It was also believed that American privateers would speedily ruin British commerce and fisheries, and that, by sea and land expeditions, the people of the United States would be remunerated tenfold for all the spoliations inflicted on their commerce, and thus compel the British government to act justly and respectfully. 6

Randolph 7 then gave the Democrats some severe words concerning the adverse policy advocated by their party in 1798, when the Federal administration was preparing for a war with France. He taunted them with being preachers of reform and economy heretofore, but now, in their blind zeal to serve their French master, were willing to create a heavy national debt by rushing into an unnecessary and wicked war with a fraternal people – fraternal in blood, language, religion, laws, arts, and literature. 8

Randolph’s speech had but little effect upon his auditors other than to irritate the more sensitive and amuse the more philosophic. A few members, at the risk of poisoned arrows from his tongue, ventured to give him some home thrusts, while Calhoun, then less than thirty years of age, made this the occasion of his first oratorical effort in that great theatre of legislative strife wherein he so long and so valiantly contested. 9 With that dexterous use of subtle logic which never failed to give him ingenious arguments in favor of any views he might desire to enforce, he replied to Randolph at some length, insisting that it was a principle as applicable to nations as to individuals to repel a first insult, and thus command the respect, if not the fear of the assailant. "Sir," he said, "I might prove the war, should it ensue, justifiable by the express admission of the gentleman from Virginia; and necessary, by facts undoubted and universally admitted, such as that gentleman did not pretend to controvert. The extent, duration, and character of the injuries received; the failure of those peaceful means heretofore resorted to for the redress of our wrongs, is my proof that it is necessary. Why should I mention the impressment of our seamen; depredation on every branch of our commerce, including the direct export trade, continued for years, and made under laws which professedly undertake to regulate our trade with other nations; 10 negotiation resorted to time after time till it became hopeless; the restrictive systems persisted in to avoid war and in the vain expectation of returning justice? The evil still grows, and in each succeeding year swells in extent and pretension beyond the preceding. The question, even in the opinion and admission of our opponents, is reduced to this single point, Which shall we do, abandon or defend our own commercial and maritime rights, and the personal liberties of our citizens in exercising them? These rights are essentially attacked, and war is the only means of redress. The gentleman from Virginia has suggested none, unless we consider the whole of his speech as recommending patient and resigned submission as the best remedy. Sir, which alternative this house ought to sustain is not for me to say. I hope the decision is made already by a higher authority than the voice of any man. It is not for the human tongue to instill the sense of independence and honor. This is the work of nature – a generous nature that disdains tame submission to wrongs. This part of the subject is so imposing as to enforce silence even on the gentleman from Virginia. He dared not deny his country’s wrongs, or vindicate the conduct of her enemy."

In this dignified strain Mr. Calhoun charmed his listeners, steadying the vacillating, convincing the doubting, and commanding the respectful attention of the opponents of the resolutions. He treated Randolph’s bugbear of slave insurrection with lofty contempt. "However the gentleman may frighten himself" he said, "with the disorganizing effects of French principles, I can not think our ignorant blacks have felt much of their baleful influence. I dare say more than one half of them never heard of the French Revolution." 11

The Federalists said very little on this occasion. It had always been their policy to be prepared for war. The resolutions appended to the report of the Committee on Foreign Relations were adopted [December 16, 1811.], and bills were speedily prepared and passed for augmenting the army. Additional regulars to the number of twenty-five thousand were authorized by a vote of the House early in January [January 4, 1812.]. The bill also provided for the appointment of two major generals and five additional brigadiers; also for a bounty to new recruits of sixteen dollars, and, at the time of discharge, three months’ extra pay and a certificate for one hundred and sixty acres of land. 12 On the 14th of the month another act was passed, appropriating a million of dollars for the purchase of arms, ordnance, camp equipage, and quarter-master’s stores; and four hundred thousand dollars for powder, ordnance, and small-arms for the navy. Thus, in a brief space of time, the little army of the peace establishment, which had been comparatively inactive, was swelled in prospective from about three thousand men to more than seventy thousand regulars and volunteers. The President was authorized to call upon the governors of states each to furnish his respective quota of one hundred thousand militia, to be held in readiness to instantly obey the call of the chief magistrate. For the expense of this reserve one million of dollars were appropriated.

