without casting off her deeply-laden prize) hauled to the wind on the starboard tack and got clear. Although ordered by telegraph from the Euryalus, whose captain was senior to Sir Edward Berry, to hasten to the British fleet, then to south-ward of the former, with intelligence of the number and position of the enemy, the Agamemnon continued standing to the north-west with her prize in tow. This seemed an unaccountable remissness on the part of Lord Nelson's favourite ship.

The Sirius was also in some danger. She had waited so long for the return of her boat from an American vessel, that the enemy's advanced ships found themselves near enough to chase and fire at her ; but the frigate, crowding sail, effected her escape. Between 2 and 3 P.M. the horizon cleared, and the wind shifted to west-north-west. Whereupon Vice-admiral Villeneuve ordered his fleet to form in five columns, agreeably to a plan which he had previously communicated to his flag-officers and captains. The fleet accordingly divided itself into two parts. The first part, consisting of 21 sail of the line, and denominated the line of battle, then subdivided itself into three squadrons of seven ships each ; of which the centre was commanded by M. Villeneuve himself, the van by Vice-admiral Alava, and the rear by Rear-admiral Dumanoir. The second part, or corps de reserve, divided itself into two squadrons of six ships each ; the first was under the orders of Admiral Gravina, and the second of Rear-admiral Magon.

At the time of communicating the foregoing plan of formation, Admiral Villeneuve reminded his officers of the instructions he had given to them previously to his quitting Toulon at the commencement of the year. * In case of being to windward, M. Villeneuve's directions then were, for the line to bear down together, and each ship to take her opponent in the enemy's line, whom she was to engage closely even to boarding. If, on the contrary, the opposite fleet lay to windward, his fleet was to wait the attack in close line of battle. " The enemy ", says the French admiral, "will not confine himself to forming a line of battle parallel to ours and engaging us with his cannon, where success often attends the most skilful, and always the most fortunate : he will endeavour to turn our rear, to pass through our line, and, such of our ships as he may succeed in cutting off, will endeavour to surround and reduce with clusters (pelotons) of his own. In this case a captain would do better to trust to his courage and ardour for glory, than to the signals of the commander-in-chief ; who, himself engaged and covered with smoke, would perhaps be unable to make them ". � "There is nothing to alarm us, " adds M. Villeneuve, " in the sight of an English fleet ; their 74-gun ships have not 500 men on board ;

*  See p.10.

�  Victoires et Conquetes, tome xvi., p. 109.

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