ¹ and it happened that the First Sea Lord was Admiral of the Fleet Sir John Fisher. ² Lord Charles Beresford had on many occasions expressed his disapproval of the policy of Lord Fisher as regards his redistribution of the Fleet.

Lord Charles Beresford's grievance against the Admiralty was that they were forming another fleet in home waters under the name of the "Home Fleet," and that it was not to be under his command. He explained to me that this Home Fleet ³ was a fraud on the public and a danger to the State ; that so grave was the disorganisation and confusion, that, if the country had been suddenly attacked, the Navy, in his opinion, would have suffered a reverse, if not a severe defeat. Lord

¹ Afterwards raised to the Peerage as Lord Beresford. He was a most popular officer. In the Navy we knew he was not a sailor, but thought that he was a politician ; in the House of Commons, I have been told, they knew he was not a politician, but thought he was a sailor. P.S.

² Afterwards Lord Fisher of Kilverstone.

³ The first Fleet of the Home Fleets later on became the Grand Fleet.

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Charles appeared to be of opinion that he could either enforce his views on the Admiralty, or procure the retirement of the Sea Lords ; that the Admiralty were not to remain in control of the Navy unless they accepted him as a dictator of what they should do. He was, in fact, to be an admiralissimo.

I listened to all this. Very politely, I refused to join in a campaign against the Board of Amiralty. In so doing I fully appreciated that my Commander-in-Chief would be much annoyed. I remained firm in my determination to do my duty to the country and the Admiralty as I saw it. Soon afterwards, whether by a mere coincidence or otherwise, a charge of insubordination was made against me, and Lord Charles applied in the strongest possible terms to the Admiralty that I should be superseded in the command of my squadron. Their Lordships, the Commissioners of the Admiralty, of course, did not supersede me.

I should have been well content never to think of this episode again, so trivial in its origin. But there are strong reasons against ignoring the matter. Under such headings as "Admirals' Quarrel," "Difficulties in the Navy," "Scott too Free," the incident was related, so far as the facts were known, and commented on in the columns of the daily and weekly Press throughout the country. The story was retold in the Dominions ; it was discussed with relish by the enterprising journals of New York ; it woke journalistic echoes in Paris and Berlin. While the newspapers were furiously raging together, and for some time after, my mouth was closed, and I was still on the active

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list when four years later Lord Charles Beresford published his book "The Betrayal," in which, without mentioning me by name, he thought fit to cast reflections upon my character and ability as an officer. This attack seemed to me to demand notice, and as soon as I retired on promotion to Admiral, I took steps to present to the public, through the courtesy of the editor of the British Review, a "Reply to Lord Charles Beresford." ¹ There I am content to leave the matter.

My attention in the meantime was devoted to fitting my flagship, H.M.S. Good Hope, with "director firing," so that if she had to fight a German there would be a chance of her remaining on the top, instead of going to the bottom. ²

This operation was difficult, as I could get no assistance from the Admiralty, and was forced to beg, borrow, or steal all the necessary material. Fortunately, I had a very competent and clever torpedo officer, Lieutenant Charles Rice (a son of Admiral Sir Charles Rice). This officer made out all the drawings, and supervised the work, which could not have been done without him. His untimely death was greatly regretted. He was killed through the fall of an aeroplane in which he had gone up to demonstrate the utility of a wireless telegraphy invention he had devised. The nation lost a very valuable officer, and I lost a very charming friend.

As H.M.S. Scylla and H.M.S. Terrible, my two former ships, had been the top ships of the whole

¹ The British Review, April, 1913.

² H.M.S. Good Hope subsequently had to fight a German and she went to the bottom with all hands, but she had not then the description of director with which I fitted her.

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H.M.S. GOOD HOPE'S SHOOTING

Fleet in shooting, H.M.S. Good Hope was very anxious to occupy the same position. Both officers and men worked hard, "and in the competitions the ship came out top of the Channel Fleet, but seventh in the whole Fleet. This result was disappointing to me. It may be of interest to give the figures :

Some of the scores by the Good Hope's gun layers were out of the way at least in those days so I append them. The Good Hope had to steam at a speed of about twelve knots, and her gunners were required to fire at a target measuring only eighty square feet which was just under a mile distant. The vessel mounted two 9.2-inch guns of the Mark X. type, firing 380 lb. projectiles, and

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sixteen 6-inch breechloading guns of the Mark VII. type, firing 100 lb. shells. The results were as follows :

The run for the 9.2-inch guns was two minutes, and for the 6-inch guns one minute, and therefore, in summary, the average result of each gun per minute was as follows :

The shooting with the 6-inch guns was then without parallel in the British Fleet.

The commanding officer of the Good Hope was Captain E. H. Grafton, while the gunnery officer was Lieut. J. L. S. Kirkness.

It was during Fleet manoeuvres of this year

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that we experienced great difficulty in the matter of cipher messages. Under the system then in use valuable time was frequently lost and many mistakes occurred. I remember getting one signal to take my ship to a certain spot indicated by latitude and longitude. It was realised that a mistake had been made when the position as indicated proved to be the Sahara Desert.

Putting a message into cipher or de-coding a cipher involved the use of several books, a process which occupied much time and made it easy to commit errors. I conceived the idea of a double typewriter, the message being sent in cipher and, passing through the typewriter, coming out en clair.

I designed such a machine and submitted it in February, 1907, to the Admiralty, who expressed the following opinion on it : "The machine appears to be indestructive, is quick in working, save for a person unaccustomed to typewriting, and mistakes are improbable and easily detected and corrected." Mr. Winston Churchill said that this machine filled him with hope that I had solved or was about to solve the difficult question.

The Admiralty "secret" patented the invention and consigned it to themselves, and then, in accordance with their usual practice, started to improve upon it. Seven years afterwards, on the 6th of July, 1914, their Lordships informed me that they waived the right of secrecy of my invention, and that I could put it on the open market if I wanted to do so. In other words they turned it down, and the Admiral had to fight the Battle of Jutland with the handicap of the old appliances.

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Lord Jellicoe has declared ¹ that the time of the receipt of a signal is not a true indication of the time at which the officer making his report commenced his task. A variable but considerable time is bound to elapse a period - which includes the time taken to write out the report, to transmit it to the wireless office or bridge, to code it, signal it, de-code it on board the receiving ship, write it out and transmit it to the bridge. It was this very delay that my mechanical coder or de-coder was designed to avoid.

Early in 1908, we went for a cruise round Ireland and Scotland, and visited many interesting places, finally getting back to Portsmouth in May, 1908. After a short stay, we received an order again to paint the Fleet, this time to do honour to M. Fallières, the President of the French Republic, who was to cross to Dover. Dover for a few days was very gay in entertaining the officers and men of the Leon Gambetta, the man-of-war which brought over England's illustrious guest.

These international amenities concluded, the Fleet went back to Portland, and H.M.S. Good Hope carried out her 1908 firing test. This time Captain Grafton and the officers obtained the place they desired, namely, top ship of the Fleet. The score of one hundred and twenty hits out of one hundred and fifty rounds was then unprecedented. I was very glad of it, as I liked every ship I was in to be absolutely the best in shooting.

The routine, when with the Battle Fleet, was dull and uninteresting. To get out a bower anchor and get it back again is not the most exciting of

¹ Lord Jellicoe's "Grand Fleet, 1914-1916," p. 318.

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tasks, and even a pull round the Fleet becomes monotonous after frequent repetition. The day of these old-fashioned evolutions should have come to an end long ago. Efficiency can only be arrived at by allowing individual captains to arrange independently for their men's training. A captain had then hardly one day at his disposal for the organisation of training classes in gunnery, and for teaching things to his men which have far more to do with modern warfare than exercises handed down from the days of sailing ships.

Towards the middle of June the whole Fleet started on a cruise, with Christiania as its first halting-place. Such a large armada had never been previously assembled in Norwegian waters, and naturally excited considerable interest among the inhabitants of Norway. The Good Hope found herself relegated, with the cruiser squadron, to Bygdo Bay, a charming creek from which it was possible to land and walk the three miles into Christiania, or go direct by boat to the town itself. The officers thoroughly enjoyed the hospitality showered upon them, and several of them had the honour of being presented to King Haakon and his charming consort, at a dinner given in the newly decorated palace.

At this dinner I was asked if I could not provide some little surprise for the morrow, when the King and Queen of Norway were going to steam round the Fleet. The request rather upset my appetite, as I could not think of anything. Fortunately an idea came. When I returned on board very late - I routed out the Commander. He and a few carpenters stayed up all night, and the next morning

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when His Majesty, the King of Norway, passed H.M.S. Good Hope, he saw traced in human letters on the ship's side the words " Leve Kongen," which means, I believe, " Long live the King," or at any rate it was the nearest that I could get to it in the time. I was with the King, on board his yacht, and both His Majesty and the Queen were very pleased.

The night before we left Christiania I gave a ball on board the Good Hope, and a more beautiful assemblage of ladies it would have been very hard to see. When we broke up I heard many an earnest farewell uttered, and many were the pledges mutually given of another meeting. For two or three days after leaving Christiania my officers were very dull ; the fair ladies of the northern city had made a deep impression on them.

After this event, H.M.S. Good Hope was ordered home. We proceeded to Portsmouth, and on the 30th July, 1908, I had an interview with the First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. McKenna, who informed me that I should no longer be troubled by Lord Charles Beresford, as the Admiralty had decided to place me in command of a squadron of cruisers to represent the Mother Country in South Africa, during the time of the assembly of the Convention for the discussion of closer union between the various states of the great sub-continent.

As regards the last signal made to me by Lord Charles Beresford, Mr. McKenna informed me that he was very anxious to hush the matter up ; that he was going to make a statement in the House of Commons justifying my action, and that he hoped

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in these circumstances I would say no more about it. To this I agreed. Mr. McKenna made his statement in the House. It was so evasive that it would never have been questioned, had not Lord Charles years afterwards revived the question by writing and publishing an inaccurate account of it.

Apart altogether from this personal matter, there was an obvious reason for the Admiralty's choice, since, with the possible exception of Sir Hedworth Lambton (afterwards Sir Hedworth Meux), I had been more closely associated with South Africa during the war than any other Admiral. I had many friends there, particularly in Natal. I was delighted with my new appointment, besides being more than pleased to get clear of the Channel Fleet. In my year and a half I had not been able to do anything, and I had learned nothing except how not to manage a fleet.

While H.M.S. Good Hope was at Portsmouth, preparing for her long cruise, an interesting ceremony took place. Princess Christian presented the ship with some silver plate and a silk ensign, which had been subscribed for by the ladies of Cape Colony. In a short speech Her Royal Highness expressed her pleasure in making the presentation, adding that her feelings with regard to South Africa were of a very special nature - an indirect reference to the lamented death of her son, Prince Christian Victor, which awakened the sympathetic interest of her hearers.

At last, on the 8th September, 1908, we left Portsmouth, the squadron consisting of the Good Hope (flagship), the Antrim, Carnarvon, and

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Devonshire ; four fairly good ships. The moment that I had been looking forward to for many years had come at last. I was in command of a squadron of H.M. ships, and was in a position to do away with the existing routine, and convert all the ships into schools, with every one on board learning something more useful about his profession than the housemaiding part of it. A man-of-war must, of course, be housemaided - that is, she must be kept clean. What I had to break down was the tradition that housemaiding should be the chief consideration. It had been so ever since I joined the Service, and the advancement of the officers and the men, and consequently the fighting efficiency of the Navy, had been entirely subservient to it.

I gave an order to the squadron that all the housemaiding was to be completed by 9 a.m., and that from that time on all attention should be devoted to training the officers and men in the essentials of their profession. This order, combined with breaking down some of the traditions of the Navy, - good in their time, but now out of date and obsolete, - had the desired effect, as the following results will show.

When I joined the squadron the ships had been fifteen months in commission, and during that time they had trained (under the old method of doing things) 900 men, which is 60 per month. In five months of the new method they trained 1000 men, which is at the rate of 200 per month. The new method practically more than trebled the amount of instruction given, notwithstanding its being a first attempt, carried out against some opposition, and in difficult circumstances, as we

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FIGHTING AGAINST CHANGE

were on a purely pleasure cruise. If this routine had been maintained, and had been applied to the whole Navy, it would have trebled the fighting efficiency of the Fleet ; but when I left the squadron on the 15th February, 1909, the routine I had instituted, and the " director firing " I had installed, were put on the scrap-heap, and the old methods reinstalled. That is one way we had in the Navy - a determination to fight against any change, however desirable.