The navy, important as it proved to be in the war that followed, was neglected. Cheves, of South Carolina, made a report in favor of its augmentation; and he and Lowndes, in supporting speeches, hinted at the expediency of constructing forty frigates and twenty-five ships of the line. It was urged by these members, in direct opposition to the narrow views of Williams from the same state a year before, that "protection to commerce was protection to agriculture." Quincy also argued that protection to commerce was essential to the preservation of the Union, and, with a covert but significant threat, he gave as a reason that the commercial states could not be expected to submit to the deliberate and systematic sacrifice of their most important interests. 13 Their pleas were in vain. A bill, containing only an appropriation of four hundred and eighty thousand dollars for repairing three frigates – Constellation, Chesapeake, and Adams – and two hundred thousand dollars annually for three years, to purchase timber for the purpose of refitting three others, was passed, and sent to the Senate, where Lloyd, of Massachusetts, moved to insert an appropriation for thirty new frigates [January 17, 1812.]. "Let us have the frigates," he said; "powerful as Great Britain is, she could not blockade them. With our hazardous shores and tempestuous northwesterly gales from November to March, all the navies in the world could not blockade them. Divide them into six squadrons. Place those squadrons in the northern ports ready for sea, and at favorable moments we would pounce upon her West India Islands, repeating the game of De Grasse and D’Estaing in ’79 and ’80. By the time she was ready to meet us there, we would be round Cape Horn cutting up her whalemen. Pursued thither, we would skim away to the Indian Seas, and would give an account of her China and India ships very different from that of the French cruisers. Now we would follow her Quebec, now her Jamaica convoys; sometimes make our appearance in the chops of the Channel, and even sometimes wind north almost into the Baltic. It would require a hundred British frigates to watch the movements of these thirty. Such are the means by which I would bring Great Britain to her senses. By harassing her commerce with this fleet, we could make the people ask the government why they continued to violate our rights."

In this state of things, Mr. Madison was waited upon [March 2, 1812.] by several of the leading Democratic members of Congress, and informed, in substance, that war with England was now resolved upon by the dominant party, the supporters of his administration; that the people would no longer consent to a dilatory and inefficient course on the part of the national government; that, unless a declaration of war took place previous to the Presidential election, the success of the Democratic party might be endangered, and the government thrown into the hands of the Federalists; that, unless Mr. Madison consented to act with his friends, and accede to a declaration of war with Great Britain, neither his nomination nor his re-election to the Presidency could be relied on. Thus situated, Mr. Madison concluded to waive his own objections to the course determined on by his political friends, and to do all he could for the prosecution of a war for which he had neither taste nor practical ability. 14

Mr. Madison’s first step in the prescribed direction after this interview was in the form of a confidential message to Congress on the 1st of April, recommending, as preliminary to a declaration of war, the immediate passage of a law laying a general embargo on all vessels then in the ports of the United States, or that might thereafter enter, for the period of sixty days. Meanwhile another subject had produced very great excitement throughout the country. An Irishman, named John Henry, who had become a naturalized citizen of the United States, and had lived several years in Canada, appeared at the Presidential mansion one dark and stormy evening early in February [February 2.], 1812. He bore a letter of introduction to Mr. Madison from Governor Gerry, of Massachusetts, who seemed to be impressed with the truthfulness of Henry, and the great importance of the information which he proposed to lay before the President. 15 An interview was arranged for the following evening, when Henry divulged to the President what appeared to be most astounding secrets concerning efforts that had been in progress for two years on the part of the British authorities in Canada, sanctioned by the home government, to effect a separation of the Eastern States from the Union, and to attach them to Great Britain. He told Mr. Madison that, up to the year 1809, he had been living for five years on his farm in Vermont, near the Canada line, and amused himself in writing essays for the newspapers against republican governments, which he detested.

