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Convoy PQ18

 

The Merchant Ships of Convoy PQ18

Russia

ANDRE MARTI  2,352 tons; built 1918 

KOMILES  3,962 tons; built 1932   

PETROVSKI  3,771 tons; built 1921   

STALINGRAD  3,559 tons; built 1931

SUKAHONA  3,214 tons; built 1918

TBILISI  7,169 tons; built 1912   

Panama

AFRICANDER  5,441 tons; built 1921

MACBETH  4,935 tons; built 1920

WHITE CLOVER  5,462 tons; built 1920   

USA

CAMPFIRE  5,671 tons; built 1919   

ESEK HOPKINS  7,191 tons; built 1942   

EXFORD  4,969 tons; built 1919   

HOLLYWOOD  5,498 tons; built 1920   

JOHN PENN  7,177 tons; built 1942

KENTUCKY  5,446 tons; built 1921

LAFAYETTE  5,887 tons; built 1919   

MARY LUCKENBACH  5,049 tons; built 1919

MEANTICUT  6,061 tons; built 1921   

NATHANIEL GREENE  7,177 tons; built 1942   

OLIVER ELLSWORTH  7,191 tons; built 1942

OREGONIAN  4,862 tons; built 1917

PATRICK HENRY  7,191 tons; built 1942   

SAHALE  5,028 tons; built 1919   

ST. OLAF  7,191 tons; built 1942   

SCHOHARIE  4,971 tons; built 1919   

VIRGINIA DARE  7,176 tons; built 1942   

WACOSTA  5,432 tons; built 1920

WILLIAM MOULTRIE  7,177 tons; built 1942   

Britain

ATHELTEMPLAR  8,992 tons; built 1930

BLACK RANGER  3,417 tons; built 1941

CHARLES R. MCCORMICK  6,027 tons; built 1920   

COPELAND  1,526 tons; built 1923   

DAN-Y-BRYN  5,117 tons; built 1940   

EMPIRE BAFFIN  6,978 tons; built 1941   

EMPIRE BEAUMONT  7,044 tons; built 1942

EMPIRE MORN  7,092 tons; built 1941   

EMPIRE SNOW  6,327 tons; built 1941   

EMPIRE STEVENSON  6,209 tons; built 1941

EMPIRE TRISTRAM  7,167 tons; built 1942    

GOOLISTAN  5,851 tons; built 1929

GRAY RANGER  3,313 tons; built 1941 

OCEAN FAITH  7,173 tons; built 1942   

OLIGARCH  6,894 tons; built 1918   

TEMPLE ARCH  5,138 tons; built 1940   

 

Convoy PQ18

In order to reduce, as far as possible, the duration of the operation for the destroyer covering force and the escort of PQ18, the convoy was brought, from Loch Ewe to the Denmark Strait, by a separate escort from the Western Approaches Command, the permanent escort starting from Icelandic ports.

It was necessary to hold three conferences, one at Loch Ewe for the convoy and others at Hvalfjord and Seidisfjord for the escort and covering forces. These were conducted in succession by Rear Admiral Commanding, Home Fleet Destroyers.

 

The convoy sailed from Loch Ewe on 2nd September and immediately met foul weather. It arrived off Skagi on 7th September, 36 hours astern of station, and was there joined by the ocean escort of three destroyers, four corvettes, two anti-aircraft ships and four trawlers. Apart from the weather, and two U-boat contacts, the passage so far had been uneventful.

 

The weather improved on 8th September and the convoy was joined the next morning by Rear Admiral Commanding, Home Fleet Destroyers, in the SCYLLA, eight destroyers, the AVENGER, two Hunt class destroyers to escort her, three minesweepers and two submarines, all from Seidisfjord. The other eight destroyers of the covering force were sailed direct from Akureyri to refuel at Lowe Sound, Spitzbergen. The oilers OLIGARCH and BLUE RANGER, escorted by four destroyers, had sailed from Scapa for Lowe Sound on 3rd September.

 

Besides the two submarines which formed part of the close escort, four were disposed off the Northern Lofoten Islands in an attempt to intercept the German surface ships if they moved north, and three off the north coast in the usual covering positions. The SCHEER, HIPPER and KŐLN moved up from Narvik to Altenfjord on 10th September. They were sighted by all four submarines on the coastal patrols, TIGRIS, TRIBUNE, UREDD and P-54; but the TIGRIS alone was close enough to fire torpedoes; her attack was spoilt by one of the screening destroyers, which almost rammed her just before she fired, and the torpedoes missed astern. After this, the four inshore submarines were moved up to join the covering patrol off the north coast.

