THE BATTLES OF IUKA AND CORINTH
The Third Louisiana Regiment was now attached to the Second Brigade of General
Price's army, under the command of Colonel Hebert, who was receiving a
commission of Brigadier-General.
The regiment left Camp Poteau, Ark., on April 28, 1862 en route to Memphis. On
the first of May the troops boarded trains toward Corinth, Miss.
The regiment reached Tupelo, Miss. on Sunday June 8, 1862.
HEADQUARTERS THIRD LOUISIANA INFANTRY
Camp near Priceville, Miss., July 6th, 1862.
General Orders
No. 7
Having been promoted and assigned to the command of a brigade of cavalry, the
undersigned, with feelings of regret, relinquishes the command of the Third
Louisiana Infantry. Well tried Veterans! distinguished not only for their
daring gallantry on the battle-field, but for their soldierly and military
bearing on all occasions, and the alacrity and willingness with which they have
always borne the many privations and hardships they have had to undergo.
Fare-well! fellow soldiers! and remember that I will ever feel proud that I was
chosen to command the Veterans of Oak Hill and Elk Horn! the pride of the Army
of the West, the gallant Third Louisiana.
F. C. ARMSTRONG, Brigadier-General.
On the last day of August the regiment made ready to march toward Iuka, Miss.
They fought numerous engagements at Iuka and Corinth. On the 20th of September
The regiment started its retreat from Corinth and arrived at Holly Springs on
the 9th of October, 1862.
REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL EARL VAN DORN
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF WEST TENNESSEE,
Holly Springs, Miss., Oct. 20, 1862.
GENERAL---I have the honor to make the following report of the battle of
Corinth:
Having established batteries at Port Hudson, secured the mouth of the Red
River and navigation of the Mississippi River to Vicksburg, I turned my
especial attention to affairs on the Northern portion of my district.
On the 30th day of August, I received a dispatch from General Bragg, informing
me that he was about to march into Kentucky, and would leave to General Price
and myself West Tennessee.
On the 4th day of September, I received a communication from General Price, in
which was inclosed a copy of the dispatch from General Bragg, above named,
making an offer to co-operate with me. At this time General Breckenridge was
operating on the Mississippi River, between Baton Rouge and Port Hudson, with
all the available force I had for the field, therefore I could not accept
General Price's proposition. Upon the return, however, of General Breckenridge,
I immediately addressed General Price, giving my views in full in regard to the
campaign in West Tennessee, and stating that I was then ready to join him with
all my troops.
In the meantime, orders were received by him from General Bragg to follow
Rosecrans across the Tennessee River, into Middle Tennessee, whither it was
then supposed he had gone. Upon the receipt of this intelligence, I felt at
once that all my hopes of accomplishing anything in West Tennessee with my
small force was marred. I nevertheless moved up to Davis's Mills, a few miles
from Grand Junction, Tenn., with the intention of defending my district to the
best of my ability, and to make a demonstration in favor of General Price, to
which latter end, also, I marched my whole command, on the 20th day of
September, to within seven miles of Bolivar, driving three brigades of the
enemy back to that place, and forcing the return from Corinth of one division
(Ross's) which had been sent there to strengthen Grant's army.
General Price, in obedience to his orders, marched in the direction of Iuka,
to cross the Tennessee, but was not long in discovering that Rosecrans had not
crossed that stream. This officer in connection with Grant, attacked him on the
19th day of September, and compelled him to fall back to Baldwin, on the Mobile
and Ohio Railroad. On the 25th day of the same month, I received a dispatch by
courier, from General Price, stating that he was at Baldwin, and was ready to
join me with his forces in an attack on Corinth, as had been previously
suggested by me. We met at Ripley on the 28th of September, according to
agreement, and marched the next morning toward Pocahontas, which place we
reached on the 1st of October. From all the information we could obtain, the
following was the "situation" of the Federal army at that time: Sherman at
Memphis, with about 6,000 men; Huelburt, afterward Ord, at Bolivar, with 8,000;
Grant (headquarters at Jackson) with about 3,000; Rosecrans at Corinth with
about 15,000; together with the following outposts, viz.: Rienzi, 2,500;
Burnsville, Jacinto, and Iuka, about 6,000. At important bridges, and on
garrison duty, about two or three thousand, making in the aggregate about
42,000 men in West Tennessee. Memphis, Jackson, Bolivar and Corinth are in the
arc of a circle, the chord of which, from Memphis to Corinth, makes an angle
with a due east line about fifteen degrees south. Bolivar is about equi-distant
from Memphis, and Corinth somewhat nearer the latter, and is at the
intersection of the Hatchie River, and the Mississippi Central and Ohio
Railroad. Corinth is the strongest, and most salient point.
