Disastrous in the highest degree to the American cause was the fall of Mackinack, and the prospect which it presented to Hull was justly appalling. His uneasiness was increased by intelligence that came almost hourly of the web of extreme difficulties fast weaving around him. He had sent to the Governors of Ohio and Kentucky for re-enforcements and supplies, but he had, as yet, no positive tidings of their approach. From the north came sounds of dreadful import to a handful of isolated soldiers. The savage chiefs in alliance with the British at Mackinack had sent couriers to all the villages south as far as the Maumee, informing their warriors of that alliance, of the fall of Mackinack, of the investment of Chicago, and of their active preparations to proceed to Malden in great force, to join other warriors there, and attack Detroit. From the east came a rumor that the Canadians and savages in that direction were also hasting toward Malden, and that a detachment of British soldiers, with artillery, under the command of Major Chambers, had landed at the west end of Lake Ontario, penetrated in the direction of Detroit as far as the River Trench, or Thames, and were receiving great accessions of militia and Indians on their march. The alarm created by these facts and rumors was immediately intensified by farther reports [August 4, 1812.] that Colonel Proctor, of the British army, had arrived at Malden from Fort Erie with re-enforcements. 1 Then came over from Sandwich an intercepted letter from a member of the Northwest Company at Fort William, dated two days after the fall of Mackinack, saying that, on the receipt of the declaration of war, their agents ordered a general muster of their forces, which amounted to twelve hundred men, exclusive of several hundreds of the natives. "We are equal, in all," he said, "to sixteen or seventeen hundred strong. One of our gentlemen started on the 17th with several light canoes for the interior country to rouse the natives to activity, which is not hard to do on the present occasion. We likewise dispatched messengers in all directions with the news. I have not the least doubt but our force two days hence will amount to five thousand effective men. Our young gentlemen and engagees offered most handsomely to march immediately for Michillimackinack. Our chief, Mr. Shaw, expressed his gratitude, and drafted one hundred. They are to proceed this evening for St. Joseph’s. He takes about as many Indians. Could the vessel contain them, he might have had four thousand more. It now depends on what accounts we receive from St. Joseph’s, whether these numerous tribes from the interior will proceed to St. Joseph’s or not." 2

In addition to these causes for alarm, Hull discovered a spirit of mutiny in his own camp which gave him more uneasiness still – a spirit, he said, "which before had manifested itself in whispers, increased and became more open. It was evident it was now fostered and encouraged by the principal officers of the militia, and was fast rising into an avowed conspiracy." 3 This mutinous spirit we shall consider presently.

The energy and vigilance of Major General Brock, and the lack of these qualities at this time in General Hull, saved Upper Canada from a disastrous invasion. The amiable Sir George Prevost, the governor general, was spending precious time at Quebec in absolute unbelief of impending war, while Brock, who, in October [October 9.], 1811, had been made "president and administrator of the government of Upper Canada" – that is to say, lieutenant governor – perceived, from the moment of his arrival at his post, that war was inevitable, and made preparations accordingly. He was vigilant, active, sagacious, and brave, and made the most of his inadequate resources to repel the invasion of Hull. From the beginning he was opposed to the employment of the Indians, and discountenanced the attempts to arouse their resentment against the Americans before war was declared; but necessity compelled him to accept their services. 4 He endeavored to strengthen the remote military posts. When navigation opened in the spring of 1812, he sent a supply of ordnance and stores to St. Joseph’s and to Amherstburg. He visited the latter post early in June, taking with him a re-enforcement of one hundred men of the Forty-first Regiment. But in all his movements he was restrained by his superior. As late as his departure for Amherstburg, Sir George Prevost, not believing hostilities to be near, recommended him to employ the most rigid economy in the public expenditure, and to avoid all expenses not absolutely necessary, because of the great difficulty of raising money.

When intelligence of the declaration of war reached Brock he was at York, now Toronto, the capital of his province. He had just been offered a company of farmers’ sons, with their draught-horses, for the equipment of a car brigade, under Captain Holcroft, of the Royal Artillery. He was considering this generous offer of the yeomanry when the startling news arrived. It was immediately accepted. An extraordinary session of the Legislature was summoned; and with Evans, his brigade major, and his aid-de-camp, Captain Glegg, he hastened to Fort George, on the Niagara frontier, and there established his military head-quarters. His intention was to cross the Niagara River immediately and capture the American fort of that name, but he shrank from the responsibility of taking such an important step without instructions, at the same time assuring his superior that it might be "demolished, when found necessary, in half an hour." 5 He contented himself with making preparations for offensive or defensive movements, as circumstances might require. The militia of the peninsula between Lakes Erie and Ontario being summoned to his standard, eight hundred men responded by their presence. Yielding to necessity, he called upon the Indians on the Grand River for aid, and a hundred came, under John Brant, bringing promise of the speedy appearance of the remainder. 6

By the 3d of July the "car brigade" was completed, with horses belonging to gentlemen "who spared them free of expense." Meanwhile the Americans had gathered a considerable force on the east side of the river, scattered at different points along a line of thirty miles from Buffalo to Fort Niagara, and estimated by General Brock to be twelve hundred strong. 7

On the 20th of July Brock received intelligence of Hull’s invasion; also a copy of his proclamation, with hints of its effect. Those hints, and a knowledge of the weakness of Fort Malden, alarmed him. 8 The Legislature, about to meet at York, would require his presence, and he could not leave for the field in the West, as he desired to do. Divided duties perplexed him. He instantly recalled a portion of the militia whom he had permitted to go home to gather in the grain harvest, and they murmured. He dispatched Colonel Proctor, of the Forty-first Regiment, with such re-enforcements as he could spare, to assume command at Amherstburg, and the inhabitants of the Niagara border felt themselves abandoned. He issued a counter-proclamation [July 22, 1812.] to neutralize the effect of Hull’s, and hope revived.