 

The convoy was first sighted by an enemy aircraft late on 8th September, but was not shadowed until 12th September. This immunity was due to clouds and low visibility; U-boats were in contact and shadowing from 10th September onwards. It did prevent the early and comparatively small scale attacks which had been directed against previous convoys; and thus had the unexpected and unfortunate result of depriving the guns and fighters of the practice and experience which would have helped them to deal with the first massed attack.

 

The SCYLLA and five of the destroyers with the convoy parted company north-east of Jan Mayen Island on llth September and proceeded to Lowe Sound to fuel. The eight destroyers which had been fuelling joined the convoy early on 13th September, and the force with Rear Admiral Commanding, Home Fleet Destroyers rejoined at noon the same day. The two oilers and their screen left Lowe Sound and cruised to the north-westwards to fuel the destroyers of the cruiser force and await the return of the destroyer covering force. All the destroyers with the convoy were topped up in succession throughout the passage by the two oilers in company.

 

Though several promising attacks on U-boats had already been made by the escorts, the first losses to the convoy from U-boat attack did not occur until just before Rear Admiral Commanding, Home Fleet Destroyers rejoined; two ships were sunk.

 

The air attacks started in the afternoon with a diversion by six bombers, followed immediately by a massed attack by 40 to 50 torpedo aircraft, each carrying two torpedoes. This attack came in low, and little more than visual warning was obtained, with the result that the fighters were caught out of position, chasing bombers and shadowers. The attack was pressed right home and eight ships were sunk. Two smaller torpedo attacks were made that day, but no more ships were hit. One more serious loss occurred during the night, the large freighting tanker ATHELTEMPLAR being sunk by U-boat.

 

As a result of his experience on the first day, the Commanding Officer, HMS AVENGER, decided to change his tactics and reserve his fighters for the heavy attacks. Fighter patrols were relieved at short intervals, so that they should not be short of fuel or ammunition if an attack developed without warning, and the main force of fighters was not normally flown off until the striking force was actually in sight. This system, though it did not give the fighters time to prevent an attack from developing, did ensure that they should harass its final stages, disturbing the enemy and spoiling his aim.

 

Combined with the greater accuracy of anti-aircraft gunfire, which came with experience, the new tactics proved successful. Two heavy torpedo attacks, by 22 25 aircraft respectively, and two bombing attacks, all on 14th September, succeeded only in sinking one merchant ship ; and a prolonged attack by about 70 bombers on the next day was entirely without success. During the whole period, just over two days, of concentrated air attack, the enemy lost at least 40 aircraft: there can be little doubt that these heavy casualties, especially among his limited supply of really skilled torpedo pilots, was largely responsible for the steady decline in the size and vigour of his attacks.

 

The AVENGER, whose flying deck is too small for landing on when the ship is pitching, was fortunate in having calm weather throughout the operation. The precaution of attaching two Hunt class destroyers to the AVENGER, for her close protection, proved its value. Several attacks were directed especially at her, but she suffered no damage.

 

No more air attacks were made on PQI8 while the destroyer covering force was in company, but off Cape Kanin, near the entrance to the White Sea, three further attacks succeeded in sinking one more ship. Three more ran aground in a heavy gale off the Dvina Bar, but were later refloated, so that 27 of the original and all the escort, arrived safely at Archangel.

 

 

Merchant Losses PQl 8.

Ten merchant ships by Air Attack

Three by U-boat.

Four fighters were lost ( One pilot killed ).

 

Russia

STALINGRAD   U-408

SUKAHONA   Air Attack

Panama

AFRICANDER   Air Attack

MACBETH   Air Attack

USA

JOHN PENN  Air Attack

KENTUCKY  Air Attack

MARY LUCKENBACH  Air Attack

OLIVER ELLSWORTH  U-408

OREGONIAN  Air Attack

WACOSTA   Air Attack

Britain

ATHELTEMPLAR   U-408

EMPIRE BEAUMONT   Air Attack

EMPIRE STEVENSON  Air Attack

 

 

Source : Despatches submitted to

 the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty

 by Admiral Sir John C. Tovey, K.C.B., D.S.O.,

Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet.

 

 

 

Raymond Forward