Part of the
Acorn Archive
Hearts of Oak
Convoy PQ18
The Merchant Ships of Convoy PQ18
Russia
ANDRE MARTI 2,352 tons; built 1918
KOMILES
3,962 tons; built 1932
PETROVSKI 3,771 tons; built 1921
STALINGRAD 3,559 tons; built 1931
SUKAHONA 3,214 tons; built 1918
TBILISI
7,169 tons; built 1912
Panama
AFRICANDER 5,441 tons; built 1921
MACBETH
4,935 tons; built 1920
WHITE CLOVER 5,462 tons; built 1920
USA
CAMPFIRE 5,671 tons; built 1919
ESEK HOPKINS 7,191 tons; built 1942
EXFORD
4,969 tons; built 1919
HOLLYWOOD 5,498 tons; built 1920
JOHN PENN 7,177 tons; built 1942
KENTUCKY 5,446 tons; built 1921
LAFAYETTE 5,887 tons; built 1919
MARY LUCKENBACH 5,049 tons; built 1919
MEANTICUT 6,061 tons; built 1921
NATHANIEL GREENE 7,177 tons; built 1942
OLIVER ELLSWORTH 7,191 tons; built 1942
OREGONIAN 4,862 tons; built 1917
PATRICK HENRY 7,191 tons; built 1942
SAHALE
5,028 tons; built 1919
ST. OLAF 7,191 tons; built 1942
SCHOHARIE 4,971 tons; built 1919
VIRGINIA DARE 7,176 tons; built 1942
WACOSTA
5,432 tons; built 1920
WILLIAM MOULTRIE 7,177 tons; built 1942
Britain
ATHELTEMPLAR 8,992 tons; built 1930
BLACK RANGER 3,417 tons; built 1941
CHARLES R. MCCORMICK 6,027 tons; built 1920
COPELAND 1,526 tons; built 1923
DAN-Y-BRYN 5,117 tons; built 1940
EMPIRE BAFFIN 6,978 tons; built 1941
EMPIRE BEAUMONT 7,044 tons; built 1942
EMPIRE MORN 7,092 tons; built 1941
EMPIRE SNOW 6,327 tons; built 1941
EMPIRE STEVENSON 6,209 tons; built 1941
EMPIRE TRISTRAM 7,167 tons; built 1942
GOOLISTAN 5,851 tons; built 1929
GRAY RANGER 3,313 tons; built 1941
OCEAN FAITH 7,173 tons; built 1942
OLIGARCH 6,894 tons; built 1918
TEMPLE
ARCH 5,138 tons; built 1940
Convoy PQ18
In order to reduce, as far as possible,
the duration of the operation for the destroyer covering force and the escort
of PQ18, the convoy was brought, from Loch Ewe to the Denmark Strait, by a
separate escort from the Western Approaches Command, the permanent escort
starting from Icelandic ports.
It was necessary to hold three
conferences, one at Loch Ewe for the convoy and others at Hvalfjord and
Seidisfjord for the escort and covering forces. These were conducted in
succession by Rear Admiral Commanding, Home Fleet Destroyers.
The convoy sailed from Loch Ewe on 2nd
September and immediately met foul weather. It arrived off Skagi on 7th
September, 36 hours astern of station, and was there joined by the ocean escort
of three destroyers, four corvettes, two anti-aircraft ships and four trawlers.
Apart from the weather, and two U-boat contacts, the passage so far had been
uneventful.
The weather improved on 8th
September and the convoy was joined the next morning by Rear Admiral
Commanding, Home Fleet Destroyers, in the SCYLLA, eight destroyers, the AVENGER,
two Hunt class destroyers to escort her, three minesweepers and two submarines,
all from Seidisfjord. The other eight destroyers of the covering force were
sailed direct from Akureyri to refuel at Lowe Sound, Spitzbergen. The oilers
OLIGARCH and BLUE RANGER, escorted by four destroyers, had sailed from Scapa
for Lowe Sound on 3rd September.
Besides the two submarines which formed
part of the close escort, four were disposed off the Northern Lofoten Islands
in an attempt to intercept the German surface ships if they moved north, and
three off the north coast in the usual covering positions. The SCHEER, HIPPER
and KŐLN moved up from Narvik to Altenfjord on 10th September.