Surveying the whole field of operations before me calmly and dispassionately,
the conclusion forced itself irresistibly upon my mind, that the taking of
Corinth was a condition precedential to the accomplishment of anything in West
Tennessee. To take Memphis would be to destroy an immense amount of property,
without any adequate military advantage, even admitting that it could be held,
without heavy guns, against the enemy's guns and mortar-boats. The line of
fortifications around Bolivar is intersected by the Hatchie River, rendering it
impossible to take the place by quick assault, and re-enforcements could be
thrown in from Jackson by railroad; and, situated as it is, in the angle of the
three fortified places, an advance upon it would expose both my flanks and rear
to an attack from Memphis and Corinth.
It was clear to my mind that if a successful attack could be made upon Corinth
From the west and north-west, the forces there driven back on the Tennessee and
cut off, Bolivar and Jackson would easily fall, and then, upon the arrival of
exchanged prisoners of war, West Tennessee would soon be in our possession, and
communication with Bragg effected through Middle Tennessee. The attack on
Corinth was a military necessity requiring prompt and vigorous action.
It was being strengthened daily under the astute soldier, General Rosecrans;
convalescents were returning to fill his ranks; new levies were arriving to
increase his brigades, and fortifications were being constructed at new points;
and it was very evident that, unless a sudden and vigorous blow could be struck
there at once, no hope could be entertained of driving the enemy From a base of
operations so convenient; that in the event of misfortune to Bragg in Kentucky,
the whole valley of the Mississippi would be lost to us before winter. To have
awaited for the arrival, arming, clothing and organization of the exchanged
prisoners, would have been to wait for the enemy to strengthen themselves more
than we could possibly do. With these reflections, and after mature
deliberation, I determined to attempt Corinth. I had a reasonable hope of
success. Field returns at Ripley showed my strength to be about 22,000 men.
Rosecrans, at Corinth, had about 15,000, with about 8,000 additional at
outposts from twelve to fifteen miles distant. I might surprise him, and carry
the place before these troops could be brought in. I therefore marched toward
Pocahontas, threatening Bolivar, then turned suddenly across the Hatchie and
Tuscumbia, and attacked Corinth without hesitation, and did surprise that place
before the outpost garrisons were called in. It was necessary that this blow
should be sudden and decisive, and, if unsuccessful, that I should withdraw
rapid y from the position between the armies of Ord and Rosecrans. The troops
were in fine spirits, and the whole Army of West Tennessee seemed eager to
emulate the armies of the Potomac and of Kentucky. No army ever marched to
battle with prouder steps, hopeful countenances, or with more courage, than
marched the Army of Tennessee out of Ripley, on the morning of the 28th of
September, on its way to Corinth.
Fully alive to the responsibility of my position as commander of the army, and
after mature and deliberate reflection, the march was ordered. The ground was
well-known to me, and required no study to determine where to make the attack.
The bridge over the Hatchie was soon reconstructed, and the army crossed at 4
o'clock A.M. on the 2d of October. Adams's Brigade of cavalry was left to guard
this approach to our rear, and to protect the train which was parked between
the Hatchie and Tuscumbia. Colonel Hawkins's regiment of infantry, and Captain
Dawson's battery of artillery, were also left in the Bone Yard road, in easy
supporting distance of the bridge. The army bivouacked at Chewalla, after the
driving in of some pickets from that vicinity by Armstrong's and Jackson's
cavalry. This point is about ten miles from Corinth.
At daybreak on the 3d the march was resumed, the precaution having been taken
to cut the railroad between Corinth and Jackson by a squadron of Armstrong's
cavalry. Lovell's Division, in front, kept the south side of the Memphis and
Charleston Railroad. Price, after marching on the same road about five miles,
turned to the left and formed line of battle in front of the outer line of
intrenchments, about three miles from Corinth. Lovell formed line of battle,
after some heavy skirmishing (having to construct a passage across the dry bed
of Indian Creek for his artillery, under fire), on the right and in front of
the same line of intrenchments.
The following was the first order of battle: The three brigades of Lovell's
Division, Villepegue's, Bowen's and Rust's in line, with reserve in rear of
each; Jackson's cavalry brigade on the right, in echelon. The left flank of the
division on the Charleston Railroad; Price's Corps on the left, with the right
flank resting on the same road; Maury's Division on the right, with Moore's and
Phiffer's Brigades in line; Hebert's Division on the left, with Gates's and
Martin's Brigades in line; Colbert's in reserve; Armstrong's Cavalry Brigades
on the extreme left, somewhat detached and out of view. Hebert's left was
masked behind a timbered ridge, with orders not to bring it into action until
the last moment. This was done in hopes of inducing the enemy to weaken his
right by re-enforcing his center and left, where the attack was first to be
made, that his right might be forced.