Leaving the military along the Niagara frontier in charge of Lieutenant Colonel Myers, Brock hastened to York, and, with much parade, opened the Legislature in person. His address was cordially responded to; but he soon found that the Legislature partook, in a large degree, of the despondency of a great portion of the people of Upper Canada, which Hull’s menacing proclamation and actual invasion had produced. Five hundred militia in the Western District had already sought Hull’s protection; the Norfolk militia, most of them connected by blood with the inhabitants of the United States, peremptorily refused to take up arms; and the Indians on the Grand River, in the heart of the province, after some of their chiefs returned from a visit to Hull, refused, with few exceptions, to join the British standard, declaring their intention to remain neutral. With such promises of failure and disaster before them if resistance should be made, a majority of the Assembly were more disposed to submit, and to court the favor of the invaders, than to stand up boldly in defense of their province. Mr. Wilcox, a prominent politician of York or Toronto, and editor of a leading newspaper, took strong ground in favor of the Americans, but he was finally overawed by the energy and influence of Brock, and induced to offer him the use of his pen and services. Wilcox was not a hearty supporter of the British, and afterward joined the American army, in the service of which he was killed at Fort Erie. Perceiving this alarming symptom of disloyalty, and apprehending more evil than good from the presence, in a body, at the capital of these timid representatives of the people, Brock prorogued the Assembly as soon as it had passed the necessary supply bills. 9 He had sought in vain for its leave to suspend the Habeas Corpus Act or to declare martial law when necessary; but, after consultation with his council, Brock resolved to do both, should certain exigencies occur. 10

Brock’s confident tone in his speech at the opening of the Legislature, and the spirit and power of his counter-proclamation, produced a marked change; 11 and when, very speedily, the fall of Mackinack and the American reverses on the Detroit frontier became known, a reversal of public sentiment was so manifest that Brock was enabled to write to Sir George Prevost from York, saying, "The militia stationed here volunteered their services this morning [July 29, 1812.] to any part of the province without the least hesitation. I have selected one hundred, whom I have directed to proceed without delay to Long Point, where I propose collecting a force for the relief of Amherstburg. This example, I hope, will be followed by as many as may be required. 12

The detachment was moving very cautiously half an hour after this sad occurrence, when it was joined by some mounted militia, and a few gentlemen who had taken this opportunity to travel in safety to the Raisin. These, with Major Van Horne, stopped at the house of a Frenchman for water, and were informed by him that several hundred Indians and British soldiers were lying in ambush, near Brownstown, for the purpose of intercepting the party. Van Horne had become accustomed to alarmists, and did not credit the story. He marched on in fancied security, his front guard of twenty-four men in two columns, each column preceded by three dragoons, and the main body in the same order. The mail, with a mounted escort, was placed in the centre. Where the ground would permit, the columns marched a hundred yards apart. As they approached Brownstown the road passed through a narrow prairie skirted with thick woods, and a creek on the right. The woods on the creek came to a point toward the town, through which the road passed to the ford. On the left were corn-fields and thickets of thorn bushes; and near the creek the columns were compelled to approach each other on account of the narrowness of the way. Just as they reached its margin, and were entering upon the open ground around the village, near the house of Adam Brown, a heavy fire, at only fifty yards’ distance, was opened upon them from both sides by a large body of Indians who lay in ambush in the thickets and the woods. The attack was sudden, sharp, and deadly, and the troops were thrown into confusion. Apprehensive that he might be surrounded, Major Van Horne immediately ordered a retreat. This movement was conducted with much confusion. The Indians pursued, and a running fight was kept up for a considerable distance, the retreating Americans frequently turning upon the savage foe, and giving him deadly volleys. The retreat continued to the Ecorces, but the Indians, restrained by the prudent Tecumtha, only followed about half that distance. 13 The mail was lost, and passed into the hands of the British authorities, by which most valuable information concerning the weakness and disaffection of Hull’s army was made manifest, for the officers and soldiers had written freely to their friends at home on the subject. 14 The detachment also lost seventeen killed and several wounded, who were left behind. 15

But Canada was not to be wholly abandoned. Major Denny, with one hundred and thirty convalescents and a corps of artillerists, under Lieutenant Anderson, was left "to hold possession of that part of Canada, and afford all possible protection to the well-disposed inhabitants," A strong house, belonging to one Gowris, had been stockaded, and called Fort Gowris. In this, and in a long stone building yet standing in Sandwich, 16 which the American soldiers had used as barracks, the convalescents were placed, and Denny was ordered to defend the post to the last extremity against musketry, but to leave it in the event of artillery being brought against it so powerfully as to make it untenable. 17

Sullenly that humiliated army obeyed their overcautious commander, and during the night of the 7th and morning of the 8th [August, 1812.] they crossed the deep, dark, rapidly-flowing river in sadness, and encamped upon the rolling plain behind Fort Detroit. Hull’s reason for this mortifying termination of his invasion of Canada was the receipt of intelligence, as we have observed, that General Brock was hasting toward Amherstburg with re-enforcements, and the necessity of securing a permanent communication between his army and the sources of its supplies in the Ohio settlements. He accordingly dispatched six hundred men, under Lieutenant Colonel James Miller, on the afternoon of the 8th, to open a communication with the Raisin and escort Brush to Detroit. The detachment consisted of the Fourth Regiment of regulars; two small corps of the First Regiment, under Lieutenant Dixon Stansbury and Ensign Robert A. M‘Cabe; detachments from the Ohio and Michigan volunteers – the latter, sixty in number, from the "Michigan Legion," 18 mostly French, under Captain Antoine Dequindre; a corps of Captain Dyson’s artillerists, then stationed at the fort with a six-pounder, under Lieutenant John L. Eastman (who was Miller’s brigade major on this occasion), and a howitzer, under Lieutenant James Daliba; and a part of Captains Smith and Sloan’s cavalry, under the latter. Majors Van Horne and Morrison were associated with Lieutenant Colonel Miller as field officers. "Commodore" Brevoort, who was a captain of infantry, and appointed commander of any government vessels that might be placed on the lakes, and Captain A. F. Hull, the general’s son, who was afterward killed at the Battle of Niagara Falls, volunteered as aids to Lieutenant Colonel Miller. 19