Those essays, he said, had arrested the attention of Sir James Craig, then Governor General of Canada, who invited him to Montreal at the close of 1808. At that time the violent demonstrations of the Federalists in New England against the embargo induced the English to believe that there was deep-seated disaffection to the government of the United States on the part of the people of that section. Under that impression Henry was commissioned by Sir James Craig to proceed to Boston, and ascertain the true state of affairs there, and the temper of the people in that part of the Union. His instructions directed him especially to ascertain whether the Federalists of Massachusetts would, in the event of their success at the approaching election, be disposed to separate from the Union, or enter into any connection with England. "The earliest information on this subject," said Sir James, "may be of great consequence to our government; as it may also be, that it should be informed how far, in such an event, they would look to England for assistance, or be disposed to enter into a connection with us." 16 Henry was authorized to intimate to the Federalist leaders, if the supposed state of things should be found to exist, that they might communicate to the British government through him. 17

According to Henry’s statement, he passed through Vermont after receiving these instructions, and arrived at Boston on the 5th of March. There he remained about three months, spending his time in coffee-houses and disreputable places, until Erskine’s arrangement and a recall by Ryland [May 4, 1809.], Craig’s Secretary, put an end to his mission. During that time Henry had addressed fourteen letters to Sir James over the initials "A. B.," most of them written at Boston. The earlier ones were filled with the most encouraging accounts of the extreme disaffection of the Eastern people, especially those of Massachusetts, on account of the commercial restrictions. He expressed his belief that, in the event of a declaration of war against Great Britain by the United States, the Legislature of Massachusetts would take the lead in establishing a separate Northern Confederacy, which might, in some way, end in a political connection with Great Britain. The grand idea of destroying the Union was the theme of all the letters, expressed or implied. "If a war between America and France," he wrote, "be a grand desideratum, something more must be done; an indulgent, conciliating policy must be adopted. . . . To bring about a separation of the states under distinct and independent governments is an affair of more uncertainty, and, however desirable, can not be effected but by a series of acts and long-continued policy tending to irritate the Southern and conciliate the Northern people. . . . This, I am aware, is an object of much interest in Great Britain, as it would forever insure the integrity of his majesty’s possessions on this continent, and make the two governments, or whatever member the present confederacy might join with, as useful and as much subject to the influence of Great Britain as her colonies can be rendered." 18

Henry’s performances seem to have pleased Sir James Craig, who promised him employment in Canada worth at least a thousand pounds ($5000) per annum. Henry waited long for the fulfillment of that promise, and finally Sir James died. In June, 1811, the British spy was in London humbly petitioning the government for remuneration for his services in Boston. There he was at first treated with great consideration by the government. "I was received in the highest circles," he said to his friend, the Count Edward de Crillon. "I was complimented with a ticket as member of the PITT CLUB without being balloted for." 19 But when he had spent all his money, and presented his claims for retribution, the government attempted to cheapen his services. He claimed thirty thousand pounds, but speedily lowered his demands. He would be content, he said, with the office of Judge Advocate of Lower Canada, with a salary of five hundred pounds a year, or a consulate in the United States. Robert Peel, the Earl of Liverpool’s under secretary, in behalf of that official, politely referred Henry to Sir James Craig’s successor in Canada, Sir George Prevost. The spy was exasperated, and sailed for Boston instead of for Quebec, full of wrath, and a determination to be revenged by divulging the whole secret of his mission to the United States government, and, if possible, receive from it the remuneration which he had vainly sought in England. He was successful. Mr. Madison was satisfied of the great value of Henry’s disclosures at that crisis, when war against England was about to be declared. They gave overwhelming proof of the secret designs of the British government to destroy the new republic in the West. Out of the secret service fund in his possession he gave Henry fifty thousand dollars for the entire correspondence of the parties to the affair in this country and in England.

