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CHAPTER XIII

NAVAL MANOEUVRES, 1889 - A ROYAL RESCUE

IN the autumn of 1889 I was appointed to take command of the Inflexible, temporarily commissioned for the naval manoeuvres.

These autumnal naval manceuvres had for some years past been systematically carried out, with varying programmes of hypothetical warfare. They were extremely interesting, not only to the officers who were actually engaged in them, but also as a means of elucidating several obscure problems in naval warfare such as the possibility or otherwise of blockade, under modern conditions; the endurance of officers and men, and also the endurance of the ships themselves, and specially of their engines and boilers, under circumstances which were made to represent - so far as possible - a state of hostility between two opposed squadrons, each of which was given a certain definite strategic problem to solve, the tactics, of course, being left to the Admirals in command.

All sham battles, either by land or sea, must necessarily be but a pale, and sometimes a misleading, image of actual war. But as long as this is well borne in mind, and people do not jump to hasty conclusions, naval manoeuvres are extremely useful exercises, from all points of view, always bearing in mind that any conclusions which may be arrived at are strictly temporary, and are liable to be upset at any moment by some new

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invention, such as wireless telegraphy, submarines, and airships. Hence the necessity for the annual repetition of the manoeuvres.

The mobilization of the fleet for the 1889 manoeuvres reminded me of the mobilization for the Russian War in 1854, a description of which I gave in the first volume of these records. It was not, of course, quite such a hurry-scurry, haphazard business as that, for we had made some advance in organization since that date, and there were not quite so many old fossils remaining on the so-called Active List as there were at the earlier date; but nevertheless there were not a few ancient and somewhat rusty Lieutenants, who had to be dug out of harbour ships and other sloping billets, to fill up the complements of the ships specially commissioned for the manoeuvres; and it appeared to me, on commissioning the Inflexible, that I was given rather more than my fair share of them. Indeed, one or two of them appeared to be so rusty and so little to be trusted that I did not feel it safe to leave the deck when they had the watch at sea, either by night or day; and one of them I had to bring before a court-martial, on a charge of drunkenness, before the ship left the dockyard. He was acquitted, however; he was sharp enough to go to a young, lately joined surgeon, fresh from the hospitals and full of science, and this young medico gave his evidence at the court-martial to the effect that Lieutenant was sober, basing his diagnosis on something he saw in the whites of the patient's eyes; only, of course, expressing himself in highly scientific medical language, which so impressed the Court that the prisoner was acquitted.

I had thought, up to that time, that I knew a drunken man when I saw one; but it seems I was wrong. My

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medical education had been entirely neglected, and I did not even know the meaning of some of the words which were employed to prove sobriety. I must also frankly acknowledge that I was afterwards told privately, by one of the culprit's messmates, that I had court-martialled him about the only time he was sober! I felt that I should have to read some medical books.

The Inflexible had been a crack ship in 1882. She took part in the bombardment of Alexandria, and was at that time commanded by the present Lord Fisher. She carried four eighty-ton muzzle-loading guns in two turrets, placed en echelon, and her central citadel was protected with twenty-four inches of wrought-iron armour; but this only extended over about a third of her length, her ends being entirely unprotected. The smallest guns afloat could have riddled her ends and laid them open to the sea; in which case she would have promptly capsized, with her impregnable citadel intact. At least, so said Sir Edward Reed; and I believe he was right.

This was the era of the citadel ship. The exponents of the type argued that a fighting ship ought to be so constructed that it would be impossible to knock her out with one heavy blow. They therefore concentrated all the armour she was able to carry on a short thick belt amidships, protecting what they called the vitals of the ship, but leaving two-thirds of her length entirely unprotected and liable to be riddled by guns of the lightest calibre, as if this was not vital to her stability and buoyancy. The theory would have been all right if one could have been sure that the enemy would fire only at the citadel and not at the other two-thirds of the ship; but as no prospective enemy had given any such assurance, the theory was seen to be wrong, and

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largely owing to the influence of sailors - the battleships of the Naval Defence Act, and those which followed them, were given long belts.

When all the ships selected to take part in the naval manoeuvres had been mobilized and assembled at Spithead, the German Emperor was graciously pleased to inspect the fleet. The Captains of all the ships were assembled on board the Hohenzollern to be presented to him, and they had the honour of receiving a hearty shake from the unmailed fist, before it had become stained with innocent blood, and before the blasphemous hypocrite - prince of spies and father of lies - had been found out, and his villainous character exposed.

The two fleets then put to sea, and we were given a few days to shake down and find our sea-legs, before war was declared.

I have no intention of attempting to give any general account of the various phases of the 1889 manoeuvres. It would be rather technical, and I don't think it would be of much interest to the general reader, so I propose to give only a brief sketch of the part which the Inflexible took in them, and of an incident in which our present gracious King was the principal actor.