The troops paraded on the north side of Jefferson Avenue, in Detroit, nearly opposite where the Exchange now stands, When placed in marching order, Lieutenant Colonel Miller rode up in front of them, and in his clear, loud voice, said to the volunteers and militia, "Soldiers, we are now going to meet the enemy, and to beat them. The reverse of the 5th (Van Horne’s) must be repaired. The blood of our brethren, spilt by the savages, must be avenged. I shall lead you. You shall not disgrace yourselves nor me. Every man who shall leave the ranks or fall back without orders will be instantly put to death. I charge the officers to execute this order." Then, turning to the veteran Fourth Regiment of regulars, he said, "My brave soldiers, you will add another victory to that of Tippecanoe – another laurel to that gained on the Wabash last fall. If there is now any man in the ranks of the detachment who fears to meet the enemy, let him fall out and stay behind." A loud huzza went up from the entire corps, and "I’ll not stay! I’ll not stay!" broke from every lip. 20

Miller led his detachment to the River Rouge that night, crossed it in two scows, and bivouacked on its southern shore, The march was resumed early in the morning. Major Thompson Maxwell, 21 with the spies, led the way, followed by a vanguard of forty-men, under the high-souled Captain Snelling, of the Fourth Regulars. The infantry marched in two columns, about two hundred yards apart. The cavalry kept the road in the centre in double file. The artillery followed, and flank-guards of riflemen marched at proper distances. In this order a line of battle might be instantly formed. The march was very slow, owing to the difficulty of moving cannon over marshy ground.

At about nine in the morning – a sultry Sabbath morning – the sky overcast with clouds, and not a leaf stirring upon the trees, it became evident that an enemy was near. Several Indians, fleet of foot, were seen flying in the distance. But nothing of much interest occurred until, in the afternoon, they approached the Indian village of Maguaga, fourteen miles below Detroit, where a man named White, who, with his young son, accompanied the expedition as an amateur soldier, and in his eagerness had outstripped the spies, was shot from his horse near the cabin of the chief Walk-in-the-Water, behind which some Indians were concealed. 22 He was scalped before the advance-guard could reach the spot.

The flying savages, seen by the Americans in the morning, and who had been scouting for Muir, had entered the little British camp at Brownstown in hot haste, uttering the peculiar news-cry, and warning the soldiers that the enemy, strong in numbers, was advancing upon them, The camp was immediately broken up, and Muir and Tecumtha, with their followers, pressed forward to Maguaga, and formed an ambush in the Oak Woods. There they lay for several hours, awaiting the slowly-approaching Americans, and were joined by a fresh detachment from Malden, under Lieutenant Bullock, of the Forty-first Grenadiers, who had been sent by General Brock from Fort George. 23 He had reached Malden the previous day, and was sent over to assist Muir and his savage allies. He took with him twenty of his grenadiers, twenty light infantry, and twenty battalion-men, The Indians occupied the left of the line. 24

A single shot on the left of the foe, then the terrible yells of scores of savages, and then a heavy volley of musketry from the whole British line, were the first intimations given to Snelling of the presence of the concealed enemy. He received and returned the fire gallantly, and maintained his position until joined by the main body. Miller’s quick ear caught the first sound of battle, and, ordering his men forward at double quick, he rode at full speed toward the field of conflict. As his troops came up and formed in battle order, he waved his sword aloft, and cried, "Charge! boys, charge!" 25 The order was instantly, gallantly, and effectually obeyed; and, at the same time, a six-pounder poured in a storm of grape-shot that made sad havoc. A body of Indians, that had been detached to the left of the foe, and near the river, was driven back by an impetuous charge by Major Dequindre and his Michigan and Ohio Volunteers, 26 and fled. Their white auxiliaries, who performed but little fighting in this engagement, mistaking them for Indian allies of the Americans, fired upon them. The savages returned it with spirit, and for a few moments these friends in the same service seemed determined to annihilate each other.

The battle had now become general. This sudden blow upon the right wing, and the confusion produced by the mistake just mentioned, alarmed the centre, and the whole British line, civilized and savage, wavered. Closely pressed in front, and expecting an attack in the rear, the British regulars and Canadians broke and fled in confusion, leaving Tecumtha and his savages to bear the brunt of the battle, which they did with great obstinacy. 27 Muir rallied his men, in a good position, a quarter of a mile in rear of the battle-ground, when, becoming alarmed by firing in the woods on the left, they retreated "at the double-quick," as Major Richardson said, gained their boats as speedily as possible, and sped across the river to Malden as fast as strong arms and stout oars could take them. The savages finally broke and fled, and Miller ordered Sloan to pursue them with his cavalry. That officer’s courage seemed to have been paralyzed for the moment. He stood still. The impetuous Snelling perceived it, and, rushing up to him, peremptorily ordered him to dismount, leaped upon the horse himself; and, at the head of his troops, bareheaded (his hat having been shot away in the battle), his red hair streaming in the wind, he dashed after the fugitives, and pursued them more than two miles, when the danger of an ambuscade, the necessary care of the wounded, and the approach of night, induced Lieutenant Colonel Miller to order a suspension of the chase. The rout and victory were complete. According to the British account, the loss of their regulars was twenty-four, only one of whom was killed. 28 That of the militia and Indians were never reported. Our troops found forty of the latter dead on the field. The loss of the Americans was eighteen killed and fifty-seven wounded. 29