After receiving the money 20 Henry went to Philadelphia, where he wrote a letter to the President [February 20, 1812.] as a preface to his disclosures. On the 9th of March the United States sloop-of-war Wasp, Captain Jones, sailed from Sandy Hook with dispatches for Mr. Barlow, the American minister at Paris, bearing away Henry to sunny France, where he would be safe from British vengeance. On the same day the President laid the Henry documents 21 before Congress, with a message, in which he said, "They prove that at a recent period, while the United States, notwithstanding the wrongs sustained by them, ceased not to observe the laws of neutrality toward Great Britain, and in the midst of amicable professions and negotiations on the part of the British government through its public minister here [Mr. Erskine], a secret agent of that government was employed in certain states – more especially at the seat of government in Massachusetts – in fomenting disaffection to the constituted authorities of the nation, and in intrigues with the disaffected for the purpose of bringing about resistance to the laws, and eventually, in concert with a British force, of destroying the Union, and forming the eastern part thereof into a political connection with Great Britain."

The indignation against Great Britain was intensified by these disclosures, and the inhabitants of New England felt deeply annoyed by this implied disparagement of the patriotism of their section. Both political parties endeavored to make capital out of the affair. The Democrats vehemently reiterated the charge that the Federalists were a "British party," and "disunionists;" 22 while the opposition alleged that the affair was a political trick of the administration to damage their party, insure the re-election of Madison, and to offer an excuse for war. The feeling excited in New England against the administration was intense, and the indignation of the people was almost equally divided between the President and the British sovereign. It was charged that the whole matter was a fraud; that Monroe wrote the letter purporting to have been sent by Henry from Philadelphia to the government, and that the paper on which Lord Liverpool’s communication to Henry, through Robert Peel, was written, bore the mark of a Philadelphia paper manufacturer.

These charges were all untrue. Every thing about the matter was genuine. The British minister at Washington (Mr. Foster), two days after the President’s message was published, declared in the public prints [March 11, 1812.] his entire ignorance of any transaction of the kind, and asked the United States government to consider the character of the individual 23 who had made these disclosures, and to "suspend any farther judgment on its merits until the circumstances shall have been made known to his majesty’s government." That government was called upon for an explanation, early in May, by Lord Holland, who gave notice [May 5.] that he should make a motion to call for the correspondence in relation to the intrigue. Ministers were alarmed, and their guilt was apparent in their efforts to suppress inquiry. Every pretext was brought to bear to oppose the motion. When they could no longer deny the facts, they endeavored to throw the obloquy of the act upon the dead Sir James Craig. The ministerial party in the House of Lords, when the motion was made, prevailed, and, by a vote of seventy-three against twenty-seven, refused to have the correspondence produced. Lord Holland declared in his closing speech that, until such investigation should be had, the fact that Great Britain had entered into a dishonorable and atrocious intrigue against a friendly power would stand unrefuted. And it does stand unrefuted to this day. It was so palpable, that Madison, in his war message on the 1st of June, made this intrigue one of the serious charges against Great Britain as justifying war.

The President, as we have observed, sent a confidential message to Congress on the 1st of April, recommending the laying of an embargo for sixty days. It was avowedly a precursor of war; and Mr. Calhoun immediately presented a bill in Committee of the Whole in accordance with the recommendation. 24 The opposition sounded an alarm. The weakness of the country, and its utter want of preparation for war, became the themes of impassioned appeals to the fears of the people. The continued aggressions of France – equal, they said, to those of England 25 – were pointed to as causes for war with that nation, and it might be necessary to encounter both at the same time.