At 10 o'clock all skirmishers were driven into the intrenchments, and the two
armies were in line of battle confronting each other in force. A belt of fallen
timber, or abattis, about four hundred yards in width, extended along the whole
line of intrenchments. This was to be crossed. The attack commenced on the
right, by Lovell's Division, and extended gradually to the left; and by
half-past 10 o'clock the whole line of outer works was carried, several pieces
of artillery being taken. The enemy made several ineffectual efforts to hold
their ground, forming line of battle at advantageous points, and resisting
obstinately our advance to the second line of detached works. I had been in
hopes that one day's operations would end the contest, and decide who should be
the victors on this bloody field; but a ten miles' march over a parched
country, on dusty roads, without water, getting into line of battle in forests
with undergrowth, and the more than usual activity and determined courage
displayed by the enemy, commanded by one of the ablest generals of the United
States army, who threw all possible obstacles in our way that an active mind
could suggest, prolonged the battle, until I saw, with regret, the sun sink
behind the horizon as the last shot of our sharpshooters followed the
retreating foe into their innermost lines. One hour more of daylight, and
victory would have soothed our grief for the loss of the gallant dead who sleep
on that lost but not dishonored field. The army slept on their arms, within six
hundred yards of Corinth, victorious so far. During the night, three batteries
were ordered to take position on the ridge overlooking the town from the West,
just where the hills dip into the flat extending into the railroad depot, with
instructions to open on the town at 4 o'clock A.M. Hebert, on the left, was
ordered to mass a portion of his division on his left; to put Cabell's Brigade
in echelon on the left; also (Cabell's Brigade being detached from Maury's
Division for this purpose), to move Armstrong's Cavalry Brigade across the
Mobile and Ohio Railroad, and, if possible, to get some of his artillery in
position across the road. In this order of battle he was directed to attack at
day- break with his whole force, swinging his left flank in toward Corinth, and
advance down the Purdy Ridge. Lovell, on the extreme right, with two of his
brigades in line of battle and one in reserve, with Jackson's Cavalry on the
extreme right on College Hill, his left resting on the Memphis and Charleston
Railroad, was ordered to await in this order, or to feel his way along slowly
with his sharpshooters, until Hebert was heavily engaged with the enemy on the
left. He was then to move rapid y to the assault, and force his right inward
across the low grounds south-west of the town. The center, under Maury, was to
move quickly at the same time to the front, and directly at Corinth. Jackson
was directed to burn the railroad bridge over the Tuscumbia during the night.
Daylight came, and there was no attack on the left. A staff officer was sent to
Hebert to inquire the cause. That officer could not be found. Another messenger
was sent, and a third, and, about 7 o'clock, Hebert came to my headquarters and
reported sick. General Price then put General Green in command of the left
wing, and it was 8 o'clock before the proper dispositions for the attack at
this point were made. In the meantime the troops of Maury's left became engaged
with the enemy's sharpshooters, and the baffle was brought on and extended
along the whole center and left wing; and I regretted to observe that my whole
plan of attack was, by this unfortunate delay, disarranged. One brigade after
another went gallantly into action, and, pushing forward through direct and
cross-fire, over every obstacle, reached Corinth and planted their colors on
the last stronghold of the enemy. A hand-to-hand contest was being enacted in
the very yard of General Rosecrans's headquarters, and in the streets of the
town. The heavy guns were silenced, and all seemed about to be ended, when a
heavy fire from fresh troops from Iuka, Burnsville and Rienzi, that had
succeeded in reaching Corinth in time, poured into our thinned ranks. Exhausted
From loss of sleep, wearied from hard marching and fighting, companies in
regiments without officers, our troops (Let no one censure them) gave way. The
day was lost! Lovell's Division was at this time advancing, pursuant to orders,
and was on the point of assaulting the works, when he received my orders to
throw one of his brigades, Villepigue's, rapidly to the center, to cover the
broken ranks thrown back from Corinth, and to prevent a sortie.
He then moved his whole division to the left, and was soon afterwards ordered
to move slowly back and take position on Ind an Creek, and prevent the enemy
from turning our flank. The center and left were withdrawn on the same road on
which they approached, and being somewhat in confusion on account of loss of
officers, fatigue, thirst, want of sleep, thinned ranks, and the nature of the
ground, Villepigue's Brigade was brought in opportunely, and covered the road
to Chewalla.