MAGUAGA BATTLE-GROUND. 30

Hull’s shortcomings were freely spoken of, and the belief was inculcated among the troops that he was either traitorously inclined, or had become an imbecile. At times he would be shut up in his room 31 for hours, inaccessible to all but his son, who was his aid-de-camp; at others he appeared abstracted and confused – "sullen in deportment, and wavering in his orders." 32 His incompetency to meet the crisis at hand was felt by all, and his officers of every grade, after consultation, came to the conclusion that the salvation of the little army would only be found in depriving him of the command and giving it to another. 33 Lieutenant Colonel Miller was invited to accept it. He declined, but expressed his willingness to unite with them in giving the command to M‘Arthur, the senior officer of the volunteers, and one of the most vigilant and active soldiers in the army. It would be a bold step for subordinates to strip a commanding general of his sword and epaulets while at the head of his army, and, when they were ready to act, they naturally hesitated. Relief might speedily come from Ohio. Governor Meigs, it was suggested, might accompany it in person, and upon him the honor might properly be laid. Colonel Cass acted promptly on this suggestion, and wrote [August 12, 1812.] an energetic letter to the governor, urging him to press forward with re-enforcements and supplies.

Before this letter was shown to the other officers a change in affairs had taken place. The British were congregating in force at Sandwich, and, in view of this menace, the following postscript was added to the letter: "Since the other side of this letter was written, new circumstances have arisen. The British force is opposite, and our situation has nearly reached its crisis. Believe all the bearer will tell you. Believe it, however it may astonish you, as much as if told by one of us. Even a c**** is talked of by the *****. The bearer will supply the vacancy. 34 On you we depend." This was signed by Cass, Findlay, M‘Arthur, Taylor, and Colonel Elijah Brush, of the Michigan militia.

With his few regulars and three hundred militia, Brock embarked in boats, batteaux, and canoes (supplied by the neighboring farmers) at Long Point [August 8.], and, after a rough voyage of five days and nights, nearly two hundred miles in extent, he reached Amherstburg a little before midnight of the 13th. The patient endurance of his troops delighted him. He was welcomed by a feu de joie of musketry from Tecumtha and his band on Bois Blanc Island, before Amherstburg. Half an hour afterward that warrior was brought over by Colonel Elliot, the Indian agent whom we have already spoken of (who lived near Amherstburg), and Brock was introduced to the great chief of the Shawnoese. 35 It being late, the conference was short, and they parted with the understanding that a council would be called immediately. Brock held a conference with the Indians on the morning of the 14th. About one thousand were present. The general opened the interview by informing them that he had come to assist them in driving the Americans from Detroit and their rightful hunting-grounds north of the Ohio. His speech was highly applauded by Tecumtha, who replied in an eloquent and sagacious manner, and gave Brock a high opinion of his genius. 36 Not deeming it prudent to reveal too much of his plan of operations to the assembled savages, the latter invited Tecumtha, with a few old chiefs, to Colonel Elliott’s quarters, and there he laid the whole matter before them. The chiefs listened with great attention, and assured Brock that he should have their cordial co-operation. In reply to his question whether the warriors could be restrained from drinking whisky, Tecumtha replied that, before leaving their country on the Wabash, they had promised him that they would not taste a drop of the fire-water until they had humbled the big-knives – the Americans – and that they might be relied on. 37

Major Denny had already evacuated Fort Gowris [August 11, 1812.], and, with the convalescents and troops under his command, had crossed the river to Detroit. The American camp at Sandwich and vicinity was immediately taken possession of by British troops, under Captain Dixon, of the Royal Engineers (whom we shall meet at Fort Stephenson), and a battery was planted so as to command Detroit. The American artillerists begged permission to open upon them from the fort with twenty-four pounders, 38 but Hull would not grant it, and the enemy was allowed to complete his preparations for reducing the fort without molestation. The brave Captain Snelling asked permission to go over in the night and take the works, but Hull would listen to no propositions of the kind. He seemed unwilling to injure or exasperate the enemy.

That General Hull had determined to surrender Detroit, under certain contingencies, rather than risk an engagement with, or a protracted siege by the British and Indians, at least two or three days before that deed was accomplished, the careful student of the history of that affair can not doubt. All of his movements indicate this, according to the positive testimony given by M‘Afee, and of Colonel Stanley Hatch’s narrative, already cited. Hatch was Hull’s assistant quartermaster general. Hull seemed convinced that, under all the circumstances, the post would be untenable against such a force as the enemy might bring to bear upon it, unless his communication with Ohio might be kept up. Dearborn had failed to make any diversions in his favor on the Niagara or at Kingston, as he had been directed to do. 39 His communication with Ohio (his only source of supply), lying beyond a trackless wilderness two hundred miles away, was cut off. His provisions, he thought, were becoming too scarce to warrant the risk of a protracted siege, and an intercepted letter from Proctor to Roberts at Mackinack threatened a descent of five thousand Indians from that region. Hemmed in on every side, and his force wasting with disease, disappointment, and death, his kindness of heart, and the growing caution incident to old age, made him timid and fearful. He did not know that the letter from Proctor at Malden had been sent for the purpose of interception to alarm him. 40 He did not know that a large portion of Brock’s troops, reported to him as regulars, were only the militia of Long Point and vicinity, dressed in scarlet uniforms to deceive him. 41 He was too honest (whatever may be said of his military sagacity) to suspect deceptions of this kind, and he sincerely believed that his little army would be exterminated by the savages should he exasperate them by shedding their blood. "A man of another mould, full of resolution and resource," says Ingersoll, "might have triumphed over the time-serving negligence of his own government, and the bold resistance of an enemy who could not fail to perceive that he had a feeble and dismayed antagonist to deal with." 42