To these alarmists Clay vehemently responded. He charged them with having cast obstacles in the way of preparation, and now made that lack of preparation an excuse for longer submission to great wrongs. Weak as we are, he said, we could fight France too, if necessary, in a good cause – the cause of honor and independence. He had no doubt that the late Indian war on the Wabash had been excited by the British; 26 and he alluded to the employment of Henry, as a spy and fomentor of disunion, as another gross offense. "We have complete proof" he said, "that England would do every thing to destroy us. Resolution and spirit are our only security." He viewed the Embargo as a war measure, and "war we shall have in sixty days," he said.

Other remarks were heard from both sides. The bill, by the aid of the previous question, was passed that evening [April 1, 1812.] by a vote of seventy against forty-one. It was sent to the Senate the next morning. That body suspended the rules, took up the bill, and carried it through all the stages but the last, with an amendment increasing the time to ninety days. It was sent back to the House the next morning [April 3.], where it was concurred in, and on Saturday, the 4th of April, it became a law by the signature of the President. It had been violently assailed by Quincy, when it came back from the Senate, as an attempt to escape war, not as a preliminary to it. It was absurd to think of creating a sufficient army and navy in ninety days to commence war. He coincided with Randolph in the belief that the Embargo was only intended to aid Bonaparte, by stopping the shipment of provisions to Spain, where the British armies were then beginning to win victories. 27 It was called, in ridicule, "a Terrapin War." 28

The Embargo Act (which prohibited the sailing of any vessel for any foreign port, except foreign vessels, with such cargoes as they had on board when notified of the act) was speedily followed by a supplement [April 14, 1812.] prohibiting exportations by land, whether of goods or specie. 29 Farther provision was also made for the immediate strengthening of the army.

These belligerent measures were hailed with joy throughout the country by the war party, who were dominant and determined. They alarmed those who wished for peace; yet these, unwilling to believe that the administration would push matters to the extreme of actual hostility, acquiesced in the embargo because of a delusive hope that it might be the means of causing Great Britain to modify its system concerning neutrals, and thereby avert war. It was, indeed, a delusive hope. The letters of Jonathan Russell (who had succeeded Mr. Pinkney as minister to England) at this time gave no encouragement for it. On the contrary, they were discouraging. To Mr. Monroe he wrote, after attending discussions on the orders in Council in Parliament: "If any thing was wanting to prove the inflexible determination of the present ministry to persevere in the orders in Council, without modification or relaxation, the declarations of leading members of the administration on these measures must place it beyond the possibility of a doubt. I no longer entertain a hope that we can honorably avoid war." 30

George Clinton, the Vice-President, whom they had intended to nominate for re-election, had died a few weeks before, 31 and the aged Elbridge Gerry, lately defeated as a candidate for re-election to the governorship of Massachusetts, was placed on the ticket for Vice-President. This matter disposed of, and the continued claims of De Witt Clinton, of New York, to a nomination for President being considered as of little moment, the war party, led by Clay and Calhoun, put forth vigorous exertions for the full accomplishment of their purposes.

In his message to Congress on the 1st of June the President recapitulated the wrongs which the people of the United States had suffered at the hands of Great Britain – wrongs already noticed in preceding pages, and need not be repeated here. He declared that her conduct, taken together, was positively belligerent. "We behold in fine," he said, "on the side of Great Britain, a state of war against the United States, and on the side of the United States a state of peace toward Great Britain." 32 He warned his countrymen to avoid entanglements "in the contests and views of other powers" – meaning France – and called their attention to the fact that the French government, since the revocation of her decrees as applied to American commerce, had authorized illegal captures by her privateers; but he abstained at that time from offering any suggestions concerning definitive measures with respect to that nation.