Lovell came in the rear of the whole army, and all bivouacked again at
Chewalla. No enemy disturbed the sleep of the weary troops. During the night I
had a bridge constructed over the Tuscumbia, and sent Armstrong's and Jackson's
cavalry, with a battery of artillery, to seize and hold Rienzi until the army
came up, intending to march to and hold that point; but after consultation with
General Price, who represented his troops to be somewhat disorganized, it was
deemed advisable to return by the same road that we came, and fall back toward
Ripley and Oxford. Anticipating that the Bolivar force would move out and
dispute my passage across the Hatchie Bridge, I pushed rapidly on to that
point, in hopes of reaching and securing the bridge before their arrival; but I
soon learned, by couriers from Wirt Adams, that I would be too late. I
nevertheless pushed on, with the intention of engaging the enemy until I could
get my train and reserved artillery unparked on the Bone Yard road to the
crossing at Crumb's Mills. (This road branches off south from the State-line
road, about two and a half miles west of the Tuscumbia Bridge, running south,
or up the Hatchie.) No contest of long duration could be made here, as it was
evident that the army of Corinth would soon make its appearance on our right
flank and rear. The trains and reserve artillery were therefore immediately
ordered on the Bone Yard road, and orders were sent to Armstrong and Jackson to
change their direction, and cover the front and flank of the trains until they
crossed the Hatchie, and then to cover them in front until they were on the
Ripley road. The enemy were then engaged beyond the Hatchie Bridge by small
fragments of Maury's Division as they could be hastened up, and were kept in
check sufficiently long to get everything off. General Ord commanded the forces
of the enemy, and succeeded in getting into position before any number of our
travel-worn troops could get into line of battle. It is not surprising,
therefore, that they were driven back across the bridge; but they maintained
their position on the hills overlooking it, under their gallant leader, General
Price, until orders were sent to fall back, and take up their line of march on
the Bone Yard road, in rear of the whole train. At one time, fearing that the
enemy, superior in numbers to the whole force I had in advance of the train,
would drive us back, I ordered General Lovell to leave one brigade to guard the
reserve to Tuscumbia Bridge, and to push forward with the other two to the
front. This order was quickly executed, and very soon the splendid bngades of
Rust and Villepigue made their appearance close at hand.
The army corps of General Price was withdrawn, and Villepigue filed in and
took position as rear-guard to the army against Ord's forces. Rust was ordered
forward to report to General Price, who was directed to cross the Hatchie at
Crumb's Mills and take position to cover the crossing of the teams and
artillery. Bowen was left at Tuscumbia Bridge, as rear-guard against the
advance of Rosecrans from Corinth, with orders to defend that bridge until the
trains were embarked and on the road; then to cross the bndge and burn it, and
to join Villepigue at the junction of the roads. In the execution of this
order, and while in position near the bridge, the head of the Corinth army made
its appearance and engaged him, but was repulsed with heavy loss, and in a
manner that reflected great credit on General Bowen and his brigade. The army
was not again molested on its retreat to Ripley, nor on its march to this
place. The following was found to be our loss in the several conflicts with the
enemy, and on the march to and from Corinth, viz.: killed, 594; wounded, 2,162;
prisoners and missing, 2,102. One piece of artillery was driven in the night by
a mistake into the enemy's lines and captured. Four pieces were taken at the
Hatchie Bndge, the horses being shot. Nine wagons were upset and abandoned by
the teamsters on the night's march to Crumb's Mills. Some baggage was thrown
out of the wagons, not amounting to any serious loss.
Two pieces of artillery were captured from the enemy at Corinth by Lovell's
Division, one of which was brought off. Five pieces were also taken by General
Pnce's Corps, two of which were brought off. Thus making a loss to us of only
two pieces. The enemy's loss in killed and wounded, by their own accounts, was
over 3,000. We took over three hundred prisoners; most of the pnsoners taken
from us were the stragglers from the army on the retreat.
The retreat from Corinth was not a rout, as it has been industriously
represented by the enemy, and by the cowardly deserters from the army. The
Division of General Lovell formed line of battle, facing the rear, on several
occasions, when it was reported the enemy was near; but not a gun was fired
after the army retired from the Hatchie and Tuscumbia bridges. Nor did the
enemy follow, except at a respectful distance. Although many officers and
soldiers, who distinguished themselves in the battle of Corinth and in the
affair of Hatchie Bridge, came unde my personal observation, I will not mention
them to the exclusion of others who may have been equally deserving, but who
did not fall under my own eye; I have deemed it best to call on the different
commanders to furnish me with a special report, and a list of the names of the
officers and soldiers of their respective commands who deserve special mention.