On the 14th General Hull sent a message to Captain Brush informing him that a sufficient detachment to escort him to head-quarters could not then be spared, and directing him to remain where he was until farther orders, or, if he thought best, to attempt a forward movement by a circuitous and more inland route, after consulting with Colonel Anderson and Captain Jobard, the bearers of the letter. 43 Toward the evening of the same day, he changed his mind, and concluded to send a detachment to escort Brush to Detroit. He communicated his plan to Colonels M‘Arthur and Cass, who not only approved of it, but volunteered to perform the duty. They were permitted to choose three hundred and fifty men from their respective regiments. M‘Arthur, as senior officer, took the command; and they left in haste in the evening without a sufficient supply of provisions for a protracted absence, or even of blankets for repose in resting, for they were assured that they would doubtless meet Brush between the Rouge and Huron, and not more than twelve miles distant. When they remonstrated because they were dispatched with a scanty supply of provisions, Hull promised to send more after them on pack-horses. But Brush’s orders left it optional with him to remain or move forward. He was not found on the way, nor were provisions received from Hull as promised.

The detachment under M‘Arthur and Cass crossed the Rouge that evening [August 14, 1812.], and the next day pushed forward by a circuitous route toward the head waters of the Huron, twenty-four miles from Detroit, when they became entangled in a swamp, and could proceed no farther. Half famished and greatly fatigued by their march through the forest, they had prepared to bivouac for the night, when, just as the evening twilight was fading away, a courier arrived with a summons from Hull to return immediately to Detroit. 44 The order was obeyed, and they approached head-quarters the next day at about ten o’clock in the morning. Meanwhile affairs at Detroit had reached a crisis.

On the morning of the 15th of August, General Hull pitched his marquee in the centre of his camp, near the fort. It was the first time since the 4th of July that it had made its appearance, and much attention and remark was elicited by it, especially because its top was ornamented with red and blue stripes, which made it conspicuous among the tents. 45 The British had been in considerable force on the opposite shore since the 13th, and had been permitted to throw up intrenchments, and to plant a battery for two eighteen-pounders and an eight-inch howitzer in a position to command the town and fort, notwithstanding the latter was armed with twenty-eight pieces of heavy ordnance, which the artillerists were anxious to use in driving the enemy from his works. When his preparations for attack were completed, General Brock, at little past meridian on the 15th, sent Lieutenant Colonel M‘Donell and Major Glegg from Sandwich, with a flag, to bear to General Hull a summons for the unconditional surrender of the post. "The force at my disposal," said Brock, "authorizes me to require of you the surrender of Detroit. It is far from my inclination to join in a war of extermination, but you must be aware that the numerous body of Indians who have attached themselves to my troops will be beyond my control the moment the contest commences." 46

This covert threat of letting loose the blood-thirsty savages upon the town and garrison of Detroit deeply impressed the commanding general with contending emotions. His pride of character, and his patriotism, for which all venerated him, bade him fight; his fear of the consequences to the army and the inhabitants under his charge bade him surrender. His whole effective force then at his disposal did not exceed one thousand men, 47 and the fort was thronged with trembling women, and children, and decrepit old men of the town and surrounding country, who had fled thither to escape the blow of the tomahawk and the keen blade of the scalping-knife. For full two hours he kept the flag waiting while revolving in his mind what to do. His troops were confident in their ability to successfully confront the enemy, and were eager to measure strength with him; and at length Hull mustered resolution sufficient to say to Brock, "I have no other reply to make than to inform you that I am ready to meet any force which may be at your disposal, and any consequences which may result from its execution in any way you may think proper to use it." He added, apologetically, that a certain flag of truce, sent to Malden at about the time Colonel Cass fell upon the British and Indians at the Aux Canards, proceeded contrary to his orders; and that the destruction of Gowris’s house at Sandwich was also contrary to his orders. 48

Hull’s response to Brock, when made known, was welcomed by the troops with the most lively satisfaction; and when the flag touched the Canada shore, the bearers were startled by a loud huzza from the fort at Detroit and the adjacent camp. The time for trial, and, as Hull’s little army believed, of victory for them, was at hand, and the most active preparations to meet the foe was seen on every side. Major Jesup rode down to Spring Wells to reconnoitre the enemy at Sandwich. He was satisfied, from the position which the Queen Charlotte had taken, that the British intended to land at that place under cover of her guns. Having selected a commanding point for a battery from which that vessel might possibly be driven away, he hastened back to head-quarters, and requested Hull to send down a twenty-pounder for the purpose. Hull refused. Jesup returned to Spring Wells, where he found Captain Snelling, with a few men and a six-pounder, occupying the place he had selected for his battery. They perceived that the greater part of the British forces were at Sandwich, and both hastened to head-quarters. Jesup now asked for one hundred and fifty men to go over and spike the enemy’s guns opposite Detroit. Hull said he could not spare so many. "Give me one hundred, then," said the brave Jesup. "Only one hundred," said Snelling, imploringly. "I will think of it," was Hull’s reply; and soon afterward he took refuge in the fort, for at four o’clock in the afternoon the British battery of five guns opposite, under the direction of Captain Dixon, of the Royal Engineers, opened upon the town, the fort, and the camp, with shot and shell. All the troops, except Findlay’s regiment, which was stationed three hundred yards northwest of the fort, were ordered within the walls, crowding the work far beyond its capacity. 49

The British kept up their cannonade and bombardment until toward midnight. 50 The fire was returned with great spirit, and two of the enemy’s guns were silenced and disabled. 51 At evening twilight it was suggested to Hull that as the fort did not command the river, a strong battery might be placed near the margin of the stream, so as to destroy the enemy as fast as they should attempt to land. An eligible point for the purpose, in the direction of Spring Wells, was selected, but the general, whose mind seemed to have been benumbed from the moment the enemy’s battery was opened, would listen to no suggestions of the kind; and when that enemy, in full force, crossed the river during the early morning of the 16th – a calm and beautiful Sabbath morning – completing the passage in the matin twilight, they were allowed to land without the least molestation from ball or bullet. Colonels Elliott and M‘Kee, with Tecumtha, had crossed during the night two miles below, with six hundred Indians, and taken position in the woods to attack the Americans on flank and rear, should they attempt to dispute the debarkation of the regulars and militia, who numbered seven hundred and seventy men, with five pieces of light artillery. 52 When all had breakfasted, the invaders moved toward the fort; the white troops in a single column, their left flank covered by the Indians, who kept in the woods a mile and a half distant. Their right rested on the Detroit River, and was covered by the guns of the Queen Charlotte.

Lieutenant Colonel Miller, with the 4th Regiment, was now in the fort; and the Ohio Volunteers and part of the Michigan militia were posted behind the town palisades, so as to annoy the enemy’s whole left flank. The remainder of the militia were stationed in the upper part of the town, to resist the incursions of the Indians, whose chief motive in joining the British standard was plunder, and the free and safe indulgence of their ferocity. Two twenty-four-pounders had been placed in battery on an eminence from which they could sweep the advancing column. 53 The American force was considerably less than that of the British, white and red combined, but their position was much superior. They had four hundred rounds of twenty-four-pound shot fixed; about one hundred thousand cartridges prepared; ample provisions for fifteen days and more approaching, and no lack of arms and loose ammunition. 54

The invaders advanced cautiously, and had reached a point within five hundred yards of the American line, near the site of Governor Woodbridge’s residence, at the crossing of the Central Railroad, when General Hull sent a peremptory order for his soldiers to retreat into the fort. The troops were astounded and bewildered. Confident in their ability to repulse and probably capture the invaders, they were eager for the order to begin the contest. "Not a sign of discontent broke upon the ear; not a look of cowardice met the eye. Every man expected a proud day for his country, and each was anxious that his individual exertion should contribute to the general result." 55 Like true soldiers they obeyed, but not without loud and fearless expression of their indignation, and their contempt for the commanding general. Many of them, high-spirited young men from the best families in Ohio, showed symptoms of positive mutiny at first; and the twenty-four-pounder would have poured a destructive storm of grape-shot upon the advancing column, notwithstanding the humiliating order, had not Lieutenant Anderson, who commanded the guns, acting under the general’s direction, forcibly restrained them. He was anxious to reserve his fire until the approaching column should be in the best position to receive the most destructive volleys. The guns were heavily charged with grape-shot, and would have sent terrible messengers to many of the "red-coats," as the scarlet-dressed British were generally termed. The eager artillerists were about to apply the match too soon, when Anderson sprang forward, with drawn sword, and threatened to cut down the first man who should disobey his orders.

Many women and children were in the house where the officers were slain. Among them were General Hull’s daughter and her children. Some of the women were petrified with affright, and were carried senseless to the bomb-proof vault for safety. Several of them were bespattered with blood; and the general, who saw the effects of the ball from a distance, knew not whether his own child was slain or not. These casualties, the precursors of future calamities, almost unmanned him, and he paced the parade backward and forward in the most anxious frame of mind. At that moment an officer from the Michigan militia in the town, who had observed the steady approach of the enemy without a gun being fired from the fort or the twenty-four pounders outside, came in haste to inquire whether it was the intention of the general to allow that body alone to defend the place; also to inform him that the British and Indians were at the tan-yard, close upon the town. The general made no reply, but, stepping into a room in the barracks, he prepared a note hastily, handed it to his son, Captain Hull, and directed him to display a white flag immediately from the walls of the fort, 56 where it might be seen by Captain Dixon over the river. 57 This was done. The firing soon ceased, and in a few minutes Captain Hull was "unexpectedly seen emerging from the fort" 58 with a flag of truce. At the same time, a boat, with a flag, was dispatched to the commander of the battery on the Canada shore.

Captain Hull bore proposals for an immediate capitulation. He soon returned with Lieutenant Colonel M‘Donell and Major Glegg, who were authorized by Brock to negotiate the terms of surrender. The white flag upon the walls had awakened painful suspicions; the arrival of these officers announced the virtual betrayal of the garrison. Hull had asked no man’s advice, nor suggested to any the possibility of a surrender. 59 His act was quick, and as unexpected as a thunderbolt from a clear sky. Not a shot had been fired upon the enemy – not an effort to stay his course had been made. For a moment nothing but reverence for gray hairs, and veneration for a soldier of the Revolution, saved the commander from personal violence at the hands of his incensed people. Many of the soldiers, it is said, shed tears of mortification and disappointment.

The terms of capitulation were soon agreed to, 60 and the American commander issued a general order saying that it was "with pain and anxiety" that he announced to the Northwest Army that he had been compelled, from a sense of duty, to agree to articles of capitulation which were appended to the averment. He then sent a messenger with a note to Colonel M‘Arthur (who, with Colonel Cass and the detachment sent toward the Raisin, were, as we have seen, hastening back to Detroit) informing him of the surrender, and that he and his command were included in the capitulation as prisoners of war. 61 They had arrived in sight of Detroit at about the time when the American white flags had silenced the British cannon, 62 thoroughly exhausted by rapid and fatiguing marches and lack of food, for they had tasted nothing for more than forty-eight hours, excepting some green pumpkins and potatoes found in the fields. They had observed the enemy, and the ease with which, in connection with the army at Detroit, they might capture him by falling upon his rear. But all was silent. That fact was a sealed enigma. There were two armies within half cannon-shot of each other, and yet, to the ears of these listeners, they both seemed as silent as the grave. Had there been firing, or any signs of resistance, M‘Arthur would have fallen upon the rear of the invaders even without orders. But all was mystery until the arrival of Hull’s courier with the unwelcome tidings.