I cannot honestly say that I was proud of my command. She was very slow. We never succeeded in getting more than eleven knots out of her, and she steered like a beast - a stubborn mule, for instance.

It took the quartermasters and helmsmen a long time to get accustomed to her vagaries. In fact, they never got quite accustomed to them, as we spent most of our time in harbour, which was the best place for the old tub, as her lack of speed only hampered the movements of other ships.

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Admiral Baird, who commanded our fleet, soon found this out; but instead of cursing me, as some Admirals would have done, because my ship would not go, he gave me a special job of my own - viz., the defence of Lough Swilly, in the north of Ireland, which was one of our unfortified ports that might be captured and used by the enemy.

My little squadron consisted of the Inflexible, Hecla (torpedo-depot and mine-layer), and six torpedo-boats. It was a very suitable job for the old " bogey " ship, as the Inflexible was called. So off we went to the north, and proceeded to make Lough Swilly impregnable. We laid several minefields - dummies, of course, with light-blowing charges, to see if they went off - landed light guns to protect the mine-fields; moored the Inflexible head and stern just round the corner, with her four eighty-ton guns ready to blow out of the water any enemy's ship that should dare to approach the anchorage; connected up a wire with the shore telegraphs; and then felt that we were as safe as the German fleet in the Kiel Canal.

It was necessary, however, that we should patrol the wide entrance to the Lough at night-time, in order that we might receive timely warning of the night attack which we fully expected the enemy to deliver; and in order that this patrol work might be efficiently performed, I sent out three of my six torpedo-boats each night at sunset, to patrol till daylight, when they came in and had about thirty-six hours' rest, until the night after next.

The August of 1889 was one of the stormiest I ever remember in the British Isles. It blew hard on most days, and when it was not blowing it generally rained; and on by-days, when it was not doing either, there was

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a fog; so that the patrolling business was rather rough work for the little torpedo-boats. But I had nothing else to do it with, as we had no good, wholesome, seagoing destroyers in those days.

One of my torpedo-boats (No. 79) was commanded by Sub-Lieutenant Prince George of Wales, who, with one other officer, a gunner, had to run the show night and day.

One morning at daylight No. 79 came into harbour and reported that one of her consorts had broken down and was anchored on a lee-shore not far from the rocks; that she had tried to tow her off, but had carried away her only hawser, a small wire one, and then came into harbour to report, leaving the third boat to stand by the disabled one. This sounded rather bad; and as the Inflexible was moored off Rathmullen - round the corner, so to speak, and not in sight of the disabled boat - I decided to go out myself and undertake the rescue; but this seemed so greatly to disappoint Prince George, and he begged so hard to be allowed to " have another try," that I could not find it in my heart to refuse him; so I supplied him with a new five and a half inch hemp hawser and sent him out again, though I must confess I felt a little bit anxious, as it was blowing fresh from the north-west, and I knew quite well what sort of a sea there must be on the exposed southern shore of the wide entrance to the Lough.

The commander of No. 79 and his crew had been out all night, and a rough night too, so that they could have had no sleep; but they were all hot on the job, " for the credit of the ship," as sailors love to put it; and a little before noon No. 79 triumphantly towed her disabled consort safely into harbour.

It is not altogether plain-sailing for one torpedo

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boat to take in tow another one, anchored on a lee-shore, in a rough sea, just outside the breakers. It demands a bold initiative, considerable nerve, and skilful seamanship, such as would do credit to any officer who had enjoyed a far longer nautical experience than had fallen to the lot of our gracious King in 1889. It was, in short, a very creditable performance. But I had seen enough of Prince George to lead me to the conclusion that he was not one of those who care to play to the gallery. It was enough for him to know that he had done his duty as a seaman, and done it well. So I didn't make a fuss about it.

Of course, I reported the case to my Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Baird, telling him at the same time that I felt sure it would not be agreeable to Prince George to make any more noise about it than he would have done had the duty been performed by Sub-Lieutenant Joe Buggins. And Admiral Baird agreed with me.

It occurred to me, however, that it would be gratifying to the Prince of Wales if I wrote to him privately and told him how well his sailor son was qualifying to become an accomplished seaman. I did so, and received from His Royal Highness one of those gracious, charming letters which he knew so well how to write. In which he said

" My wish has always been that my son should not only do the same as all other officers in the Navy, but if possible exceed any duties that may devolve upon him. It is most gratifying to me to learn that you gave him a duty to perform that was not unattended by danger, and would have reflected credit on an officer of far wider experience than he possesses."