These lists and special reports I will take pleasure in forwarding, together
with one of my own, when completed; and I respectfully request that they be
appended as part of my report. I cannot refrain, however, from mentioning here
the conspicuous gallantry of a noble Texan, whose deeds at Corinth are the
constant theme of both friends and foes. As long as courage, manliness,
fortitude, patriotism, and honor exist, the name of Rogers will be revered and
honored among men. He fell in the front of the battle and died beneath the
colors of his regiment, in the very centre of the enemy's stronghold. He
sleeps, and glory is his sentence!
The attempt at Corinth has failed, and, in consequence, I am condemned, and
have been superseded in my command. In my zeal for my country I have ventured
too far with inadequate means, and I bow to the opinion of the people whom I
serve. Yet I feel, if the spirits of the gallant dead who now lie beneath the
batteries of Corinth could see and judge the motives of men, they do not rebuke
me, for there is no sting in my conscience. Nor does retrospection admonish me
of error, or of a disregard of their valued lives.
Very respectfully, sir, I am
Your obedient servant,
EARL VAN DORN,
Major-General.
REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL PRICE OF THE BATTLES OF CORINTH AND DAVIS'S BRIDGE
HEAD-QUARTERS, ARMY OF THE WEST,
Holly Springs, October 20th, 1862.
MAJOR:-I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of
this army connected with the several engagements at Corinth and Davis's bridge,
of the 3d, 4th, and 5th instants. Having arranged with Major-General Van Dorn
to unite my forces with his for active operations, I joined him at Ripley, on
the 27th ult. My force at this time consisted of effective infantry, 10,498;
effective cavalry, 2,437; effective artillery, 928 men, and forty-four guns,
including two 24-pounder howitzers, and four rifled pieces of three and
five-eighths caliber. The infantry was divided into two Divisions, commanded by
Brigadier-Generals Maury and Hebert. Maury's Division consisted of three
brigades, commanded by Brigadier-General Green and Colonels Martin Gates and
Colbert. The cavalry, except such companies as were on detached service, was
under command of Acting Brigadier-General Armstrong. The artillery was
appointed as follows: with Maury's Division, Hoxton's Battery, Lieutenant
Tobin, commanding; Bledsoe's Battery; McNally's Battery, Lieutenant Moore,
commanding; Lucas's Battery, and Songstack's Battery. Hoxton's and Brown's
Batteries, and Songstack's Battery were held as reserves, under command of
Lieutenant Burnett, Acting Chief of Artillery of the Division. With Hebert's
Division were Wade's, Landis's, Guibor's, Dawson's and King's. The cavalry
force under General Armstrong reported to the Major-General commanding the
combined forces, and afterward acted under direct orders from him.
On the morning of the 30th ultimo, we took up the line of march in the
direction of Pocahontas, which place we reached on the 1st instant, and from
which we moved on the enemy at Corinth, bivouacking on the night of the 2d
instant at a point nearly opposite to Chewalla, having left one regiment of
infantry and a section of artillery with the wagon-train as guard.
At 4 o'clock, on the morning of the 3d instant, we resumed the march, my
command moving on the main Pocahontas and Corinth road, in rear of General
Lovell's. At a point about a mile and a half from the enemy's outer line of
fortifications, my command made a detour to the left, with instructions to
occupy the ground between the Memphis and Charleston and Mobile and Ohio
Railroads. This done, my line-Maury occupying the right and Hebert the left,
with Coball's and Colbert's Brigades in reserve-fronted the enemy's work in a
south-easterly direction, the right resting upon the Memphis and Charleston
Railroad. While these dispositions were making, General Lovell engaged the
enemy upon our right. All being now ready for the attack, my line was ordered
forward at about 10 o'clock A.M. Almost simultaneously with the movement, the
opposed armies became engaged in desperate conflict along the whole extent of
my line. My command had scarcely cleared the position of its first formation,
when, entering an abattis of more than three hundred yards, it became unmasked
before a position naturally exceedingly formidable, and rendered trebly so by
the extent of felled timber through which it must be approached, and the most
approved and scientifically-constructed intrenchment, bristling with artillery
of large caliber, and supported by heavy lines of infantry. My troops charged
the enemy's position with the most determined courage, exposed to a murderous
fire of musketry and artillery. Without faltering, they pressed forward over
every obstacle, and, with shouts and cheers, carried, in less than twenty
minutes, the entire line of works-the enemy having fled, leaving in our hands
many prisoners and two pieces of artillery one a 4-inch Parrott gun, the other
a 24-pounder howitzer. Our loss in this attack was comparatively small. This is
attributable to the impetuosity with which the charge was made and the works
carried. It becomes my painful duty, in this connection, to revert to the
distinguished services of two gallant officers who fell in this
engagement-Colonel John D. Martin, commanding a brigade of Mississippians, and
Lieutenant Samuel Farrington, of Wade's Battery. Colonel Martin fell mortally
wounded while leading the charge against an angle in the enemy's works, exposed
to the fire of enfilading batteries. The gallant bearing of this officer on
more than one bloody field had won for him a place in the heart of every
Mississippian, and the admiration and confidence of his superior officers.