The message was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, 33 and on the 3d of June Mr. Calhoun, its then chairman, presented a report, in which the causes and reasons for war were more fully stated – more in historical order and detail – than in the President’s message. In concluding the review of British aggressions, the report declared that the hostility of the government of Great Britain was evidently based on the fact that the United States were considered by it as its commercial rival, and that their prosperity and growth were incompatible with its welfare. "Your committee," said the report, "will not enlarge on any of the injuries, however great, which have a transitory effect. They wish to call the attention of the House to those of a permanent nature only, which intrench so deeply on our most important rights, and wound so extensively and vitally our best interests, as could not fail to deprive the United States of the principal advantages of their Revolution, if submitted to. The control of our commerce by Great Britain, in regulating at pleasure and expelling it almost from the ocean; the oppressive manner in which these regulations have been carried into effect, by seizing and confiscating such of our vessels, with their cargoes, as were said to have violated her edicts, often without previous warning of their danger; the impressment of our citizens from on board our own vessels on the high seas and elsewhere, and holding them in bondage till it suited the convenience of their oppressors to deliver them up, are encroachments of that high and dangerous tendency which could not fail to produce that pernicious effect; nor would these be the only consequences that would result from it. The British government might, for a while, be satisfied with the ascendency thus gained over us, but its pretensions would soon increase. The proof which so complete and disgraceful a submission to its authority would afford of our degeneracy, could not fail to inspire confidence that there was no limit to which its usurpations and our degradation might not be carried."

When the bill reached the Senate [June 5, 1812.] it was referred to a committee already appointed to consider the President’s message. It remained under discussion twelve days. Meanwhile the people throughout the country were fearfully excited by conflicting emotions. A memorial against the war went from the Legislature of Massachusetts; and another from the merchants of New York, led by John Jacob Astor, recommending restrictive measures as better than war. War-meetings were held in various places, and the whole country was in a tumult of excitement. Finally, on the 17th of June – the anniversary of the battle of Bunker Hill – the bill, with some amendments, was passed by a vote of nineteen against thirteen. It was sent back to the house on the morning of the 18th, where the amendments were concurred in. The bill was engrossed on parchment, and at three o’clock on the afternoon of that day became a law by the signature of the President. 34 In the House, the members from Pennsylvania, and the states South and West, gave sixty-two votes for it to seventeen against it. In the Senate the same states gave fourteen for it to five against it. "Thus," says a late writer, "the war may be said to have been a measure of the South and West to take care of the interests of the North, much against the will of the latter," 35

This was soon followed by an able protest against the measure. It was chiefly written by Mr. Quincy, who then stood at the head of the opposition, not only in Congress, but throughout the country. The prestige of his father’s name as a leading patriot of the Revolution; his own long services in the National Legislature; his family connections and influence; his sterling worth in private life; his withering sarcasm of tongue and pen; his fluency of speech in declamation or debate, and his handsome and commanding presence, all combined to make him peerless as a leader. He was consequently assailed with the greatest bitterness by the friends of the administration; and squibs, and epigrams, and caricatures 36 frequently attested the general acknowledgment of his commanding position. Mr. Quincy outlived all of his contemporaries. Not one of the members of the Twelfth Congress – the Congress that declared war against Great Britain in 1812 – was living at the time of his death. He was born with the nation, whose full independence was only achieved at the close of that war, and lived to see it, in sturdy maturity, not only resist a most dangerous internal and inherited disease that threatened to destroy its life, but to rise from the attack purified and strengthened, with every promise of long and vigorous existence impressed upon every fibre of its being. 37

