Fifty Years in the Royal Navy by Admiral Sir Percy Scott, Bt.,


 
Contents

 

CHAPTER XIX

WAR REFLECTIONS 1915-1917

Guns for the Army - Visit to the Front - Inferior Elevation of the 9.2-inch - Gun - The Mounting improved after Official Delay - Naval Searchlights - A Primitive Method - My Improved Design - A New System ultimately adopted - A Letter from the Admiralty - The Dardanelles Commission - A Question of Gunnery - The Essence of the Problem - A Criticism of the Report.

I WAS sent for by Mr. Balfour on the 9th July, 1915, to be informed that the Army was terribly in want of guns, and had approached him as to whether the Navy could give them some 6-inch. He asked if I could design a mounting for them which could be quickly constructed, and not necessarily by a gun-making firm, as they were all too busy. I explained to Mr. Balfour that this was just what I had offered to do nearly a year ago, that the Army had then declined the offer ; but as they now wanted the mountings, I could easily and quickly get them made, provided there was no red-tape about it and I had a free hand to order Chatham Dockyard to make them. To this Mr. Balfour agreed ; so I went to the War Office to inquire what they wanted. I found that they did not know what they wanted - rather a handicap to speedy construction - and it took a week for them to make up their minds.

On the 17th they decided that they wanted

321


322

WAR REFLECTIONS 1915-1917

eight 6-inch guns, mounted on carriages which would allow of 25 degrees of elevation being used. I pointed out that they ought to have at least 35 degrees of elevation ; but my remonstrance was in vain, for they would have only 25 degrees.

I got out a design - there was nothing in it, as it was practically the same as the one I made for General Buller in South Africa. On the 19th July Chatham Dockyard commenced the job. So splendidly did they work that by the 27th July most of the eight mountings were nearly completed, and one had been tested by firing a large number of rounds at different elevations.

On the 28th July the War Office altered their minds and wanted 35 degrees of elevation. I put the eight mountings that we had made on the scrap-heap, got out another design, and two days later Chatham Dockyard commenced again. The officers and men were rather annoyed at their ten days' work being wasted, but they went ahead with their former energy and in ten days one mounting was tested and the other seven were nearly completed. These guns turned out to be very useful at the front. They were the only long-range guns that they had.

On the 20th January, 1918, I paid a visit to the front and noted that the 9.2-inch guns had only 20 degrees of elevation. I pointed out to General Sir Henry Rawlinson that by putting a piece on top of the mounting, 35 degrees of elevation could be obtained, which would increase the range from 13,000 to 17,000 yards. Sir Henry considered it most important that the alteration should be carried out. On my return to England I wrote


323

VALUE OF TIME IN WAR

to Sir Wm. Armstrong, Whitworth and Co. for a drawing ; they only took two days to complete it, and I forwarded it to Sir Henry Rawlinson. On the 28th March, 1916, Sir Wm. Armstrong, Whitworth and Co. were asked to fit four guns in this manner; that is to say, sixty-two days elapsed between that firm's dispatch of the drawing to me and their receipt of the order from the War Office to start the work. The job was, comparatively speaking, a small one, and it took only a short time to complete.

Here is a case where a bad mistake was made in the beginning, at the time the gun mounting was ordered, and, when the mistake had been pointed out, the authorities took longer to make up their minds whether or not to rectify it than the gun-makers did to alter the mounting. It is one of the thousands of such instances that occurred during the war, indicating that neither the Admiralty nor the War Office had any appreciation of the value of time and that even when at war they could not leave the beaten path of peace-time red-tapism.

In January, 1917, I paid a visit to H.M.S. Centaur, a new light cruiser flying the broad pennant of Commodore Tyrwhitt. 1 In the course of conversation the Commodore mentioned to me how hopelessly his squadrons were handicapped in any night action, as they were not supplied with any star shells which would illuminate the enemy, and their searchlights could not be effectively used. It was a strange thing that although we had used searchlights in the Navy for so many

1 Afterwards Rear-Admiral Sir Reginald Tyrwhitt.


324

WAR REFLECTIONS 1915-1917

years, we had continued a system which was so unscientific that the operator at the searchlight could not get his light on to the target because the glare made it invisible. It was a method, as I have already remarked, which necessitated the employment of another man as an observer who, with his eyes on the object, would shout out " go right " or " left " or " up " or " down."

Lord Jellicoe points out in his book 1 that we were inferior to the Germans in the power of our searchlights, and the control of them, and that our guns forming the secondary armament were not fitted for director firing, whereas the Germans had a good system. It was for these reasons that he did not seek a night action in the Battle of Jutland. The question is why had the

1 " The possibility of a night action was, of course, present to my mind, but for several reasons it was not my intention to seek such an action between the heavy ships. It is sufficient to mention the principal arguments against it. In the first place, such a course must have inevitably led to our Battle Fleet being the object of attack by a very large destroyer force throughout the night. No senior officer would willingly court such an attack, even if our battleships were equipped with the best searchlights and the best arrangements for the control of the searchlights and the gunfire at night. It was, however, known to me that neither our searchlights nor their control arrangements were at this time of the best type. The fitting of director-firing gear for the guns of the secondary armament of our battleships (a very important factor for firing at night) had also only just been begun, although repeatedly applied for. The delay was due to manufacturing and labour difficulties. Without these adjuncts I knew well that the maximum effect of our fire at night could not be obtained, and that we could place no dependence on beating off destroyer attacks by gunfire. Therefore, if destroyers got into touch with the heavy ships, we were bound to suffer serious losses with no corresponding advantage. Our own destroyers were no effective antidote at night, since, if they were disposed with this sole object in view, they would certainly be taken for enemy destroyers and be fired on by our own ships."

" The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916," pp. 373-374.


325

CONTROL OF SEARCHLIGHTS

Germans this superiority? They ought not to have had it and they would not have had it if suggestions put forward by British naval officers had been accepted.

On my way up to London from Chatham after my visit to H.M.S. Centaur, I thought out an idea, and took it to Sir John Jellicoe (then First Sea Lord). He made up his mind at once, and with characteristic promptitude, he ordered it to be proceeded with, but unfortunately after this he left the Admiralty and the invention took the ordinary course, that is to say, its adoption was delayed because the departmental officials wished as usual to introduce my idea in some other form which they could call their own. In this they partially succeeded, so at length the Royal Navy secured a method of controlling their searchlights which had been badly needed for forty years.

After the departure of Sir John Jellicoe from Whitehall, I had nothing to do. I was supposed to be adviser to the Admiralty on gunnery matters, but they did not keep me well enough informed to advise them, and when I gave them advice they did not take it. That the country should in these circumstances be paying me annually �1200, the difference between my full pay and retired pay, seemed to me indefensible, and early in 1918, I pointed out to the authorities that as they would not give me anything to do I would do what I could without robbing the country of �1200 a year.

There remains one of the choicest of my collection of Admiralty communications to be mentioned. In August, 1916, I received a letter from the


326

WAR REFLECTIONS 1915-1917

Admiralty in which they informed me that they had received " with much satisfaction a report from the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleets, representing the admirable manner in which the ships of the Home Fleets have been fitted with director-firing gear." The letter conveyed to me " their high appreciation " of the valuable services which I had rendered in connection with the design and manufacture of this gear and their thanks for " the diligence and care with which I had carried out the arduous work which devolved on me both before and during the War and which had resulted in this system being completed in all the capital ships of the Home Fleets."

The Commissioners for executing the office of Lord High Admiral have often written absurd letters to me. One would like to know what was in the brain of the writer of this particular communication. Was it thought that I should show it to the Germans in order to convince them that all our capital ships were fitted with director firing? To attempt to camouflage the facts for my benefit was useless, since I knew very well which of our capital ships were so fitted, and I knew that at the rate their Lordships were proceeding all our capital ships would not be completed before the War was over, as, in fact, they were not. 1

While on the subject of gunnery, I cannot forbear mentioning another war matter which greatly interested and afterwards amused me. Under the Special Commissions (Dardanelles and Mesopotamia) Act, 1914, Royal Commissioners were appointed to inquire into the origin, inception

1 Cf. "The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916. "


327

THE DARDANELLES MISTAKE

and conduct of the operations in the Dardanelles. Lord Cromer was the President, the Army was represented by Field-Marshal Lord Nicholson, and the Navy by Admiral of the Fleet Sir William May.

I must comment on their report 1 because it reveals some very strange facts in connection with a subject that I have studied nearly all my life - Gunnery.

The idea that the battleships of the Mediterranean Squadron could reduce the forts and guns protecting the Dardanelles sprang from a sad want of knowledge. The authorities responsible for the mistaken idea were impressed by the success with which the German guns had reduced the Belgian forts, and concluded that in the same way ships' guns could reduce the Dardanelles forts. This deduction was due to a failure to realise the difference between firing on land and firing from a ship.

Referring to the reduction of the Belgian forts, Lord Grey said, 2 "The experience of this war was supposed to have changed the prospect of successful attack upon forts and made successful attack upon forts a practical operation where it had not been a practical operation before." As to that, I would observe that the war had not changed the prospect of successfully attacking forts or land guns by naval guns ; all recent wars have demonstrated that on land you can successfully attack forts or guns if you can locate them, and during the war new methods were in use for locating them.

1 The Report cost the country �4850.

2 " Dardanelles Commission Report," p. 24.


328

WAR REFLECTIONS 1915-1917

Mr. Winston Churchill, in the course of his evidence, said, "This war had brought about many surprises. We had seen fortresses reputed throughout Europe to be impregnable collapsing after a few days' attack by field armies." I do not think that the war brought surprises to those who knew anything about artillery fire. If the statement that all Europe thought the Belgian forts impregnable is correct, then all Europe was very ignorant. I cannot agree with Mr. Winston Churchill, for I am quite sure that no officer with any knowledge of artillery fire would consider any fort impregnable from guns on land. Here we had a very wrong supposition and an even more erroneous idea, and these two wrongs were the basis for the authorities' decision that the obsolescent battleships in the Mediterranean could successfully attack the Dardanelles.

For the destruction of the Namur and other Belgian forts, the Germans could place their guns where they liked, and by camouflage conceal them from even the eyes of an aeroplane; they could obtain the range to a yard and could employ balloons to observe and direct their fire ; the destruction of the forts was therefore not a difficult task. The forts were helpless ; they were shelled by weapons they could not see, and they had no target to fire on. A parallel case to this existed later on, when a number of obsolescent ships of the Allies in the Mediterranean were ordered to attack the shore guns of the Turks. The shore guns could hide themselves and, by means of scientific methods, fire at the ships, although unable to see them. The ships could


329

GUNNERY BY SEA AND LAND

not hide themselves and could not fire at the shore guns because they could not see them.

The main difference between sea and land gunnery as exhibited at the time of the Dardanelles operations was that in the ships the gunners, in order to fire effectively, had to be able to see the object they were firing at, whereas on the land this necessity did not exist ; a hill could be between the land gun and the target, but it would not affect the accuracy of fire. This is so important a point that I wish to make it quite clear to my readers. In order that a shot from a gun may reach an object, the distance of the object must be known, and the gun pointed up into the air at an angle which varies with the distance. This angle is called the angle of elevation, and can be applied to the gun in two different ways :

  1. By clinometer.
  2. By direct observation.

A clinometer is practically a pair of nutcrackers with an ordinary level attached to one handle. You separate the handles of the nutcrackers to the angle that the range requires, then put the nutcrackers on to the gun, and when the bubble of the level is in the middle you know that the gun is at the correct angle of elevation. This is what is called pointing the gun by clinometer and is the system generally used by guns on shore. This method cannot be used on board a ship, as the bubble of the level would never be steady on account of the vessel's motion, so the ship gunner looks along the top of the nutcracker handle and, when he sees it in line with the object to be hit, he knows that the gun has the correct elevation.


330

WAR REFLECTIONS 1915-1917

Hence when firing from a ship the gunner must be able to see the object that he is firing at.

The fact that the gunners on board the ships could not fire unless they were able to see the object they wished to hit is another very important detail. Let me try and make it quite clear.

Here we have a gun on shore with a hill intervening between it and the ship at sea. It is obvious that the gunners on shore cannot see the ship, and the gunners on board the ship cannot see the gun on shore. Notwithstanding that neither opponent can see the other, the gun on shore can fire at the ship, because it can be given the correct elevation by a clinometer or level ; on the other hand, the ship cannot fire, because the gunners on board cannot use a clinometer. Herein lies the difference between ship and shore gunnery.

Whether the obsolescent ships in the Mediterranean, unsupported by the Army, could be expected successfully to attack guns on shore, was purely an artillery question ; it was to be a duel, and before deciding on the duel, the authorities should have carefully investigated the case to see which side was likely to win. Had they done so, they would have found that the chances of hitting


331

SHIPS VERSUS FORTS

were decidedly in favour of the shore guns, for the following reasons :-

  1. A concealed battery can fire at a ship, but the ship cannot return the fire.
  2. The shore guns can use a clinometer; ships cannot.
  3. The shore gun fires from a steady platform ; the ship gun fires from a rolling platform.
  4. From the shore the range of the ship can be accurately obtained, as a long base can be used for range finding, while the ship can only use a short-base range-finder.
  5. Even if the shore gun is visible from the ship, it is a very small target to aim at, whereas the ship is a very large target.
  6. The shore gun, when visible, is not easy to locate from its surroundings, whereas the ship stands out on the sea like a black bull's-eye on a white background.
  7. Observation of fire is much easier to judge accurately when the projectiles are falling in the sea than when they fall on land.
  8. The ships that were told off to carry out the bombardment (with the one exception of the Queen Elizabeth] were unable to fire at a long range because their guns could not be given sufficient elevation ; they were not efficiently fitted for firing their guns by broadsides ; and they could not fire their guns from aloft, which is essential when using them at long range.

With all these advantages on the side of the shore guns, it is obvious that the ships alone could not defeat them, and the authorities should not have made the attempt.


332

WAR REFLECTIONS 1915-1917

In 1916 it was decided, as I have recalled, to have a Commission of Inquiry into the origin, inception, and conduct of the operations in the Dardanelles. With regard to the " inception," or to put the matter in plainer English, whether the obsolescent ships selected for the operation could defeat the Dardanelles guns or not, the Commission 1 state, " The arguments involved in the consideration of this subject are of so highly technical a character that none but specialists can express a very confident opinion on them.'" The reasons given by me as to why the inception was wrong do not embrace a very high technical knowledge.

I have seen the Royal Navy change from sails to steam, from fighting on the water to fighting under the water and over the water. What is the future Navy to be ? Some officers say that the battleship is more alive than ever ; others declare that the battleship is dead. I regarded the surface battleship as dead before the War, and I think her more dead now, if that is possible. The battleship of to-day costs roughly �8,000,000 ; she carries about 1000 shells containing about 100,000 lbs. of high explosives ; her effective range is, say, 15 miles, she is vulnerable to aircraft with bombs and ariel torpedoes, and to submarines, the latter possibly carrying a 15-in. or 18-in. gun ; and the ordinary automobile torpedo is still in process of development, and may, in the future, carry a ton of high explosives, which would probably sink any battleship.

For �8,000,000 we could build many aeroplane- carrying ships, equipped with aeroplanes carrying over 100,000 lbs. of high explosives. If these aeroplanes carried fuel sufficient for five hours, their

1 " Dardanelles Commission Report," p. 24.


333

THE FUTURE NAVY

range would be about 150 miles out and 150 miles home.

In the battleship we put all our eggs into one basket. In peace-time the aeroplane-carrying ships could be used as passenger ships, and the aeroplanes for carrying passengers instead of bombs.

As to relative cost of upkeep, the single battle-ship would require in peace-time about-

 

Pay

40 officers

�8,000

800 men

60,000

Provisions and stores

30,000

Coal

10,000

 

108,000

Say �120,000 a year. The aeroplane-carrying ships and the aeroplanes would cost nothing ; they would be earning money. The officers and men to form the crews of the ships would belong to the Merchant Navy. Aeroplane pilots will be as numerous as taxi drivers and get about the same pay. The battleship waddles along at twenty miles an hour, and cannot waddle very far, and in comparison with an aeroplane has a very low rate of speed.

The object in war is to introduce high explosive materials into your enemy's ships or country ; transmitting this high explosive by guns is expensive as the container of the high explosive has to be very strong, and consequently very heavy, to withstand the shock of discharge. It takes a battleship weighing 30,000 tons to carry 100,000 lbs. of this explosive. Ten aeroplanes weighing about three tons each would carry the same amount, so the relative weights of the carriers is as 30 tons to 30,000 tons.

When the battleship nears the end of her coal or ammunition, she must waddle home at about the same speed as a South Eastern Railway train (I am told that this is the slowest line on earth), and


334

WAR REFLECTIONS 1915-1917

it takes her several hours to fill up even if she uses oil fuel. The aeroplane does not waddle home, but comes back at 100 miles an hour, and it takes three minutes to fill her up with fuel and ammunition. The future is with the aeroplane, which is going to develop rapidly in the next few years. Probably we shall also have submersible battleships of 10,000 tons. What chance will the surface battleship, presenting a huge target, have against such a vessel ?

My task is completed, for from the summer of 1916 to the end of the war neither the Admiralty nor the War Office had further need of any services I could render. As I had retired in the year preceding the beginning of hostilities, I was fortunate in being able to take some part, however small, in the prosecution of the War on the water, under the water, on the land, and in the air.

This war work rounded off my career, and as I lay down my pen my thoughts turn to the old Britannia which I entered as a boy. The ship has disappeared and my companions of those early days have had varied fortunes in life. Of the sixty-four little boys who embarked on board H.M.S. Britannia in 1866, two only rose to the rank of Admiral, while another left the Navy for the Army and became a Field-Marshal and a peer. Looking backwards, thoughts and incidents crowd one's mind, and I have felt inclined, in reading through this manuscript, to make additions here and deletions there. But, after all I set out merely to write down the more or less random recollections of my fifty years in the Royal Navy, and it must go forth with whatever faults the reader may notice.

<-Previous Chapter - Appendix->

^ back to top ^