Lieutenant Farrington was struck and instantly killed by a shot from a rifled
gun, while bringing one of the guns of his battery into position. This gallant
soldier, and courteous and chivalric gentleman, forgetful of personal interest,
and mindful of the necessities of the service, resigned a lieutenant-colonelcy
in the service of his State for a lieutenancy in the Confederate service, and
gave up his life, a glorious sacrifice upon the altar of his country's honor,
in the seventh of the battles in which he has been conspicuous for cool,
determined, and effective bravery. Though young, his country mourns no more
valiant defender, his command no abler commander, his friends no worthier
recipient of their affections. The outer works being in our possession, my line
moved forward in pursuit of the retreating enemy until within one mile of
Corinth, where the enemy was encountered in position and in force. The
necessary dispositions being made, my whole line again moved forward to the
attack about 3 o'clock P.M. Here the fighting was of unparalleled fierceness
along the whole extent of my line. The position of the enemy along the whole
extent of his lines was covered by fencing, heavy timber, or underbrush, while
portions of my troops advanced through open fields exposed to a deadly fire of
batteries operating over the enemy's line of infantry. Here, as in the assault
upon the outer works, we had little artillery in action, it being impossible to
procure such positions for my batteries as would enable them to co-operate
effectively with the infantry. After continuous and most desperate fighting
along the whole extent of my line, of nearly two hours' duration, the enemy,
notwithstanding his lines had been trebled by reinforcements, was driven from
his position, and forced to take refuge in his innermost works in and around
the town.
The troops of my command, having nearly exhausted their ammunition in their
heavy fighting through the day, were withheld from immediate pursuit, and the
delay in procuring the necessary supply of ammunition forced me to close the
fight for the day. My troops were withdrawn for cover, and laid on their arms
during the night in the position from which the enemy had been driven.
About 4 o'clock on the morning of the 4th, three batteries of my command were
placed in position, and opened fire upon the town, under the immediate orders
of the Major-General commanding. About daylight, orders were received to
advance my whole line. In the execution of the order, a delay was occasioned by
the illness of Brigadier-General Hebert, commanding a division. He was
necessarily relieved from duty. The command devolved upon Brigadier-General
Green, who moved forward as soon as he could make the necessary disposition of
his troops. It was after 9 o'clock when my line became generally and furiously
engaged with the enemy in his innermost and most formidable works, from which
his infantry and artillery could jointly operate against my troops. Here, as in
the previous actions, my artillery could not be brought effectively into
action, and but few of the guns were engaged. The fighting, by my command, was
almost entirely confined to the infantry. My men pressed forward upon the
enemy, and, with heavy loss, succeeded in getting into the works, having driven
him from them, capturing more than forty pieces of artillery, and forcing him
to take refuge in the houses of the town, and in every place that could afford
protection from our galling fire. He was followed, and driven from house to
house, with great slaughter. In the town were batteries in mask, supported by
heavy reserves, behind which the retreating enemy took shelter, and which
opened on our troops a most destructive fire at short range. My men held their
positions most gallantly returning the fire of the enemy with great spirit,
until a portion of them exhausted their ammunition and were compelled to
retire. This necessitated the withdrawal of the whole line, which was done
under a withering fire. The attack was not resumed, and we fell back to our
supply-train, the men being almost exhausted from exertion and the want of food
and water. General Villepigue's Brigade moved over to our assistance, but did
not become engaged, as the enemy was too badly cut up to follow us. We fell
back, in order to obtain water, some six miles from Corinth, where we
bivouacked for the night, bringing off all our artillery and arms, save one
rifle-piece, which had been inadvertency driven into the enemy's line while
going into battle before daylight in the morning, and had been left. We brought
off, also, the two guns captured at the outer line of fortifications on the 3d.
It is impossible for me to do justice to the courage of my troops in these
engagements, nor can I discriminate between officers and commands where all
behaved so nobly. This is the less necessary, as the operations of my command
were under the immediate observation of the Major-General commanding. For the
minute details of the actions, especially of the artillery, of the 3d and 4th
instants, I beg leave to refer the Major-General commanding to the reports of
the commanding officers, herewith inclosed.