I have often wondered, since that day, whether our gracious Sovereign would have been happier if circumstances

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had allowed him to continue his career in the service which he seemed to love so well, rather than wear a crown.

" Deny it to a king? Then, happy low, lie down! Uneasy lies the head that wears a crown."

But Henry IV. was rather down on his luck when he said that; and we may reasonably hope that it is not always true.

Having made Lough Swilly impregnable, and having waited in vain for the enemy to attack, it occurred to me that the enemy's spies (of whom there were plenty, though we were not allowed to shoot them) had, in all probability, given full information of our defences; and that it was therefore highly improbable that any attack would be made. Under these circumstances it seemed to be a waste of fighting power to keep the Inflexible here any longer; but as I knew full well that neither the Admiral of the first nor of the second division of our fleet wanted my old slow-coach joined up with them, to hamper their movements, I suggested - by wire - to Admiral Baird that I should go, north about, to the East Coast of England and Scotland, and raid the enemy's towns in that district. Admiral Baird approved of my suggestion and ordered me to carry it out; so off I went, in a gale of wind, and the old tub rolled and wallowed in the trough of the sea and washed us down fore and aft, till we got to the Pentland Firth, through which we passed and then got into smooth water on the eastern side.

Early next morning I bombarded Wick, which was supposed to be a fortified town; and then, about noon, we sighted the masts of two battleships, their hulls being below the horizon. I naturally assumed them to be enemies and promptly fled, as two to one would

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have involved theoretical capture, and I hoped they had not seen our masts; but they had, and gave chase. It did not take them long to catch us, and then they turned out to be friends - Anson and Collingwood, with our own Rear-Admiral's flag flying in the Anson.

I was ordered to take station astern of the Collingwood, and the squadron of three battleships shaped course to the southward, to raid the enemy's coast. From this time, until I was captured, forty-eight hours afterwards, I was under my senior officer's orders and not responsible for my movements; but I could not help thinking that the Rear-Admiral made a great mistake when he hampered himself with a ship whose best speed did not come within four knots of that of his other two ships; though it is just within the bounds of possibility that my judgment upon this point may have been vitiated by a slight tinge of disappointment at being deprived of my independent command.

It may perhaps be of interest to the reader if I give a few brief extracts from my private remark book; covering our movements for the next two days

" August 26th.-Had to stop port engine for several hours, one of the junk ring bolts of low-pressure cylinder having worked out and got loose in the cylinder. Lucky we did not have a real bad smash. Started again at eight p.m.; and the Admiral put me to lead the squadron, without giving me the authority to make the necessary signals as to alterations of course and speed.

" During the night we got in amongst an immense fleet of fishing-boats. Their lights covered the sea . . . . Anson and Collingwood, without lights, were poking me up behind; and it was far more by good luck than good management that we did not have an accident.

" August 27th.-Steering up the Forth for Leith, Inflexible still leading the squadron. Weather, thick.

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No sights. Position by dead reckoning doubtful.

This seems to be a peculiar method of conducting a squadron. Sighted May Island. Collingwood and Inflexible stopped off Inch Keith. Anson went on to Queen's Ferry; but finding nobody there, she came back again, and the squadron steered out to sea. Inflexible still leading. Looked out sharp for torpedo boats during the night. Saw none. Weather thick.

" August 28th.-At daylight the squadron stopped off the mouth of the Tyne and bombarded North and South Shields for about a quarter of an hour. Collingwood went on to Sunderland, and did the same there. The squadron then united and went on to Hartlepool and Whitby, and bombarded them. Weather somewhat thick. Blowing fresh from south-west. At 12.40, when nearly off Scarborough, sighted the enemy's squadron coming up full speed. We turned tail and fled. Inflexible easily caught, surrounded, and captured. The enemy's squadron consisted of the Rodney, Howe, two belted cruisers, two unarmoured cruisers, and the Ajax in the distance, though she never got within range. Enemy's Admiral, flying his flag in Rodney, ordered me to proceed to Portsmouth."

Thus - so far as I was concerned - ended the naval manoeuvres of 1889, the only ones in which I ever took part, which must be my excuse for entering at some length into an account of this mimic warfare.

The final result of the battle of Scarborough was, that our Rear-Admiral, in the Anson, escaped alone, through superior speed. The Collingwood was caught and captured.

There can be no doubt that our squadron committed a tactical error in continuing to hug the coast, after the enemy must have received telegraphic news of what we were doing, and also of the strength of our squadron, or rather of its weakness compared with his own.

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If we had sheered off into the North Sea after bombarding Hartlepool, considering the state of the weather, we should certainly have eluded the enemy and escaped the final catastrophe. But, on the other hand, if " ifs " and " ans " were pots and pans, there'd be no use for tinkers; or if my aunt were my uncle, she would wear different garments.

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