They were sighted by all four submarines on the coastal patrols, TIGRIS,
TRIBUNE, UREDD and P-54; but the TIGRIS alone was close enough to fire
torpedoes; her attack was spoilt by one of the screening destroyers, which
almost rammed her just before she fired, and the torpedoes missed astern. After
this, the four inshore submarines were moved up to join the covering patrol off
the north coast.
The convoy was first sighted by an enemy
aircraft late on 8th September, but was not shadowed until 12th
September. This immunity was due to clouds and low visibility; U-boats were in
contact and shadowing from 10th September onwards. It did prevent
the early and comparatively small scale attacks which had been directed against
previous convoys; and thus had the unexpected and unfortunate result of
depriving the guns and fighters of the practice and experience which would have
helped them to deal with the first massed attack.
The SCYLLA and five of the destroyers
with the convoy parted company north-east of Jan Mayen Island on llth September
and proceeded to Lowe Sound to fuel. The eight destroyers which had been
fuelling joined the convoy early on 13th September, and the force
with Rear Admiral Commanding, Home Fleet Destroyers rejoined at noon the same
day. The two oilers and their screen left Lowe Sound and cruised to the
north-westwards to fuel the destroyers of the cruiser force and await the
return of the destroyer covering force. All the destroyers with the convoy were
topped up in succession throughout the passage by the two oilers in company.
Though several promising attacks on U-boats
had already been made by the escorts, the first losses to the convoy from
U-boat attack did not occur until just before Rear Admiral Commanding, Home
Fleet Destroyers rejoined; two ships were sunk.
The air attacks started in the afternoon
with a diversion by six bombers, followed immediately by a massed attack by 40
to 50 torpedo aircraft, each carrying two torpedoes. This attack came in low,
and little more than visual warning was obtained, with the result that the
fighters were caught out of position, chasing bombers and shadowers. The attack
was pressed right home and eight ships were sunk. Two smaller torpedo attacks
were made that day, but no more ships were hit. One more serious loss occurred
during the night, the large freighting tanker ATHELTEMPLAR being sunk by
U-boat.
As a result of his experience on the
first day, the Commanding Officer, HMS AVENGER, decided to change his tactics
and reserve his fighters for the heavy attacks. Fighter patrols were relieved
at short intervals, so that they should not be short of fuel or ammunition if
an attack developed without warning, and the main force of fighters was not
normally flown off until the striking force was actually in sight. This system,
though it did not give the fighters time to prevent an attack from developing,
did ensure that they should harass its final stages, disturbing the enemy and
spoiling his aim.
Combined with the greater accuracy of
anti-aircraft gunfire, which came with experience, the new tactics proved
successful. Two heavy torpedo attacks, by 22 25 aircraft respectively, and two
bombing attacks, all on 14th September, succeeded only in sinking one merchant
ship ; and a prolonged attack by about 70 bombers on the next day was entirely
without success. During the whole period, just over two days, of concentrated
air attack, the enemy lost at least 40 aircraft: there can be little doubt that
these heavy casualties, especially among his limited supply of really skilled
torpedo pilots, was largely responsible for the steady decline in the size and
vigour of his attacks.
The AVENGER, whose flying deck is too
small for landing on when the ship is pitching, was fortunate in having calm
weather throughout the operation. The precaution of attaching two Hunt class
destroyers to the AVENGER, for her close protection, proved its value. Several
attacks were directed especially at her, but she suffered no damage.
No more air attacks were made on PQI8
while the destroyer covering force was in company, but off Cape Kanin, near the
entrance to the White Sea, three further attacks succeeded in sinking one more
ship. Three more ran aground in a heavy gale off the Dvina Bar, but were later
refloated, so that 27 of the original and all the escort, arrived safely at
Archangel.
Merchant Losses PQl 8.
Ten merchant ships by Air
Attack
Three by U-boat.
Four fighters were lost ( One pilot killed ).
Russia
STALINGRAD U-408
SUKAHONA Air Attack
Panama
AFRICANDER Air Attack
MACBETH Air Attack
USA
JOHN PENN Air Attack
KENTUCKY Air Attack
MARY LUCKENBACH Air Attack
OLIVER ELLSWORTH U-408
OREGONIAN Air Attack
WACOSTA Air Attack
Britain
ATHELTEMPLAR U-408
EMPIRE BEAUMONT Air Attack
EMPIRE STEVENSON Air Attack
Source
: Despatches submitted to
the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty
by Admiral Sir John C. Tovey, K.C.B., D.S.O.,
Commander-in-Chief,
Home Fleet.
Raymond
Forward