On the morning of the 5th instant we resumed the march in the direction of
Pocahontas, my command moving by division, Maury's in front, each in rear of
its ordnance and supply train, except Moore's Brigade, which constituted the
advance-guard. After crossing the Tuscumbia, Moore's Brigade was burned forward
to protect Davis's bridge across the Hatchie, which was threatened by an
advance of the enemy.
It being found that the enemy were in force, the remainder of Maury's Division
was ordered forward, and finally I was ordered to move up my whole command.
Moore's Brigade, with a section of the St. Louis Battery, and Songstack's
Battery, were thrown across the Hatchie, but the enemy having possession of the
heights commanding the crossing, as well as the position in which these troops
were placed, and it being found that he was in very heavy force, it was deemed
advisable to cross the Hatchie by another road, and these troops were
withdrawn, after serious loss, to the east side of the Hatchie, where, being
joined by Cabell's and Phiffer's Brigades, and assisted by the batteries of
McNally, Hogg, Landis, and Tobin, they effectually checked the advance of the
enemy. Green's Division, which had been delayed in passing the wagon train that
had been unparked near the Tuscumbia, arriving on the ground, was formed in
line of battle; but the enemy making no further effort to advance, the whole of
my command was moved off by another route, General Lovell's command being in
our rear.
This was our last engagement with the enemy. In this last engagement we lost
four guns by the killing of horses. Our whole train came off without
molestation or loss, except of a few wagons, that were broken down and had to
be abandoned.
The history of the war contains no bloodier page, perhaps, clan that which
will record this fiercely-contested battle. The strongest expressions fall
short of my admiration of the gallant conduct of the officers and men of my
command. Words cannot add luster to the fame they have acquired through deeds
of noble daring, which, living through future time, will shed about every man,
officer, and soldier, who stood to his arms through this struggle, a halo of
glory as imperishable as it is brilliant.
They have won to their sisters and daughters the distinguished honor set
before them by a General, of their love and admiration upon the event of an
impending battle, upon the same fields, of the proud exclamation, "My brother,
father, was at the great battle of Corinth!" The bloodiest record of this
battle is yet to come. The long list of the gallant dead upon this field will
carry sorrow to the hearth-stones of many a noble champion of our cause, as it
does to the hearths of those who are to avenge them. A nation mourns their
loss, while it cherishes the story of their glorious death, pointing out to
their associate officers in this mighty struggle for liberty the pathway to
victory and honor. They will live ever in the hearts of the admiring people of
the government, for the establishment of which they have given their lives. Of
the field officers killed were Colonels Rogers, Second Texas Infantry, who fell
in the heart of the town, of eleven wounds; Johnson, of Twentieth Arkansas, and
Daly, of Eighteenth Arkansas. Lieutenant-Colonels Maupin, First Missouri
Cavalry, dismounted, and Leigh, Forty-third Mississippi. Majors Vaughan, Sixth
Missouri Infantry, Doudell, Twenty-first Arkansas, and McDonald, Fortieth
Mississippi. Many of my ablest and most gallant field-officers are wounded,
several mortally. Of this number are Colonels Erwin, Sixth Missouri Infantry,
Moore, Forty-third Mississippi, and McLean, Thirty-seventh Mississippi;
Lieutenant-Colonels Pixley, Sixteenth Arkansas, Hedgespeth, Sixth Missouri
Infantry, Serrell, Seventh Mississippi Battalion, Lanier, Forty-second Alabama,
Hobson, Third Arkansas Cavalry, Mathews, Twenty-first Arkansas, Cambell,
Fortieth Mississippi, and Boone; and Majors Senteny, Second Missouri Infantry,
Keevir, Thirty-eighth Mississippi, Staton, Thirty-seventh Alabama, Timmins,
Second Texas, Jones, Twenty-first Arkansas, Russell, Third Louisiana, and Yates
and McQuiddy, Third Missouri Cavalry. For other casualties in officers and men,
I beg leave to refer to lists inclosed. I cannot close this report without
recognizing the eminent services and valuable assistance of Brigadier-Generals
Maury, Hebert (whose services I regret to have lost on the morning of the 4th
by reason of his illness), and Green, commanding divisions. I bear wiring
testimony to the admirable coolness, undaunted courage, and military skis of
these officers, in disposing their respective commands, and in executing their
orders. Through them I transmit to Brigadier-General Moore, and Acting
Brigadier-Generals Cabell, Phiffer, Gates, and Colbert my high appreciation of
their efficient services on the field.