Mr. Quincy, it has been observed, wrote the most of the minority’s protest against the war. He was aided by Mr. Bayard, of Delaware, and some suggestions were made by others. It was signed by all the minority members of the House of Representatives, and was issued in the form of an address to their constituents, in which their conduct in voting against the war was vindicated. 38 They set forth perspicuously the state of the country, and the course of the administration and its supporters in Congress. They professed to believe that a war with Great Britain would necessarily lead to a political connection with France, then waging bitter hostilities against her – a connection which would be extremely hazardous to the liberties of the United States. They professed to regard France as the greater aggressor of the two, and looked upon her commerce as not worth contending for. Notwithstanding the French edicts, a profitable trade might be carried on with England, for France had not the power to enforce their edicts to a very great extent. Indeed, a large portion of the world where American commerce might be made profitable was not affected by the actions of either of the belligerents. They would, therefore, authorize the American merchantmen to arm in their own defense, become their own protectors, and go wherever they chose to risk themselves. As to the invasion and seizure of Canada, which was a part of the programme of the war party, they considered an attempt to carry out that measure as unjust and impolitic in itself; very uncertain in the issue, and unpromising as to any good results. They pointed to the unprepared state of the country as vehemently forbidding a declaration of war. "With a navy comparatively nominal, we are about to enter into the lists against the greatest marine on the globe. With a commerce unprotected and spread over every ocean, we propose to make profit by privateering, and for this endanger the wealth of which we are honest proprietors. An invasion is threatened of the colonies of a power which, without putting a new ship into commission, or taking another soldier into pay, can spread alarm or desolation along the extensive range of our seaboard. Before adequate fortifications are prepared for domestic defense, before men or money are provided for a war of attack, why hasten into the midst of this awful contest, which is laying waste Europe? It can not be concealed that to engage in the present war against England is to place ourselves on the side of France, and expose us to the vassalage of states serving under the banners of the French emperor."

"What are the United States to gain by this war?" they asked. "Will the gratification of some privateersmen compensate the nation for that sweep of our legitimate commerce by the extended marine of our enemy which this desperate act invites? Will Canada compensate the Middle States for New York, or the Western States for New Orleans? Let us not be deceived. A war of invasion may invite a retort of invasion. When we visit the peaceable, and, as to us, innocent colonies of Great Britain 39 with the horrors of war, can we be assured that our own coast will not be visited with like horrors? At a crisis of the world, such as the present, and under impressions such as these, the undersigned can not consider the war into which the United States have in secret been precipitated as necessary, or required by any moral or political expediency."

Having resolved on war, the next important labor for Congress to perform was making adequate provisions for prosecuting it. One of the most important considerations was finance, for money has been justly styled the "sinews of war." In February [February 17, 1812.] the Committee of Ways and Means reported a system of finance adapted to a state of war for three years. Its chief features contemplated the support of war expenses wholly by loans; and the ordinary expenses of the government, including the interest on the national debt, by revenues. They estimated the war expenses at $11,000,000 for the first year. Aware that a state of war would diminish the revenue, they proposed a tariff by which the imposts should be doubled, foreign tonnage raised to a dollar and a half; a direct tax of $3,000,000, and an extensive system of internal duties and excise. 40 Congress adopted this financial scheme generally, and authorized [March 14, 1812.] a loan of $11,000,000, at an interest not exceeding six per cent. a year, and reimbursable in twelve years. The Secretary of the Treasury directed subscriptions to be opened at the principal banks in the United States on the first and second days of May [1812.]; and, to induce the banks to subscribe, it was agreed that their subscriptions should remain as deposits until called for by the wants of the Treasury.

When war was declared, it was found, by the returns of the subscriptions to the $11,000,000 loan, that the banks had subscribed only $4,190,000, and individuals $1,928,000, leaving a deficiency of $4,882,000. To supply that deficiency, the President was authorized to issue Treasury notes, payable in one year, and bearing an annual interest of five and two fifths per cent., to be receivable in all payments at the Treasury. This was intended to pass as currency, and supersede, to a certain extent, the circulation of bank-notes. It was estimated that the entire expenses of the country for the fiscal year of 1812-’13, including the $11,000,000 for war purposes, and the interest on $45,154,000 (the amount of the public debt), would be $26,616,619. 41

Congress adjourned on the 6th of July. They had requested the President to recommend a day of public humiliation and prayer to be observed by the people of the United States for the purpose of publicly invoking the blessing of the Almighty on their cause, and the speedy restoration of peace. In accordance with this request, the President issued a proclamation on the 9th of July, recommending the setting apart of the third Thursday of August following [August 20.] for that purpose. That day was generally observed throughout the Union; in most places in accordance with the spirit of the Congressional resolutions and the proclamation of the President, while from several New England pulpits went forth denunciations of the war, and the alleged authors and abettors of it. 42 The national anniversary that year was also made the occasion for political speeches, songs, and toasts condemnatory of the measures of the administration. Some of these were fierce, others were mild, and still others were dignified and patriotic – firm, outspoken, manly arguments against the necessity, the wisdom, or the justice of the war, but evincing a love of country more potent than love of party or opinions. 43