M‘Arthur attempted to communicate with Hull, but failed. He sent a message to Captain Brush with Hull’s note, saying, "By the within letter you will see that the army under General Hull has been surrendered. By the articles you will see that provision has been made for the detachment under your command; you will therefore, I hope, return to Ohio with us." 63

At sunset Colonel Elliott came to M‘Arthur from the fort with the articles of capitulation, and with authority from Brock to receive tokens of the submission of the detachment. The dark, lustrous eyes of M‘Arthur flashed with indignation at the demand. As they filled with tears of deepest mortification, he thrust his sword into the ground, and broke it in pieces, and then tore his epaulettes from his shoulders. This paroxysm of feeling was soon succeeded by dignified calmness; and in the dim twilight M‘Arthur and Cass, with their whole detachment, were marched into the fort, where the arms of the soldiers were stacked. Before the curtain of night had been fairly drawn over the humiliating scene the act of capitulation and surrender was completed – an act which produced universal mortification and intense indignation throughout the country. 64 In less than two months after war was declared, and the favorite scheme of an invasion of the enemy’s provinces had been set in motion, a strong military post, a spirited army, and a magnificent territory, with all its inhabitants, 65 had been given up without an effort to save them, or a moment’s waiting for the arrival of powerful re-enforcements and ample supplies, then on their way from the southward. About two thousand men in all 66 became prisoners of war. These consisted of two squadrons of cavalry, one company of artillery, the 4th United States Regiment, and detachments from the 1st and 3d; three regiments of Ohio Volunteers, and one regiment of the Michigan militia. The British obtained by this capitulation (for it was not a victory) a large amount of arms, ammunition, and stores, all of which, especially arms, were greatly needed in Upper Canada. 67 It was a godsend to the provinces in every aspect. The surrender caused months of delay before another invading army could be brought into the field, and thus gave the British time for preparation; and it secured the friendship and alliance of savage tribes, who, as usual, were ready to join whatever side seemed to be the stronger party, and safest as an ally.

The formal surrender of the fort and garrison took place at meridian, on the 16th. 68 At the same hour the next day (Monday, the 17th) General Brock and his staff, with other officers, appeared in full uniform, and in their presence a salute was fired from the esplanade in front of the fort, with one of the brass cannon included in the capitulation. It bore the following inscription: "TAKEN AT SARATOGA ON THE 17TH OF OCTOBER, 1777." When the British officers saw this, they were so delighted that some of them greeted the old British captive, now released, with kisses; and one of them remarked to Colonel Hatch, from whose manuscript narrative I have gained the facts, "we must have an addition put to that inscription, namely, ‘RETAKEN AT DETROIT AUGUST 16, 1812.’ " 69 The salute was answered by Dixon’s battery on the Canada shore, and by the Queen Charlotte, which came sweeping up the middle of the river from the waters between Spring Wells and Sandwich, and took position directly in front of the town. 70

General Hull and his fellow-prisoners reached Fort George, on the Niagara, on the 26th of August, when the commander immediately wrote a lengthy report of the surrender and attendant events, but was not permitted to forward it, until his arrival at Montreal. 71 Information of the disaster had already reached General Van Rensselaer, at Lewiston, and he had promptly sent the news by express to General Dearborn, the senior commander in the army, whose head-quarters at that time were at Greenbush, opposite Albany, on the Hudson River.

For this important errand Van Rensselaer employed Captain Darby Noon, the leader of a fine company of Albany Volunteers, who were then stationed at or near Fort Niagara. Captain Noon was a man of great energy, and he performed the service in an incredibly short space of time. He rode express all the way, changing his horses by impressing them when necessary, assuring the owners of remuneration from the government. He neither slept on the way, nor tasted food, excepting what he ate on horseback. When he arrived at Greenbush, he was so much exhausted that he had to be lifted from his horse, and he was compelled to remain in his bed for several days. 72

On the day of the surrender [August 16, 1812.], General Brock issued a proclamation to the inhabitants of Michigan, in which they were assured of protection in life, property, and religious observances, and were called upon to give up all public property in the Territory. Having made arrangements for the civil and military occupation of the Territory, and leaving Colonel Proctor in command of a garrison of two hundred and fifty men at Detroit, he hastened back to York, where he arrived on the 27th [August.], and was received with the greatest enthusiasm by the people, who regarded him as the savior of the province. In the short space of nineteen days he had met the Legislature, arranged the public affairs of the province, traveled about three hundred miles to confront an invader, and returned the possessor of that invader’s whole army and a vast territory, about equal in area to Upper Canada. Henceforth, during his brief career, he was the idol of the Canadians, and the Prince Regent, representing the majesty of Great Britain, created him a baronet [October 10.]. 73

While General Hull was on his way toward Montreal, Colonel Cass, at the request of Colonel M‘Arthur, was hasting to Washington City, "for the purpose," as he said, "of communicating to the government such particulars respecting the expedition lately commanded by Brigadier General Hull, and its disastrous results, as might enable them correctly to appreciate the conduct of the officers and men, and to develop the causes which produced so foul a stain upon the national character." 74 This communication was made in writing on the 10th of September, in which was given an outline history of events near Detroit, from the landing in Canada until the surrender. It exhibited much warmth of feeling, and its circulation in print prejudiced the public mind against Hull, and intensified the indignant reproaches which the first intelligence of the surrender had caused to be hurled at the head of the unfortunate general. It also diverted public attention for the moment from the palpable inefficiency of the War Department, 75 the effects of the armistice, and the injurious delays of General Dearborn, 76 to which much of the disaster should properly be charged. Colonel Cass’s opinions, as well as facts, were eagerly accepted by the excited public as veritable history, and few had words of palliation to offer for the captive veteran when they read the following glowing, dogmatic words at the conclusion of the young colonel’s letter: "To see the whole of our men, flushed with the hope of victory, eagerly awaiting the approaching contest – to see them afterward dispirited, hopeless, and desponding, at least five hundred shedding tears, because they were not allowed to meet their country’s foe and to fight their country’s battles, excited sensations which no American has ever before had cause to feel, and which, I trust in God, will never again be felt while our men remain to defend the standard of the Union. . . . . . Confident I am that, had the courage and conduct of the general been equal to the spirit and zeal of the troops, the event would have been as brilliant and successful as it is disastrous and dishonorable. 77

General Hull retired to his farm at Newton, Massachusetts, from which he was summoned to appear before a court-martial at Philadelphia on the 25th of February, 1813, of which General Wade Hampton was appointed president. The members appointed consisted of three brigadier generals, nine colonels, and three lieutenant colonels; and the eminent A. J. Dallas, of Pennsylvania, was judge advocate. This court was dissolved by the President without giving a reason for the act; and, almost a year afterward, Hull was summoned to appear before another, to convene at Albany, New York. It met on the 3d of January, 1814. General Dearborn was the president, and he was assisted by three brigadier generals, four colonels, and five lieutenant colonels. 78 Again Mr. Dallas was judge advocate. As Hull blamed Dearborn for his negligence, and as his own acquittal would condemn that officer, he might very properly have objected to the appointed president of the court; but he was anxious for a trial, and he waived all feeling. He was charged with treason, cowardice, and neglect of duty and unofficer-like conduct from the 9th of April to the 16th of August, 1812. 79 General Hull objected to the jurisdiction of the court on the first charge – treason – as a matter of civil cognizance only. The court concurred in this view, and he was tried only on the other charges. After a session of eighty days, the court decided [March 26.] that he was not guilty of treason, 80 but found him guilty of the second and third charges, namely, cowardice, and neglect of duty and unofficer-like conduct. He was sentenced to be shot dead, and his name to be struck from the rolls of the army. 81 The court strongly recommended him to the mercy of the President, on account of his age and his revolutionary services. Mr. Madison pardoned him, and he retired to his farm, to live in comparative obscurity, under a cloud of almost universal reproach, for about twelve years. He wrote a vindication of his conduct in the campaign of 1812, in a series of letters, published in the American Statesman newspaper in Boston, 82 and on his dying bed he declared his belief that he was right, as a soldier and a man, in surrendering Detroit. He had the consolation of feeling, before his death, a growing sympathy for him in the partially disabused public mind, which prophesied of future vindication and just appreciation. 83

I have given, in this and the preceding chapter, as faithful a general history of Hull’s campaign as a careful and dispassionate study of documentary and other contemporaneous narratives, written and verbal, have enabled me to do. I have recorded what I believe to be undoubted facts. As they stand in the narrative, unattended by analysis, comparison, or argument, they present General Hull in his conduct of the campaign in some instances in an unfavorable light: not as a traitor – not as an actual coward, but as bearing to the superficial reader the semblance of both. But, after weighing and estimating the value of these facts in connection with current circumstances to which they bore positive relationship – after observing the composition of the court-martial, the peculiar relations of the court and the witnesses to the accused, and the testimony in detail, the writer is constrained to believe that General Hull was actuated throughout the campaign by the purest impulses of patriotism and humanity. That he was weak, we may allow; that he was wicked, we can not believe. His weakness, evinced at times by vacillation, was not the child of cowardice, but of excessive prudence and caution, born of the noblest sentiments of the human heart. These, in his case, were doubtless enhanced by the disabilities of waning physical vigor. 84 He was thus far down the western slope of life, when men counsel more than act. The perils and fatigues of the journey from Dayton to Detroit had affected him, and the anxieties arising from his responsibilities bore heavily upon his judgment. These difficulties his young, vigorous, ambitious, daring officers could not understand; and while they were cursing him, they should have been kindly cherishing him. When he could perceive no alternative but surrender or destruction, he bravely determined to choose the most courageous and humane course; so he faced the taunts of his soldiers, and the expected scorn of his countrymen, rather than fill the beautiful land of the Ohio, and the settlements of Michigan, with mourning.

Hull had warned the government of the folly of attempting the conquest of Canada without better preparation. But the young hot-bloods of the administration – Clay, and others – could not wait; and the President and his Cabinet, lacking all the essential knowledge for planning a campaign, had sent him on an errand of vast importance and difficulty without seeming to comprehend its vastness, or estimating the means necessary for its accomplishment. The conception of the campaign was a huge blunder, and Hull saw it; and the failure to put in vigorous motion for his support auxiliary and co-operative forces, was criminal neglect. When the result was found to be failure and humiliation, the administration perceived this, and sought a refuge. Public indignation must be appeased – the lightning of the public wrath must be averted. General Hull was made the chosen victim for the peace-offering – the sin-bearing scape-goat; and on his head the fiery thunderbolts were hurled. The grass has grown greenly upon his grave for more than forty years. Let his faults (for, like all men, he was not immaculate) also be covered with the verdure of blind Charity. 85 Two generations have passed away since the dark cloud first brooded over his fair fame. We may all see, if we will, with eyes unfilmed by prejudice, the silver edging which tells of the brightness of good intentions behind it, and prophesies of evanishment and a clear sky. Let History be just, in spite of the clamors of hoary Error.