Their skill in maneuvering their troops, and promptness and gallantry in
leading them through the most desperate conflicts, elicit my highest
admiration. And of my troops, as a body, I can say no juster or more
complimentary words than that they have sustained, and deepened, and widened
their reputation for exalted patriotism and determined valor. To my personal
staff I return my thanks for their promptness in the delivery of my orders, and
their gallant bearing on the field.
All of which is respectfully submitted.
STERLING PRICE, Major-General.
MAJOR M. M. KIMMALL,
Assistant Adjutant-General,
Army of West Tennessee.
THE BATTLE OF CORINTH October 3-4, 1862
We marched upon the Yankees and dared them out to fight.
When within three miles of Corinth, we formed a battle line.
We deployed out our skirmishers the enemy to find.
The bravely came out to meet us yet we feared them not at all;
For our officers told us that their force was very small.
General Van Dorn made the attack with fifteen thousand men;
While Price brought up the rear with eleven thousand strong.
The Yankees saw our movements and towards us made a dash.
Their cannon roared like thunder and the timber loud did crash.
Great clouds of dirt, fire, and smoke went curling up on high;
Yet onward was our order to victory or die.
We charged upon a regiment -- a band of daring boys,
And if I remember rightly, it was the Fiftieth Illinois.
They tried to drive us back, but they found it would not do
To make another charge on our gallant Southern crew.
But soon the Yankees broke and fled about a mile or more,
Leaving many of their dead and wounded weltering in their gore,
But soon they made a stand -- we saw them on a bridge
Preparing their light artillery for another cannon siege.
We charged upon them furiously which made the Yankees run.
We captured three hundred prisoners and two splendid parrot guns.
They fought most furiously their position to regain,
But our brave men pressed upon the, and in terror they fled again.
The fight did rage most furiously; the enemy was driven;
And the firing was incessant from five o'clock until eleven.
When the Yankees made a charge, our men kept falling back;
And once came near bagging them in one of Price's traps.
Like heavy claps of thunder the cannon loud did roar.
The underbrush around us was all stained with human gore.
Colonel Rogers cried out furiously with a loud and cheering yell
To charge upon the Yankees and drive them all to Hell.
We made a desperate charge the Yankees to out-flank,
And soon they did skedaddle down the steep railroad bank.
They crossed a small ravine where they made another stand;
But our boys did charge upon them and drove the Yankee band.
As the day rolled on the fighting continually gained ground.
We followed up the Yankees within one mile of town.
Darkness then prevented us from further advance that night,
While we got ourselves in readiness for another hard-day's fight.
It was early the next morning before the break of day.
We commenced again the conflict of terror and dismay.
Our cannon opened on the town with a most destructive fire
Which filled the Northern Yankees with almost revengeful ire.
They came down upon us and made a desperate plunge
Amidst our deathly fire and captured both our guns.
We charged upon them furiously with all our united strength,
Resolved to take Corinth or die in the attempt.
Our lines in great rapidity moved forward in a rush,
When the Yankees lay concealed behind the logs and brush.
The Yankees could not stand up and run like hunted dear
Before our noble Southerners who fallowed with a cheer.
From redoubt, ridge and ravine the Yankees' cannon blazed.
From eighteen to seventy pounders fell among our ranks like hail.
Our boys stood it bravely and onward was the cry,
But they could not stand the bombshells the Yankees did let fly.
A most destructive slaughter was never heard of yet
That was made among our ranks near Battery Robinett.
The ground was literally covered with noble men to the south,.
As we charged in solid masses before the cannon's mouth.
Three times we charged upon them with a loud and deafening yell;
And many brave and noble men among our number fell
Our gallant Colonel Rogers was a most determined man.
He fell while on their breastworks with our cherished flag in hand.
On our left was Colonel Johnson -- then acting Brigadier --
Who led the Mississippians the men that never fear.
He led the charge in person upon the enemy work,
And died a gallant hero whenere he reached the fort.
The Yankees made a desperate charge with great determination
And rushed upon our line and fought with desperation.
Great volleys of grape and canister mowed down our men like grass.
Together with the infantry who charged in solid mass.
Their force was all engaged in one bold and general attack
Upon our bleeding columns and quickly drove us back.
I then was taken prisoner with about five hundred more,
And surrendered to the Yankees which we had never done before.
There three days we were confined
When to Vicksburg we were sent.
Some Illinoisians did guard us -- the 57th Regiment.
They treated us most kindly with honesty and respect,
And their kind and friendly treatment I never shall forget.
The army retreated south until it reached Abbeville, Misssissippi. Here the
regiment camped between Tallahatchie and Abbeyville. On November 28, 1862 the
regiment broke camp and departed for Vicksburg. The Third Louisiana Regiment
reached Snyder's Bluff on January 2, 1863.