Stuart’s monstrous figure of the Gerry-mander was presented upon a broadside containing a natural and political history of the animal, and hawked about the country. From one of these before me, kindly placed in my possession by the late Edward Everett, I copied the picture given in this note, which is about one half the size of the original.

Mr. Clay was then thirty-four years of age, and this was his first appearance as a member in the House of Representatives. He was in the Senate previously, as we have observed. The portrait given on the previous page is from a painting from life by the late Mr. Ranney, when Mr. Clay was nearly sixty years of age.

9 John Caldwell Calhoun was born in Abbeville District, South Carolina, on the 18th of March, 1782. His mother was a native of Virginia. He entered Yale College as a student in 1802, where he was marked as a young man of genius and great promise. He was graduated in 1804 with the highest honors of the institution. He studied law in Litchfield, Connecticut, and entered upon its practice in his native district. He was elected to a seat in the Legislature of South Carolina in 1808, and in 1811 he took his seat as member of the National Congress as a stanch Republican or Democrat. He ably supported Mr. Madison’s administration, and in 1817 President Monroe called him to his Cabinet as Secretary of War. He was elected Vice-President of the United States in 1825, and was re-elected with Jackson in 1828. He succeeded Hayne in the Senate of the United States in 1831, and became the leader in the disloyal movement of his native state known in history under the general title of Nullification, in 1832-’33. President Tyler called him to his Cabinet as Secretary of State in 1843, and he again entered the Senate as the representative of his state in 1845. He held that position until his death, which occurred at Washington City on the 31st of March, 1850, when he was just past sixty-eight years of age. Our portrait of Mr. Calhoun, on the next page, is from one taken from life about the year 1830, when he was forty-eight years of age.

10 See page 165.

The position taken by these leading Federalists at that critical time, in opposition to the great body of their colleagues in Congress and of the party in New England, was patriotic in the highest degree, and yet, so doubtful were they of the verdict which posterity might pass upon their actions, that two of them (Quincy and Emott) prepared quite an elaborate defense, in which the reasons for their course were ably set forth. It was drawn up by Emott, slightly amended by Quincy, and signed by both. It was left in Emott’s hands, to be used at any future time by him or his descendants in vindication of their course. Posterity – even contemporaries – have pronounced their course wise and patriotic. The original manuscript, in the possession of the Hon. James Emott, of Poughkeepsie, New York, a son of one of the signers, is before me while I write. It is in the delicate and neat handwriting of the elder Emott, * and dated January 1, 1812. After clearly stating the position of public affairs, they say: "We thought it therefore worthy of an experiment to allow the administration to make out their case before the great bar of the public without, as heretofore, aiding it by an early opposition; and we hoped, and yet hope, that by withdrawing the aliment of party rancor it will cease to exist, and that the people will see the precipice to which they have been drawn, and the danger which awaits the country unless there is a speedy and radical change of men or measures. . . . By leaving the government in the first instance unmolested, in its measures the people may receive a distinct impression of its objects. If they are really of that high and commanding character as to effectuate what their friends promised, relief to our country, it is of little consequence from whose hands so desirable a blessing is received. But if the character of the plans of the administration continues time-serving, self-oppressive, and hypocritical, on it and its supporters would fall the responsibility, without the possibility of transferring it to those who had neither shared nor opposed their purposes."

28 See note 3, page 164. Argument, ridicule, satire were all employed against the "Terrapin War." During the late spring and early summer of 1812, the subjoined song was sung at all gatherings of the Federalists, and was very popular: